Files
bambuddy/backend/app/services/virtual_printer/ftp_server.py
T
maziggy 396e9aa09e security: harden path-traversal class across routes + services; fifth CI backstop
Two attacker-controlled strings were being joined to library_dir with no
  resolve + containment check in the project ZIP import endpoint:

    - linked_folders[*].name from the request's project.json
    - per-entry zf.namelist() paths from the ZIP itself

  An absolute path in either field collapsed the join (Path("/lib") / "/etc"
  becomes Path("/etc") because pathlib discards the left side when the right
  is absolute) and the next write_bytes landed wherever the attacker chose.

  Adjacent finding from the routes audit: GET /archives/{id}/photos/{filename}
  had NO validation on filename and FileResponse-served arbitrary paths -
  the DELETE counterpart at least gated on the photos membership check.

  Adjacent finding from the services audit: ArchiveService.attach_timelapse
  wrote archive_dir / filename where filename ultimately came from a printer's
  FTP listing (compromised-printer threat model) or the /timelapse/select
  query param. A malicious printer that exposes a directory entry with ..
  segments could write the timelapse outside the archive directory.

  New backend/app/utils/safe_path.py::safe_join_under(parent, *parts) is the
  single source of truth: rejects empty / null-byte / absolute parts up-front,
  joins under parent, resolves both sides, asserts is_relative_to. Returns the
  resolved canonical path on success, raises HTTPException(400) on escape, or
  PathTraversalError when http=False (for service-layer callers that need to
  match a non-HTTP return contract).

  Wired into the import vectors, both archive photo handlers, and the
  attach_timelapse service. The full audit sweep inspected every Path/Name
  join in backend/app/api/routes/ AND backend/app/services/ - 25 route-layer
  sites + 8 service-layer sites confirmed safe and tagged with
  # SEC-PATH-OK: <reason> so future audits trust the inline guard at a glance.

  Fifth CI backstop test_route_path_arithmetic_is_safe_joined_or_marked
  AST-walks both layers and fails the build on any <dir-like>/<bare variable>
  join that doesn't either route through safe_join_under or carry the marker.
  The services layer is in scope because it receives values verbatim from the
  routes AND from external sources Bambuddy has no control over (the printer
  FTP-listing case above).

  SECURITY.md gets a fifth rule + a fifth row in the CI test mapping table;
  the rule now names the printer FTP-listing case explicitly so future
  services-layer audits set the right expectation.

--------------

  fix(library): suppress warning storm when bulk-uploading ZIPs of empty/stub STL files

  Uploading a ZIP of stub or empty STL files (e.g. the 24-byte
  "solid test\nendsolid test" shape) produced one WARNING per file in
  stl_thumbnail.py::generate_stl_thumbnail. The warnings were technically
  correct - trimesh returns a valid Mesh with zero vertices, the safeguard
  matches, and the function returns None so the library entry is still
  created without a thumbnail - but the volume turned a successful upload
  into thousands of WARNING lines in the journal.

  Two changes:

  1. The per-file "Failed to load STL or empty mesh" message in
     stl_thumbnail.py is now logger.debug instead of logger.warning. It's
     a per-file content observation, not an actionable error; the caller
     already handles None correctly. The branch now catches the rare
     "large enough but trimesh still can't parse it" case, visible in
     debug logs without spamming production.

  2. New module constant MIN_USABLE_STL_BYTES = 200 (smallest binary STL
     with one triangle is 134B, smallest ASCII ~150B; 200 is a safe floor
     below any real STL). The three thumbnail call sites in library.py
     (extract_zip_file, single-file upload, _backfill_external_stl_thumbnails)
     pre-skip files below this size before calling generate_stl_thumbnail.
     Stubs never enter the trimesh pipeline at all.

  Behavior is unchanged for real STLs: any file >=200 bytes runs through
  the existing pipeline, MAX_VERTICES still triggers simplification at
  100k vertices for the 256x256 thumbnail render, large files still get
  thumbnails.

