mirror of
https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy.git
synced 2026-09-30 03:01:21 +02:00
Two attacker-controlled strings were being joined to library_dir with no
resolve + containment check in the project ZIP import endpoint:
- linked_folders[*].name from the request's project.json
- per-entry zf.namelist() paths from the ZIP itself
An absolute path in either field collapsed the join (Path("/lib") / "/etc"
becomes Path("/etc") because pathlib discards the left side when the right
is absolute) and the next write_bytes landed wherever the attacker chose.
Adjacent finding from the routes audit: GET /archives/{id}/photos/{filename}
had NO validation on filename and FileResponse-served arbitrary paths -
the DELETE counterpart at least gated on the photos membership check.
Adjacent finding from the services audit: ArchiveService.attach_timelapse
wrote archive_dir / filename where filename ultimately came from a printer's
FTP listing (compromised-printer threat model) or the /timelapse/select
query param. A malicious printer that exposes a directory entry with ..
segments could write the timelapse outside the archive directory.
New backend/app/utils/safe_path.py::safe_join_under(parent, *parts) is the
single source of truth: rejects empty / null-byte / absolute parts up-front,
joins under parent, resolves both sides, asserts is_relative_to. Returns the
resolved canonical path on success, raises HTTPException(400) on escape, or
PathTraversalError when http=False (for service-layer callers that need to
match a non-HTTP return contract).
Wired into the import vectors, both archive photo handlers, and the
attach_timelapse service. The full audit sweep inspected every Path/Name
join in backend/app/api/routes/ AND backend/app/services/ - 25 route-layer
sites + 8 service-layer sites confirmed safe and tagged with
# SEC-PATH-OK: <reason> so future audits trust the inline guard at a glance.
Fifth CI backstop test_route_path_arithmetic_is_safe_joined_or_marked
AST-walks both layers and fails the build on any <dir-like>/<bare variable>
join that doesn't either route through safe_join_under or carry the marker.
The services layer is in scope because it receives values verbatim from the
routes AND from external sources Bambuddy has no control over (the printer
FTP-listing case above).
SECURITY.md gets a fifth rule + a fifth row in the CI test mapping table;
the rule now names the printer FTP-listing case explicitly so future
services-layer audits set the right expectation.
--------------
fix(library): suppress warning storm when bulk-uploading ZIPs of empty/stub STL files
Uploading a ZIP of stub or empty STL files (e.g. the 24-byte
"solid test\nendsolid test" shape) produced one WARNING per file in
stl_thumbnail.py::generate_stl_thumbnail. The warnings were technically
correct - trimesh returns a valid Mesh with zero vertices, the safeguard
matches, and the function returns None so the library entry is still
created without a thumbnail - but the volume turned a successful upload
into thousands of WARNING lines in the journal.
Two changes:
1. The per-file "Failed to load STL or empty mesh" message in
stl_thumbnail.py is now logger.debug instead of logger.warning. It's
a per-file content observation, not an actionable error; the caller
already handles None correctly. The branch now catches the rare
"large enough but trimesh still can't parse it" case, visible in
debug logs without spamming production.
2. New module constant MIN_USABLE_STL_BYTES = 200 (smallest binary STL
with one triangle is 134B, smallest ASCII ~150B; 200 is a safe floor
below any real STL). The three thumbnail call sites in library.py
(extract_zip_file, single-file upload, _backfill_external_stl_thumbnails)
pre-skip files below this size before calling generate_stl_thumbnail.
Stubs never enter the trimesh pipeline at all.
Behavior is unchanged for real STLs: any file >=200 bytes runs through
the existing pipeline, MAX_VERTICES still triggers simplification at
100k vertices for the 256x256 thumbnail render, large files still get
thumbnails.
------------
fix(stl-thumbnail): silence matplotlib first-import noise (writable cache + font_manager log level)
On first STL upload, three matplotlib-internal log lines surfaced:
WARNING [matplotlib] /opt/claude/.config/matplotlib is not a writable directory
INFO [matplotlib.font_manager] Failed to extract font properties from NotoColorEmoji.ttf
INFO [matplotlib.font_manager] generated new fontManager
The writable-dir warning fired because Bambuddy's $HOME isn't writable for
matplotlib's default config path; matplotlib fell back to /tmp/matplotlib-XXX
which lost the font cache on every host reboot, so font_manager rebuilt it
each cold start - producing another batch of INFO lines.
Fix is two small additions in stl_thumbnail.py before the matplotlib import:
1. New _configure_matplotlib_cache() sets MPLCONFIGDIR to
settings.base_dir/.cache/matplotlib (mkdir if missing) so the cache
persists across container restarts and the writable-dir warning never
fires. Respects an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR so operators who chose
their own path aren't overridden. Best-effort with a debug fallback if
settings can't be imported or the mkdir fails.
2. logging.getLogger("matplotlib.font_manager").setLevel(WARNING) at module
import demotes the per-font INFO scan that fires when font_manager
builds its cache cold. Real font warnings (>= WARNING) still surface.
3 new tests: font_manager logger at WARNING after module import;
_configure_matplotlib_cache creates the directory under base_dir and sets
MPLCONFIGDIR; an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR is preserved verbatim.
