Native (non-Docker) installs launched uvicorn without --loop asyncio, so
uvicorn[standard] auto-selected uvloop. uvloop's SSL layer drops
already-received but still-buffered data when the client closes the data
connection without a TLS close_notify while the reader is flow-control
paused on slow storage. cmd_STOR writes each chunk to disk inside the read
loop, so a slow consumer falls behind, the tail is lost, read() returns a
clean EOF, and the loop exits with no exception -- the server acked 226 for
a file it truncated itself, then archived, queued, and forwarded the corrupt
3MF to the real printer.
Fix in two independent layers:
1. Remove the trigger: add --loop asyncio to every native launch path,
matching the Dockerfile -- deploy/bambuddy.service, install/install.sh
(systemd + launchd), spoolbuddy/install/install.sh, the Windows NSSM
service, README, CONTRIBUTING dev command.
2. Defense in depth (loop-independent): cmd_STOR now validates that a
received .3mf opens as a ZIP (reads the central directory, no
decompression) before replying 226. A truncated/corrupt file is dropped
and answered with 426, and on_file_received never runs -- so a broken
upload surfaces as an immediate slicer-side send error instead of being
archived and pushed to the printer. Scoped to .3mf; other filetypes pass
through unchanged.
The 50000-51000 docker-compose port range spawned ~2000 docker-proxy
host processes (~3.5 GB RSS) under Docker's default userland-proxy.
The 1001-port pool was symptom treatment — collisions only matter for
multi-VP-on-shared-bind, but the cost was paid by every install.
Each VP now gets a non-overlapping 10-port slice computed from its id
(VP 1 -> 50000-50009, VP 2 -> 50010-50019, ...). Class constants are
gone; VirtualPrinterFTPServer takes passive_port_min/max instance args.
Wraps modulo PASSIVE_MAX_SLOTS = 100, with the existing 10-attempt
random retry as same-slot collision fallback.
Compose default narrowed to 50000-50029 (3 VPs). Proxy-mode VPs forward
the real printer's full range and stay on the separate TCPProxy
constants. Compose comment rewritten to acknowledge Linux multi-service
hosts as a primary bridge-mode audience and drop an over-stated
"confirmed by reporter" claim about userland-proxy=false.
The #620 patch fixed the OpenSSL-3.x-strips-plain-RSA-AES-GCM cipher
mismatch on the printer-facing TLSProxy client context. The same fix
was never applied to the four other slicer-facing TLS contexts. On
hardened distros (Fedora / RHEL with update-crypto-policies, hardened
Alpine builds) where the system narrows DEFAULT to forward-secrecy
only, the slicer's ClientHello finds no overlap with what Bambuddy
offers and the handshake aborts with the slicer reporting code=-1
before any application data flows. The reporter pinpointed the missing
set_ciphers call in bind_server.py against the #620 lineage; the
audit-wide sweep here extends the same fix to mqtt_server.py,
tcp_proxy._create_server_ssl_context (the missing other half of #620),
and ftp_server.py.
For the three new contexts (bind / mqtt / proxy-server) the cipher
string is DEFAULT:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-GCM-SHA256 — verbatim match
with the #620 client-side fix. For FTPS the original HIGH baseline is
kept (HIGH:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-GCM-SHA256:!aNULL:!MD5:!RC4) so the
cipher set stays a strict superset of what shipped before — HIGH
offers ~58 suites DEFAULT doesn't (CCM / ARIA / CAMELLIA / DSS) that
no Bambu slicer is known to pick, but narrowing a compat surface
without proof would violate the existing don't-remove-compat-pinning
rule. TLS version pins (TLSv1_2 minimum across all four, TLSv1_2 max
on FTPS for the BambuStudio PSK-reuse compat) and verify-mode settings
are unchanged — only the cipher list is widened.
Two attacker-controlled strings were being joined to library_dir with no
resolve + containment check in the project ZIP import endpoint:
- linked_folders[*].name from the request's project.json
- per-entry zf.namelist() paths from the ZIP itself
An absolute path in either field collapsed the join (Path("/lib") / "/etc"
becomes Path("/etc") because pathlib discards the left side when the right
is absolute) and the next write_bytes landed wherever the attacker chose.