------------

  fix(stl-thumbnail): silence matplotlib first-import noise (writable cache + font_manager log level)

  On first STL upload, three matplotlib-internal log lines surfaced:

    WARNING [matplotlib] /opt/claude/.config/matplotlib is not a writable directory
    INFO    [matplotlib.font_manager] Failed to extract font properties from NotoColorEmoji.ttf
    INFO    [matplotlib.font_manager] generated new fontManager

  The writable-dir warning fired because Bambuddy's $HOME isn't writable for
  matplotlib's default config path; matplotlib fell back to /tmp/matplotlib-XXX
  which lost the font cache on every host reboot, so font_manager rebuilt it
  each cold start - producing another batch of INFO lines.

  Fix is two small additions in stl_thumbnail.py before the matplotlib import:

  1. New _configure_matplotlib_cache() sets MPLCONFIGDIR to
     settings.base_dir/.cache/matplotlib (mkdir if missing) so the cache
     persists across container restarts and the writable-dir warning never
     fires. Respects an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR so operators who chose
     their own path aren't overridden. Best-effort with a debug fallback if
     settings can't be imported or the mkdir fails.

  2. logging.getLogger("matplotlib.font_manager").setLevel(WARNING) at module
     import demotes the per-font INFO scan that fires when font_manager
     builds its cache cold. Real font warnings (>= WARNING) still surface.

  3 new tests: font_manager logger at WARNING after module import;
  _configure_matplotlib_cache creates the directory under base_dir and sets
  MPLCONFIGDIR; an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR is preserved verbatim.
  5516 backend tests green, frontend gates clean.
2026-06-02 12:12:54 +02:00