5516 backend tests green, frontend gates clean.
739 lines
29 KiB
Python
739 lines
29 KiB
Python
"""Implicit FTPS server for receiving 3MF uploads from slicers.
|
||
|
||
Implements an implicit FTPS server (TLS from byte 0) that accepts file uploads
|
||
from Bambu Studio and OrcaSlicer, matching the real Bambu printer behavior.
|
||
|
||
Unlike explicit FTPS (AUTH TLS), implicit FTPS wraps the connection in TLS
|
||
immediately upon connection, before any FTP commands are exchanged.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
import asyncio
|
||
import hmac
|
||
import logging
|
||
import os
|
||
import random
|
||
import ssl
|
||
from collections.abc import Callable
|
||
from pathlib import Path
|
||
|
||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||
|
||
# Default FTP port for Bambu printers (implicit FTPS).
|
||
# Must be 990 (same as real printers) to avoid iptables REDIRECT,
|
||
# which rewrites the destination IP to the incoming interface's primary
|
||
# address — breaking multi-VP setups with different bind IPs.
|
||
# Requires CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or root.
|
||
FTP_PORT = 990
|
||
|
||
# Hard cap on a single upload. 4 GiB covers the largest realistic
|
||
# multi-plate .gcode.3mf and rejects runaway / malicious clients before
|
||
# they can exhaust the disk or OOM the host. STOR still buffers the
|
||
# whole file in memory before write_bytes — peak RSS ~2x file size during
|
||
# the b''.join — so the cap also caps that peak. If real users hit it
|
||
# with a legitimate file, raise here.
|
||
MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 # 4 GiB
|
||
|
||
|
||
class FTPSession:
|
||
"""Handles a single FTP client session."""
|
||
|
||
def __init__(
|
||
self,
|
||
reader: asyncio.StreamReader,
|
||
writer: asyncio.StreamWriter,
|
||
upload_dir: Path,
|
||
access_code: str,
|
||
ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext,
|
||
on_file_received: Callable[[Path, str], None] | None,
|
||
passive_port_range: tuple[int, int] = (50000, 50100),
|
||
pasv_address: str = "",
|
||
bind_address: str = "0.0.0.0", # nosec B104
|
||
vp_name: str = "",
|
||
):
|
||
self.reader = reader
|
||
self.writer = writer
|
||
self.upload_dir = upload_dir
|
||
self.access_code = access_code
|
||
self.ssl_context = ssl_context
|
||
self.on_file_received = on_file_received
|
||
self.passive_port_range = passive_port_range
|
||
self.pasv_address = pasv_address
|
||
self.bind_address = bind_address
|
||
self.vp_name = vp_name
|
||
self._log_prefix = f"[{vp_name}] " if vp_name else ""
|
||
|
||
self.authenticated = False
|
||
self.username: str | None = None
|
||
self.current_dir = upload_dir
|
||
self.transfer_type = "A" # ASCII by default
|
||
self.data_server: asyncio.Server | None = None
|
||
self.data_port: int | None = None
|
||
|
||
# For data transfer coordination
|
||
self._data_reader: asyncio.StreamReader | None = None
|
||
self._data_writer: asyncio.StreamWriter | None = None
|
||
self._data_connected = asyncio.Event()
|
||
self._transfer_done = asyncio.Event()
|
||
|
||
peername = writer.get_extra_info("peername")
|
||
self.remote_ip = peername[0] if peername else "unknown"
|
||
|
||
async def send(self, code: int, message: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Send an FTP response."""
|
||
response = f"{code} {message}\r\n"
|
||
logger.debug("%sFTP -> %s: %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip, response.strip())
|
||
self.writer.write(response.encode("utf-8"))
|
||
await self.writer.drain()
|
||
|
||
async def handle(self) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle the FTP session."""
|
||
try:
|
||
# Send welcome banner
|
||
await self.send(220, "Bambuddy Virtual Printer FTP ready")
|
||
|
||
while True:
|
||
try:
|
||
line = await asyncio.wait_for(
|
||
self.reader.readline(),
|
||
timeout=300, # 5 minute timeout
|
||
)
|
||
except TimeoutError:
|
||
logger.debug("%sFTP session timeout from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
|
||
break
|
||
|
||
if not line:
|
||
break
|
||
|
||
try:
|
||
command_line = line.decode("utf-8").strip()
|
||
except UnicodeDecodeError:
|
||
command_line = line.decode("latin-1").strip()
|
||
|
||
if not command_line:
|
||
continue
|
||
|
||
# Never log passwords
|
||
if command_line.upper().startswith("PASS"):
|
||
logger.debug("%sFTP <- %s: PASS ********", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
|
||
else:
|
||
logger.debug("%sFTP <- %s: %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip, command_line)
|
||
|
||
# Parse command and argument
|
||
parts = command_line.split(" ", 1)
|
||
cmd = parts[0].upper()
|
||
arg = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else ""
|
||
|
||
# Dispatch command
|
||
handler = getattr(self, f"cmd_{cmd}", None)
|
||
if handler:
|
||
await handler(arg)
|
||
else:
|
||
logger.debug("%sFTP command not implemented: %s", self._log_prefix, cmd)
|
||
await self.send(502, f"Command {cmd} not implemented")
|
||
|
||
except asyncio.CancelledError:
|
||
logger.info("%sFTP session cancelled from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
|
||
except Exception as e:
|
||
logger.error("%sFTP session error from %s: %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip, e)
|
||
finally:
|
||
logger.info("%sFTP session ended from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
|
||
await self._cleanup()
|
||
|
||
async def _cleanup(self) -> None:
|
||
"""Clean up session resources."""
