diff --git a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/Dockerfile b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/Dockerfile index 8c346038c61b..61a7979b5cb8 100644 --- a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/Dockerfile +++ b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/Dockerfile @@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ ARG DOWNLOADS_URL="downloads.bitnami.com/files/stacksmith" ARG TARGETARCH LABEL org.opencontainers.image.base.name="docker.io/bitnami/minideb:bookworm" \ - org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-23T10:36:20Z" \ + org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-29T08:35:07Z" \ org.opencontainers.image.description="Application packaged by Broadcom, Inc." \ org.opencontainers.image.documentation="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/kubescape/README.md" \ org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/kubescape" \ org.opencontainers.image.title="kubescape" \ org.opencontainers.image.vendor="Broadcom, Inc." \ - org.opencontainers.image.version="4.0.8" + org.opencontainers.image.version="4.0.9" ENV HOME="/opt/bitnami/kubescape" \ OS_ARCH="${TARGETARCH:-amd64}" \ @@ -29,17 +29,17 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=downloads_url,env=SECRET_DOWNLOADS_URL \ DOWNLOADS_URL=${SECRET_DOWNLOADS_URL:-${DOWNLOADS_URL}} ; \ mkdir -p /tmp/bitnami/pkg/cache/ ; cd /tmp/bitnami/pkg/cache/ || exit 1 ; \ COMPONENTS=( \ - "kubescape-4.0.8-0-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \ + "kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \ ) ; \ for COMPONENT in "${COMPONENTS[@]}"; do \ if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" ]; then \ curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -O ; \ - curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" -O ; \ fi ; \ - sha256sum -c "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \ + sha256sum -c "/opt/bitnami/checksums/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \ tar -zxf "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -C /opt/bitnami --strip-components=2 --no-same-owner ; \ - rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz{,.sha256} ; \ - done + rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz ; \ + done ; \ + rm -rf /opt/bitnami/checksums ; RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && \ apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists /var/cache/apt/archives RUN chmod g+rwX /opt/bitnami @@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ RUN find / -perm /6000 -type f -exec chmod a-s {} \; || true COPY rootfs / RUN /opt/bitnami/scripts/kubescape/postunpack.sh -ENV APP_VERSION="4.0.8" \ +ENV APP_VERSION="4.0.9" \ BITNAMI_APP_NAME="kubescape" \ - IMAGE_REVISION="4" + IMAGE_REVISION="0" USER 1001 ENTRYPOINT [ "/opt/bitnami/scripts/kubescape/entrypoint.sh" ] diff --git a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256 b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f7d4d48111cc --- /dev/null +++ b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +6484048e03120cf94447224301b6c0f482054829d02bb5def43a1c425cc7994a kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz diff --git a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256 b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8437bc07a258 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/checksums/kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz.sha256 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +4a81b80b809f26e357d99c3e4235910e56b9e4b32a9d9edd2f1ba49fc032275e kubescape-4.0.9-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz diff --git a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfile.sh b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfile.sh index 1c69e0e48a5d..335c1c7c9ef7 100644 --- a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfile.sh +++ b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfile.sh @@ -139,3 +139,40 @@ wait_for_log_entry() { return 1 fi } + +######################## +# Creates a secure temporary file containing the provided secret +# Arguments: +# $1 - secret to write to the temporary file +# Returns: +# String +######################### +credential_to_temp_file() { + local secret="$1" + local tmp_file + + # Use mktemp with a specific prefix for easier debugging if something lingers + if ! tmp_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/at.cred.XXXXXXXX"); then + echo "Error: Failed to create temp file" >&2 + return 1 + fi + + # Restrict permissions before writing the secret + chmod 0600 "$tmp_file" + # Write secret and ensure it's flushed to disk + printf "%s" "$secret" > "$tmp_file" + # Output the filename so the caller can capture it + echo "$tmp_file" +} + +######################## +# Cleans up temporary files created by credential_to_temp_file +# Arguments: +# None +# Returns: +# None +######################### +cleanup_credentials() { + debug "Cleaning up temporary files containing credentials" + rm -rf "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"/at.cred.* +} diff --git a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfs.sh b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfs.sh index 1337f6c2dd59..b16efabd3230 100644 --- a/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfs.sh +++ b/bitnami/kubescape/4/debian-12/prebuildfs/opt/bitnami/scripts/libfs.sh @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ relativize() { # -d|--dir-mode - mode for files. # -u|--user - user # -g|--group - group +# -n|--no-dereference - do not follow symlinks (use for runtime root chown of daemon-writable dirs) # Returns: # None ######################### @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() { local file_mode="" local user="" local group="" + local follow_symlinks="yes" # Validate arguments shift 1 @@ -161,6 +163,9 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() { shift group="${1:?missing group}" ;; + -n | --no-dereference) + follow_symlinks="no" + ;; *) echo "Invalid command line flag $1" >&2 return 1 @@ -169,22 +174,29 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() { shift done + # -L: follow symlinks and emits the target path + # This is dangerous at runtime, given a co-located lower-privileged process with write access + # to the target path can redirect the chown/chmod to arbitrary paths. Example: + # Lower-privileged process run: ln -s /etc /tmp/etc + # Then, setup.sh runs: configure_permissions_ownership --dir-mode 775 /tmp + local find_L_flag=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "yes" ]] && find_L_flag=("-L") + # -h: changes symlink inode ownership without touching the target. + local chown_flags=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "no" ]] && chown_flags=("-h") read -r -a filepaths <<<"$paths" for p in "${filepaths[@]}"; do if [[ -e "$p" ]]; then - find -L "$p" -printf "" if [[ -n $dir_mode ]]; then - find -L "$p" -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode" + find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode" fi if [[ -n $file_mode ]]; then - find -L "$p" -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode" + find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode" fi if [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then - find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}:${group}" + find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}:${group}" elif [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -z $group ]]; then - find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}" + find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}" elif [[ -z $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then - find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${group}" + find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${chown_flags[@]}" "${group}" fi else stderr_print "$p does not exist"