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"""Implicit FTPS server for receiving 3MF uploads from slicers.
Implements an implicit FTPS server (TLS from byte 0) that accepts file uploads
from Bambu Studio and OrcaSlicer, matching the real Bambu printer behavior.
Unlike explicit FTPS (AUTH TLS), implicit FTPS wraps the connection in TLS
immediately upon connection, before any FTP commands are exchanged.
"""
import asyncio
import hmac
import logging
import os
import random
import ssl
from collections.abc import Callable
from pathlib import Path
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Default FTP port for Bambu printers (implicit FTPS).
# Must be 990 (same as real printers) to avoid iptables REDIRECT,
# which rewrites the destination IP to the incoming interface's primary
# address — breaking multi-VP setups with different bind IPs.
# Requires CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or root.
FTP_PORT = 990
# Hard cap on a single upload. 4 GiB covers the largest realistic
# multi-plate .gcode.3mf and rejects runaway / malicious clients before
# they can exhaust the disk or OOM the host. STOR still buffers the
# whole file in memory before write_bytes — peak RSS ~2x file size during
# the b''.join — so the cap also caps that peak. If real users hit it
# with a legitimate file, raise here.
MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 # 4 GiB
class FTPSession:
"""Handles a single FTP client session."""
def __init__(
self,
reader: asyncio.StreamReader,
writer: asyncio.StreamWriter,
upload_dir: Path,
access_code: str,
ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext,
on_file_received: Callable[[Path, str], None] | None,
passive_port_range: tuple[int, int] = (50000, 50100),
pasv_address: str = "",
bind_address: str = "0.0.0.0", # nosec B104
vp_name: str = "",
):
self.reader = reader
self.writer = writer
self.upload_dir = upload_dir
self.access_code = access_code
self.ssl_context = ssl_context
self.on_file_received = on_file_received
self.passive_port_range = passive_port_range
self.pasv_address = pasv_address
self.bind_address = bind_address
self.vp_name = vp_name
self._log_prefix = f"[{vp_name}] " if vp_name else ""
self.authenticated = False
self.username: str | None = None
self.current_dir = upload_dir
self.transfer_type = "A" # ASCII by default
self.data_server: asyncio.Server | None = None
self.data_port: int | None = None
# For data transfer coordination
self._data_reader: asyncio.StreamReader | None = None
self._data_writer: asyncio.StreamWriter | None = None
self._data_connected = asyncio.Event()
self._transfer_done = asyncio.Event()
peername = writer.get_extra_info("peername")
self.remote_ip = peername[0] if peername else "unknown"
async def send(self, code: int, message: str) -> None:
"""Send an FTP response."""
response = f"{code} {message}\r\n"
logger.debug("%sFTP -> %s: %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip, response.strip())
self.writer.write(response.encode("utf-8"))
await self.writer.drain()
async def handle(self) -> None:
"""Handle the FTP session."""
try:
# Send welcome banner
await self.send(220, "Bambuddy Virtual Printer FTP ready")
while True:
try:
line = await asyncio.wait_for(
self.reader.readline(),
timeout=300, # 5 minute timeout
)
except TimeoutError:
logger.debug("%sFTP session timeout from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
break
if not line:
break
try:
command_line = line.decode("utf-8").strip()
except UnicodeDecodeError:
command_line = line.decode("latin-1").strip()
if not command_line:
continue
# Never log passwords
if command_line.upper().startswith("PASS"):
logger.debug("%sFTP <- %s: PASS ********", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
else:
logger.debug("%sFTP <- %s: %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip, command_line)
# Parse command and argument
parts = command_line.split(" ", 1)
cmd = parts[0].upper()
arg = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else ""
# Dispatch command
handler = getattr(self, f"cmd_{cmd}", None)
if handler:
await handler(arg)
else:
logger.debug("%sFTP command not implemented: %s", self._log_prefix, cmd)
await self.send(502, f"Command {cmd} not implemented")
except asyncio.CancelledError:
logger.info("%sFTP session cancelled from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
except Exception as e:
logger.error("%sFTP session error from %s: %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip, e)
finally:
logger.info("%sFTP session ended from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
await self._cleanup()
async def _cleanup(self) -> None:
"""Clean up session resources."""
# Release any waiting data connection callback
self._transfer_done.set()
if self.data_server:
self.data_server.close()
try:
await self.data_server.wait_closed()
except OSError:
pass # Best-effort data server cleanup; may already be closed