Adjacent finding from the routes audit: GET /archives/{id}/photos/{filename}
had NO validation on filename and FileResponse-served arbitrary paths -
the DELETE counterpart at least gated on the photos membership check.
Adjacent finding from the services audit: ArchiveService.attach_timelapse
wrote archive_dir / filename where filename ultimately came from a printer's
FTP listing (compromised-printer threat model) or the /timelapse/select
query param. A malicious printer that exposes a directory entry with ..
segments could write the timelapse outside the archive directory.
New backend/app/utils/safe_path.py::safe_join_under(parent, *parts) is the
single source of truth: rejects empty / null-byte / absolute parts up-front,
joins under parent, resolves both sides, asserts is_relative_to. Returns the
resolved canonical path on success, raises HTTPException(400) on escape, or
PathTraversalError when http=False (for service-layer callers that need to
match a non-HTTP return contract).
Wired into the import vectors, both archive photo handlers, and the
attach_timelapse service. The full audit sweep inspected every Path/Name
join in backend/app/api/routes/ AND backend/app/services/ - 25 route-layer
sites + 8 service-layer sites confirmed safe and tagged with
# SEC-PATH-OK: <reason> so future audits trust the inline guard at a glance.
Fifth CI backstop test_route_path_arithmetic_is_safe_joined_or_marked
AST-walks both layers and fails the build on any <dir-like>/<bare variable>
join that doesn't either route through safe_join_under or carry the marker.
The services layer is in scope because it receives values verbatim from the
routes AND from external sources Bambuddy has no control over (the printer
FTP-listing case above).
SECURITY.md gets a fifth rule + a fifth row in the CI test mapping table;
the rule now names the printer FTP-listing case explicitly so future
services-layer audits set the right expectation.
--------------
fix(library): suppress warning storm when bulk-uploading ZIPs of empty/stub STL files
Uploading a ZIP of stub or empty STL files (e.g. the 24-byte
"solid test\nendsolid test" shape) produced one WARNING per file in
stl_thumbnail.py::generate_stl_thumbnail. The warnings were technically
correct - trimesh returns a valid Mesh with zero vertices, the safeguard
matches, and the function returns None so the library entry is still
created without a thumbnail - but the volume turned a successful upload
into thousands of WARNING lines in the journal.
Two changes:
1. The per-file "Failed to load STL or empty mesh" message in
stl_thumbnail.py is now logger.debug instead of logger.warning. It's
a per-file content observation, not an actionable error; the caller
already handles None correctly. The branch now catches the rare
"large enough but trimesh still can't parse it" case, visible in
debug logs without spamming production.
2. New module constant MIN_USABLE_STL_BYTES = 200 (smallest binary STL
with one triangle is 134B, smallest ASCII ~150B; 200 is a safe floor
below any real STL). The three thumbnail call sites in library.py
(extract_zip_file, single-file upload, _backfill_external_stl_thumbnails)
pre-skip files below this size before calling generate_stl_thumbnail.
Stubs never enter the trimesh pipeline at all.
Behavior is unchanged for real STLs: any file >=200 bytes runs through
the existing pipeline, MAX_VERTICES still triggers simplification at
100k vertices for the 256x256 thumbnail render, large files still get
thumbnails.
------------
fix(stl-thumbnail): silence matplotlib first-import noise (writable cache + font_manager log level)
On first STL upload, three matplotlib-internal log lines surfaced:
WARNING [matplotlib] /opt/claude/.config/matplotlib is not a writable directory
INFO [matplotlib.font_manager] Failed to extract font properties from NotoColorEmoji.ttf
INFO [matplotlib.font_manager] generated new fontManager
The writable-dir warning fired because Bambuddy's $HOME isn't writable for
matplotlib's default config path; matplotlib fell back to /tmp/matplotlib-XXX
which lost the font cache on every host reboot, so font_manager rebuilt it
each cold start - producing another batch of INFO lines.
Fix is two small additions in stl_thumbnail.py before the matplotlib import:
1. New _configure_matplotlib_cache() sets MPLCONFIGDIR to
settings.base_dir/.cache/matplotlib (mkdir if missing) so the cache
persists across container restarts and the writable-dir warning never
fires. Respects an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR so operators who chose
their own path aren't overridden. Best-effort with a debug fallback if
settings can't be imported or the mkdir fails.
