[bitnami/kubescape] Release 4.0.9-debian-12-r0 (#94061)

Signed-off-by: Bitnami Bot <bitnami.bot@broadcom.com>

bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/Dockerfile

@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ ARG DOWNLOADS_URL="downloads.bitnami.com/files/stacksmith"
 ARG TARGETARCH
 
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.base.name="docker.io/bitnami/minideb:bookworm" \
-      org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-23T10:36:20Z" \
+      org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-29T08:35:07Z" \
       org.opencontainers.image.description="Application packaged by Broadcom, Inc." \
       org.opencontainers.image.documentation="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/kubescape/README.md" \
       org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/kubescape" \
       org.opencontainers.image.title="kubescape" \
       org.opencontainers.image.vendor="Broadcom, Inc." \
-      org.opencontainers.image.version="4.0.8"
+      org.opencontainers.image.version="4.0.9"
 
 ENV HOME="/opt/bitnami/kubescape" \
     OS_ARCH="${TARGETARCH:-amd64}" \
@@ -29,17 +29,17 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=downloads_url,env=SECRET_DOWNLOADS_URL \
     DOWNLOADS_URL=${SECRET_DOWNLOADS_URL:-${DOWNLOADS_URL}} ; \
     mkdir -p /tmp/bitnami/pkg/cache/ ; cd /tmp/bitnami/pkg/cache/ || exit 1 ; \
     COMPONENTS=( \
-      "kubescape-4.0.8-0-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \
+      "kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \
     ) ; \
     for COMPONENT in "${COMPONENTS[@]}"; do \
       if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" ]; then \
         curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -O ; \
-        curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" -O ; \
       fi ; \
-      sha256sum -c "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
+      sha256sum -c "/opt/bitnami/checksums/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
       tar -zxf "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -C /opt/bitnami --strip-components=2 --no-same-owner ; \
-      rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz{,.sha256} ; \
-    done
+      rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz ; \
+    done ; \
+    rm -rf /opt/bitnami/checksums ;
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && \
     apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists /var/cache/apt/archives
 RUN chmod g+rwX /opt/bitnami
@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ RUN find / -perm /6000 -type f -exec chmod a-s {} \; || true
 
 COPY rootfs /
 RUN /opt/bitnami/scripts/kubescape/postunpack.sh
-ENV APP_VERSION="4.0.8" \
+ENV APP_VERSION="4.0.9" \
     BITNAMI_APP_NAME="kubescape" \
-    IMAGE_REVISION="4"
+    IMAGE_REVISION="0"
 
 USER 1001
 ENTRYPOINT [ "/opt/bitnami/scripts/kubescape/entrypoint.sh" ]

bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+6484048e03120cf94447224301b6c0f482054829d02bb5def43a1c425cc7994a  kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz

bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+4a81b80b809f26e357d99c3e4235910e56b9e4b32a9d9edd2f1ba49fc032275e  kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz

bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfile.sh

@@ -139,3 +139,40 @@ wait_for_log_entry() {
         return 1
     fi
 }
+
+########################
+# Creates a secure temporary file containing the provided secret
+# Arguments:
+#   $1 - secret to write to the temporary file
+# Returns:
+#   String
+#########################
+credential_to_temp_file() {
+    local secret="$1"
+    local tmp_file
+
+    # Use mktemp with a specific prefix for easier debugging if something lingers
+    if ! tmp_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/at.cred.XXXXXXXX"); then
+        echo "Error: Failed to create temp file" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    # Restrict permissions before writing the secret
+    chmod 0600 "$tmp_file"
+    # Write secret and ensure it's flushed to disk
+    printf "%s" "$secret" > "$tmp_file"
+    # Output the filename so the caller can capture it
+    echo "$tmp_file"
+}
+
+########################
+# Cleans up temporary files created by credential_to_temp_file
+# Arguments:
+#   None
+# Returns:
+#   None
+#########################
+cleanup_credentials() {
+    debug "Cleaning up temporary files containing credentials"
+    rm -rf "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"/at.cred.*
+}

bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfs.sh

@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ relativize() {
 #   -d|--dir-mode - mode for files.
 #   -u|--user - user
 #   -g|--group - group
+#   -n|--no-dereference - do not follow symlinks (use for runtime root chown of daemon-writable dirs)
 # Returns:
 #   None
 #########################
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
     local file_mode=""
     local user=""
     local group=""
+    local follow_symlinks="yes"
 
     # Validate arguments
     shift 1
@@ -161,6 +163,9 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
             shift
             group="${1:?missing group}"
             ;;
+        -n | --no-dereference)
+            follow_symlinks="no"
+            ;;
         *)
             echo "Invalid command line flag $1" >&2
             return 1
@@ -169,22 +174,29 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
         shift
     done
 
+    # -L: follow symlinks and emits the target path
+    # This is dangerous at runtime, given a co-located lower-privileged process with write access
+    # to the target path can redirect the chown/chmod to arbitrary paths. Example:
+    # Lower-privileged process run: ln -s /etc /tmp/etc
+    # Then, setup.sh runs: configure_permissions_ownership --dir-mode 775 /tmp
+    local find_L_flag=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "yes" ]] && find_L_flag=("-L")
+    # -h: changes symlink inode ownership without touching the target.
+    local chown_flags=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "no" ]] && chown_flags=("-h")
     read -r -a filepaths <<<"$paths"
     for p in "${filepaths[@]}"; do
         if [[ -e "$p" ]]; then
-            find -L "$p" -printf ""
             if [[ -n $dir_mode ]]; then
-                find -L "$p" -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
+                find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
             fi
             if [[ -n $file_mode ]]; then
-                find -L "$p" -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
+                find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
             fi
             if [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
-                find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}:${group}"
+                find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}:${group}"
             elif [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -z $group ]]; then
-                find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}"
+                find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}"
             elif [[ -z $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
-                find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${group}"
+                find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${chown_flags[@]}" "${group}"
             fi
         else
             stderr_print "$p does not exist"