self.data_server = None
try:
self.writer.close()
await self.writer.wait_closed()
except OSError:
pass # Best-effort control connection cleanup; client may have disconnected
# FTP Commands
async def cmd_USER(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle USER command."""
self.username = arg
if arg.lower() == "bblp":
await self.send(331, "Password required")
else:
await self.send(530, "Invalid user")
async def cmd_PASS(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle PASS command."""
if self.username and self.username.lower() == "bblp":
# ``hmac.compare_digest`` is constant-time — keeps the auth check
# from leaking the access code via response timing under network
# jitter. LAN-only threat is marginal; this is the standard fix.
if hmac.compare_digest(arg, self.access_code):
self.authenticated = True
await self.send(230, "Login successful")
logger.info("%sFTP login from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
else:
await self.send(530, "Login incorrect")
logger.warning("%sFTP failed login from %s (access code mismatch)", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
else:
await self.send(503, "Login with USER first")
async def cmd_SYST(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle SYST command."""
await self.send(215, "UNIX Type: L8")
async def cmd_FEAT(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle FEAT command."""
features = [
"211-Features:",
" PASV",
" EPSV",
" UTF8",
" SIZE",
"211 End",
]
for line in features[:-1]:
self.writer.write(f"{line}\r\n".encode())
await self.writer.drain()
self.writer.write(f"{features[-1]}\r\n".encode())
await self.writer.drain()
async def cmd_PWD(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle PWD command."""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
await self.send(257, '"/" is current directory')
async def cmd_CWD(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle CWD command."""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
# Accept any directory change (we use a flat structure)
await self.send(250, "Directory changed")
async def cmd_TYPE(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle TYPE command."""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
if arg.upper() in ("A", "I"):
self.transfer_type = arg.upper()
type_name = "ASCII" if arg.upper() == "A" else "Binary"
await self.send(200, f"Type set to {type_name}")
else:
await self.send(504, "Type not supported")
async def _bind_passive_port(self) -> bool:
"""Try to bind a passive data port with retries.
Returns True if a port was successfully bound, False otherwise.
Sets self.data_server and self.data_port on success.
"""
port_min, port_max = self.passive_port_range
for attempt in range(10):
port = random.randint(port_min, port_max)
try:
self.data_server = await asyncio.start_server(
self._handle_data_connection,
self.bind_address,
port,
ssl=self.ssl_context,
)
self.data_port = port
return True
except OSError:
logger.debug("FTP passive port %s in use, retrying (%s/10)", port, attempt + 1)
return False
async def cmd_EPSV(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle EPSV command - Extended Passive Mode (IPv6 compatible)."""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
# Close any existing data connection/server
await self._close_data_connection()
# Reset connection state for the new transfer
self._data_connected.clear()
self._data_reader = None
self._data_writer = None
self._transfer_done = asyncio.Event()
if await self._bind_passive_port():
# EPSV response format: 229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||port|)
await self.send(229, f"Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||{self.data_port}|)")
logger.info("FTP EPSV listening on port %s", self.data_port)
else:
logger.error("Failed to bind any passive port for EPSV")
await self.send(425, "Cannot open data connection")
async def cmd_PASV(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle PASV command - set up passive data connection."""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
# Close any existing data connection/server
await self._close_data_connection()
# Reset connection state for the new transfer
self._data_connected.clear()
self._data_reader = None
self._data_writer = None
self._transfer_done = asyncio.Event()
if await self._bind_passive_port():
# Determine the IP to advertise in PASV response
if self.pasv_address:
# Explicit override (e.g., for Docker bridge mode behind NAT)
ip = self.pasv_address
else:
# Use the local IP of the control connection
sockname = self.writer.get_extra_info("sockname")
ip = sockname[0] if sockname else "127.0.0.1"
# 0.0.0.0 is not routable — fall back to control connection IP
if ip == "0.0.0.0": # nosec B104
ip = "127.0.0.1"
# Format IP and port for PASV response
ip_parts = ip.split(".")
port_hi = self.data_port // 256
port_lo = self.data_port % 256
await self.send(