2. logging.getLogger("matplotlib.font_manager").setLevel(WARNING) at module
import demotes the per-font INFO scan that fires when font_manager
builds its cache cold. Real font warnings (>= WARNING) still surface.
3 new tests: font_manager logger at WARNING after module import;
_configure_matplotlib_cache creates the directory under base_dir and sets
MPLCONFIGDIR; an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR is preserved verbatim.
5516 backend tests green, frontend gates clean.
When running multiple virtual printers with different access codes on
separate bind IPs, FTP connections were always routed to the wrong VP.
Root cause: the iptables REDIRECT rule (990→9990) rewrites the
destination IP to the incoming interface's primary address. With Linux's
weak host model (arp_filter=0), packets for secondary IPs arrive on the
primary interface, and REDIRECT sends them all to the first VP's FTP
server. MQTT was unaffected because port 8883 had no redirect.
Fix: FTP server now binds directly to port 990 (standard implicit FTPS),
eliminating the iptables redirect entirely. Requires CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
(already set in the systemd service file and Docker image).
Also removed a global asyncio set_exception_handler() in the MQTT server
that was overwritten by each VP instance, causing spurious "Unhandled
exception in client_connected_cb" errors on startup.
Changes:
- FTP_PORT: 9990 → 990 (ftp_server.py)
- Removed set_exception_handler() from MQTT server
- Updated Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml port mappings
- Deprecated --redirect-990 in install script
- Updated wiki: removed iptables instructions for all platforms
- Added migration guide (docs/migration-vp-ftp-port.md)
- Added unit tests for port constant and no-global-state invariant
FTP PASS commands were logged with the plaintext password visible in
log files. Since support packages include logs and are shared publicly
on GitHub issues, this exposed user access codes. Now redacted as
PASS ********.
This might fix (#58) getting uploads from the linux version of the
BambuStudio network plugin. Issue observer is connection resets with
larger uploads (somewhere >80k).
Large 3MF uploads intermittently failed with [Errno 104] Connection
reset by peer while the 16-byte verify_job always succeeded. The
_handle_data_connection callback returned immediately, letting the
asyncio task complete while cmd_STOR was still reading from the data
connection. The passive port listener also stayed open during transfers.
- Keep _handle_data_connection alive via _transfer_done event so the
asyncio task holds strong references throughout the transfer
- Close passive port listener after accepting the data connection
- Reject duplicate data connections with a warning log
- Add drain timeout (5s) to MQTT status pushes to prevent blocking
when the slicer is busy with FTP upload
- Improve error logging with bytes received and exception type
Enable Bambu Studio on a remote network to print through BamBuddy
acting as a TLS-terminating proxy for both MQTT and FTP connections.
- Add TLSProxy base class and FTPTLSProxy with PASV response rewriting,
EPSV→PASV translation, PROT P/C tracking, and one-shot data proxies
- Add SlicerProxyManager to coordinate per-slicer MQTT + FTP proxy pairs
- Support additional SAN IPs in certificate generation for proxy mode
- Broadcast SSDP on LAN B so slicers discover the proxy as a printer
- Narrow FTP passive port range to 50000-50100 with retry logic
- Expose proxy ports (8883, 9990, 50000-50100) in Dockerfile
- Document passive port range in docker-compose.yml
- Correct SSDP model codes: C11=P1P, C12=P1S, N7=P2S, C13=X1E
- Fix serial prefixes based on actual Bambu serial format
- Add confirmation modal for pending upload discard
- Sort model dropdown alphabetically, remove internal codes
- Add "Setup Required" warning with link to wiki documentation
- Update wiki with certificate installation and platform setup guides
- Virtual printer appears in Bambu Studio/Orca Slicer via SSDP discovery
- Secure TLS/MQTT communication with auto-generated certificates
- Queue mode (pending uploads) or auto-start mode
- Configurable access code for authentication
- Docker support with network_mode: host and certificate persistence
- Fix backup/restore for virtual printer settings (auto-save no longer overwrites)
maziggy