227,
f"Entering Passive Mode ({ip_parts[0]},{ip_parts[1]},{ip_parts[2]},{ip_parts[3]},{port_hi},{port_lo})",
)
logger.info("FTP PASV listening on %s:%s", ip, self.data_port)
else:
logger.error("Failed to bind any passive port for PASV")
await self.send(425, "Cannot open data connection")
async def _handle_data_connection(self, reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter) -> None:
"""Handle incoming data connection (used by PASV/EPSV).
This callback stays alive until the transfer completes to ensure the
asyncio task holds strong references to the reader/writer throughout
the data transfer. If the callback returned immediately, the task
would complete and the StreamReaderProtocol could release its strong
reader reference, potentially destabilising the connection.
"""
# Reject duplicate connections — only one data connection per transfer
if self._data_reader is not None:
logger.warning("FTP rejecting duplicate data connection from %s", self.remote_ip)
try:
writer.close()
await writer.wait_closed()
except OSError:
pass
return
# Log TLS details for debugging
ssl_obj = writer.get_extra_info("ssl_object")
if ssl_obj:
logger.info(
f"FTP data TLS from {self.remote_ip}: cipher={ssl_obj.cipher()}, "
f"version={ssl_obj.version()}, session_reused={ssl_obj.session_reused}"
)
else:
logger.warning("FTP data connection from %s has no SSL!", self.remote_ip)
logger.info("FTP data connection established from %s", self.remote_ip)
self._data_reader = reader
self._data_writer = writer
# Stop accepting further connections on the passive port
if self.data_server:
self.data_server.close()
self._data_connected.set()
# Keep this callback alive until the transfer command (STOR/RETR)
# finishes. This ensures the asyncio server-handler task holds strong
# references to reader/writer for the entire transfer lifetime.
await self._transfer_done.wait()
async def _close_data_connection(self) -> None:
"""Close the data connection and server."""
had_connection = self._data_writer is not None or self.data_server is not None
# Signal the _handle_data_connection callback to return, allowing
# its asyncio task to complete cleanly.
self._transfer_done.set()
if self._data_writer:
try:
self._data_writer.close()
await self._data_writer.wait_closed()
except OSError:
pass # Best-effort data writer cleanup; peer may have closed already
self._data_writer = None
self._data_reader = None
if self.data_server:
try:
self.data_server.close()
await self.data_server.wait_closed()
except OSError:
pass # Best-effort data server shutdown; port may already be released
self.data_server = None
# Only delay if we actually closed something
if had_connection:
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
async def cmd_STOR(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle STOR command - receive file upload.
Streams each chunk directly to disk inside the receive loop instead
of buffering the whole file in a ``list[bytes]`` and joining at the
end. Wire protocol unchanged — same 150/226/426 sequence, same
single-write target path (no ``.part`` or atomic rename), no new
verbs, no concurrency guard. The visible behaviour difference is
that the destination file grows progressively during upload rather
than appearing all-at-once on completion; slicers don't LIST during
STOR, so this isn't observable. Peak RSS for a multi-GB upload
drops from ~2× file size to one chunk (64 KiB).
``MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES`` cap kept — purely server-internal DoS guard.
"""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
if not self.data_server and not self._data_connected.is_set():
await self.send(425, "Use PASV first")
return
filename = Path(arg).name # Sanitize filename
file_path = (
self.upload_dir / filename
) # SEC-PATH-OK: filename = Path(arg).name strips every path component above
logger.info("FTP receiving file: %s from %s", filename, self.remote_ip)
await self.send(150, f"Opening data connection for {filename}")
# Wait for data connection to be established (client connects after 150)
try:
await asyncio.wait_for(self._data_connected.wait(), timeout=30)
except TimeoutError:
logger.error("FTP data connection timeout - client didn't connect")
await self.send(425, "Data connection timeout")
await self._close_data_connection()
return
if not self._data_reader:
await self.send(425, "Data connection failed")
await self._close_data_connection()
return
# Receive + stream to disk
total_received = 0
write_failed: Exception | None = None
try:
with file_path.open("wb") as f:
while True:
chunk = await asyncio.wait_for(self._data_reader.read(65536), timeout=60)
if not chunk:
break
total_received += len(chunk)
if total_received > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
raise OSError(f"upload exceeded size cap ({total_received} > {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES} bytes)")
f.write(chunk)
logger.debug("FTP received chunk: %s bytes (total: %s)", len(chunk), total_received)
except TimeoutError:
logger.error("FTP data transfer timeout after %s bytes for %s", total_received, filename)
write_failed = TimeoutError("Transfer timeout")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(
"FTP data transfer error after %s bytes for %s: %s(%s)",
total_received,
filename,
type(e).__name__,
e,
)
write_failed = e
# Close data connection
await self._close_data_connection()
if write_failed is not None:
# Drop the partial file so it doesn't masquerade as a complete
# upload — buffer-then-write never had a partial-file footprint.
try:
file_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
except OSError:
pass
await self.send(426, f"Transfer failed: {write_failed}")
return
# Confirm + notify
logger.info("FTP saved file: %s (%s bytes)", file_path, total_received)
await self.send(226, "Transfer complete")
if self.on_file_received:
try:
result = self.on_file_received(file_path, self.remote_ip)
if asyncio.iscoroutine(result):
await result
except Exception as e:
logger.error("File received callback error: %s", e)
async def cmd_SIZE(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle SIZE command."""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
# We don't store files for SIZE queries
await self.send(550, "File not found")
async def cmd_QUIT(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle QUIT command."""
await self.send(221, "Goodbye")
raise asyncio.CancelledError()
async def cmd_NOOP(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle NOOP command."""
await self.send(200, "OK")
async def cmd_OPTS(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle OPTS command."""
if arg.upper().startswith("UTF8"):
await self.send(200, "UTF8 mode enabled")
else:
await self.send(501, "Option not supported")
async def cmd_PBSZ(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle PBSZ (Protection Buffer Size) command.
Required for FTP security extensions. With TLS, buffer size is 0.
"""
await self.send(200, "PBSZ=0")
async def cmd_PROT(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle PROT (Data Channel Protection Level) command.
P = Private (encrypted), which we always use with implicit FTPS.
"""
if arg.upper() == "P":
await self.send(200, "Protection level set to Private")
elif arg.upper() == "C":
# Clear (unprotected) - we don't support this
await self.send(536, "Protection level C not supported")
else:
await self.send(504, f"Protection level {arg} not supported")
async def cmd_MKD(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle MKD (Make Directory) command."""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
# We don't really create directories, just pretend it works
await self.send(257, f'"{arg}" directory created')
async def cmd_LIST(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle LIST command - list directory contents.
Intentionally answers 150 + 226 without opening the passive data
channel. Bambuddy is an upload-only VP — no slicer in capture logs
actually issues LIST during the project_file flow, so the
no-data-conn ack is what every observed slicer accepts. A previous
audit recommended opening + closing the data conn for protocol
purity; reverted because (a) the bug was theoretical, (b) slicer
compatibility matters more than RFC purity here, and (c) adding
NLST/MLSD alongside changes the "supported verbs" surface in a way
we cannot regression-test without every supported slicer build.
"""
if not self.authenticated:
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
return
# We don't support listing, return empty
await self.send(150, "Opening data connection")
await self.send(226, "Transfer complete")
class VirtualPrinterFTPServer:
"""Implicit FTPS server that accepts uploads from slicers."""
# Passive-mode data port range. Widened from 50000-50100 (101 ports) to
# 50000-51000 (1001 ports) so concurrent transfers across multiple VPs
# — particularly when a VP falls back to bind 0.0.0.0 (manager.py picks
# this when bind_ip is unset) — don't collide. With 101 ports and 10
# random pick attempts per session, birthday-style collisions hit
# under load; 1001 ports gives multi-VP setups headroom.
PASSIVE_PORT_MIN = 50000
PASSIVE_PORT_MAX = 51000
def __init__(
self,
upload_dir: Path,
access_code: str,
cert_path: Path,
key_path: Path,
port: int = FTP_PORT,
on_file_received: Callable[[Path, str], None] | None = None,
bind_address: str = "0.0.0.0", # nosec B104
vp_name: str = "",
):
"""Initialize the FTPS server.
Args:
upload_dir: Directory to store uploaded files
access_code: Password for authentication (bblp user)
cert_path: Path to TLS certificate file
key_path: Path to TLS private key file
port: Port to listen on (default 990)
on_file_received: Callback when file upload completes (path, source_ip)
bind_address: IP address to bind to (default 0.0.0.0)
vp_name: Virtual printer name for log identification
"""
self.upload_dir = upload_dir
self.access_code = access_code
self.cert_path = cert_path
self.key_path = key_path
self.port = port
self.on_file_received = on_file_received
self.bind_address = bind_address
self.vp_name = vp_name
self._server: asyncio.Server | None = None
self._running = False
# Set after the socket is bound and the server is accepting connections,
# so VirtualPrinterInstance.start_server can wait for readiness before
# reporting is_running=True. Without this, a caller racing the start
# could probe the port and see "connection refused" while is_running
# already says yes.
self.ready = asyncio.Event()
self._ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None = None
self._active_sessions: list[asyncio.Task] = []
# Override PASV response IP for Docker bridge mode / NAT environments
self._pasv_address = os.environ.get("VIRTUAL_PRINTER_PASV_ADDRESS", "")
async def start(self) -> None:
"""Start the implicit FTPS server."""
if self._running:
return
logger.info("[%s] Starting virtual printer implicit FTPS on %s:%s", self.vp_name, self.bind_address, self.port)
# Ensure upload directory exists
self.upload_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
cache_dir = self.upload_dir / "cache"
cache_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
# Create SSL context for implicit FTPS (TLS from byte 0).
# Pinned to TLS 1.2 only. Allowing 1.3 broke BambuStudio mid-upload
# in the field (session_reused=True on data channel via PSK + libcurl
# CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE / RST after ~80 KiB; "server did not report OK,
# got 426"). Real Bambu printers also serve their FTPS at 1.2 only,
# and the slicer expects to match that. A future slicer drop of 1.2
# is a problem to solve when it actually happens; until then 1.2 is
# mandatory for compat.
self._ssl_context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
self._ssl_context.load_cert_chain(str(self.cert_path), str(self.key_path))
self._ssl_context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
self._ssl_context.maximum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
# Use standard TLS settings for compatibility
self._ssl_context.set_ciphers("HIGH:!aNULL:!MD5:!RC4")
logger.info("FTP SSL context created with standard settings")
try:
# Create server with SSL - TLS handshake happens before any FTP data
self._server = await asyncio.start_server(
self._handle_client,
self.bind_address,
self.port,
ssl=self._ssl_context, # This makes it implicit FTPS!
)
self._running = True
self.ready.set()
logger.info("Implicit FTPS server started on port %s", self.port)
logger.info(
"FTP passive data port range: %s-%s",
self.PASSIVE_PORT_MIN,
self.PASSIVE_PORT_MAX,
)
if self._pasv_address:
logger.info("FTP PASV address override: %s", self._pasv_address)
async with self._server:
await self._server.serve_forever()
except OSError as e:
if e.errno == 98: # Address already in use
logger.error("FTP port %s is already in use", self.port)
else:
logger.error("FTP server error: %s", e)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
logger.debug("FTP server task cancelled")
except Exception as e:
logger.error("FTP server error: %s", e)
finally:
await self.stop()
async def _handle_client(self, reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter) -> None:
"""Handle a new FTP client connection."""
peername = writer.get_extra_info("peername")
log_prefix = f"[{self.vp_name}] " if self.vp_name else ""
logger.info("%sFTP connection from %s", log_prefix, peername)
session = FTPSession(
reader=reader,
writer=writer,
upload_dir=self.upload_dir,
access_code=self.access_code,
ssl_context=self._ssl_context,
on_file_received=self.on_file_received,
passive_port_range=(self.PASSIVE_PORT_MIN, self.PASSIVE_PORT_MAX),
pasv_address=self._pasv_address,
bind_address=self.bind_address,
vp_name=self.vp_name,
)
# Track the session task so we can cancel it on stop
task = asyncio.current_task()
if task:
self._active_sessions.append(task)
try:
await session.handle()
finally:
if task and task in self._active_sessions:
self._active_sessions.remove(task)
async def stop(self) -> None:
"""Stop the FTPS server."""
logger.info("Stopping FTP server")
self._running = False
self.ready.clear()
# Cancel all active sessions and AWAIT cancellation. Previously
# this slept 0.1 s and called it good — a session mid-write,
# mid-TLS handshake, or holding a 60 s data-read could easily
# outlive that and then ``_server.close()`` would run while the
# underlying sockets were still in use.
for task in self._active_sessions[:]:
task.cancel()
if self._active_sessions:
await asyncio.gather(*self._active_sessions, return_exceptions=True)
self._active_sessions.clear()
if self._server:
try:
self._server.close()
await self._server.wait_closed()
except OSError as e:
logger.debug("Error closing FTP server: %s", e)
self._server = None