|
||
# Release any waiting data connection callback
|
||
self._transfer_done.set()
|
||
|
||
if self.data_server:
|
||
self.data_server.close()
|
||
try:
|
||
await self.data_server.wait_closed()
|
||
except OSError:
|
||
pass # Best-effort data server cleanup; may already be closed
|
||
self.data_server = None
|
||
|
||
try:
|
||
self.writer.close()
|
||
await self.writer.wait_closed()
|
||
except OSError:
|
||
pass # Best-effort control connection cleanup; client may have disconnected
|
||
|
||
# FTP Commands
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_USER(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle USER command."""
|
||
self.username = arg
|
||
if arg.lower() == "bblp":
|
||
await self.send(331, "Password required")
|
||
else:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Invalid user")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_PASS(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle PASS command."""
|
||
if self.username and self.username.lower() == "bblp":
|
||
# ``hmac.compare_digest`` is constant-time — keeps the auth check
|
||
# from leaking the access code via response timing under network
|
||
# jitter. LAN-only threat is marginal; this is the standard fix.
|
||
if hmac.compare_digest(arg, self.access_code):
|
||
self.authenticated = True
|
||
await self.send(230, "Login successful")
|
||
logger.info("%sFTP login from %s", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
|
||
else:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Login incorrect")
|
||
logger.warning("%sFTP failed login from %s (access code mismatch)", self._log_prefix, self.remote_ip)
|
||
else:
|
||
await self.send(503, "Login with USER first")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_SYST(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle SYST command."""
|
||
await self.send(215, "UNIX Type: L8")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_FEAT(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle FEAT command."""
|
||
features = [
|
||
"211-Features:",
|
||
" PASV",
|
||
" EPSV",
|
||
" UTF8",
|
||
" SIZE",
|
||
"211 End",
|
||
]
|
||
for line in features[:-1]:
|
||
self.writer.write(f"{line}\r\n".encode())
|
||
await self.writer.drain()
|
||
self.writer.write(f"{features[-1]}\r\n".encode())
|
||
await self.writer.drain()
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_PWD(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle PWD command."""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
await self.send(257, '"/" is current directory')
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_CWD(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle CWD command."""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
# Accept any directory change (we use a flat structure)
|
||
await self.send(250, "Directory changed")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_TYPE(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle TYPE command."""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
if arg.upper() in ("A", "I"):
|
||
self.transfer_type = arg.upper()
|
||
type_name = "ASCII" if arg.upper() == "A" else "Binary"
|
||
await self.send(200, f"Type set to {type_name}")
|
||
else:
|
||
await self.send(504, "Type not supported")
|
||
|
||
async def _bind_passive_port(self) -> bool:
|
||
"""Try to bind a passive data port with retries.
|
||
|
||
Returns True if a port was successfully bound, False otherwise.
|
||
Sets self.data_server and self.data_port on success.
|
||
"""
|
||
port_min, port_max = self.passive_port_range
|
||
for attempt in range(10):
|
||
port = random.randint(port_min, port_max)
|
||
try:
|
||
self.data_server = await asyncio.start_server(
|
||
self._handle_data_connection,
|
||
self.bind_address,
|
||
port,
|
||
ssl=self.ssl_context,
|
||
)
|
||
self.data_port = port
|
||
return True
|
||
except OSError:
|
||
logger.debug("FTP passive port %s in use, retrying (%s/10)", port, attempt + 1)
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_EPSV(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle EPSV command - Extended Passive Mode (IPv6 compatible)."""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
# Close any existing data connection/server
|
||
await self._close_data_connection()
|
||
|
||
# Reset connection state for the new transfer
|
||
self._data_connected.clear()
|
||
self._data_reader = None
|
||
self._data_writer = None
|
||
self._transfer_done = asyncio.Event()
|
||
|
||
if await self._bind_passive_port():
|
||
# EPSV response format: 229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||port|)
|
||
await self.send(229, f"Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||{self.data_port}|)")
|
||
logger.info("FTP EPSV listening on port %s", self.data_port)
|
||
else:
|
||
logger.error("Failed to bind any passive port for EPSV")
|
||
await self.send(425, "Cannot open data connection")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_PASV(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle PASV command - set up passive data connection."""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
# Close any existing data connection/server
|
||
await self._close_data_connection()
|
||
|
||
# Reset connection state for the new transfer
|
||
self._data_connected.clear()
|
||
self._data_reader = None
|
||
self._data_writer = None
|
||
self._transfer_done = asyncio.Event()
|
||
|
||
if await self._bind_passive_port():
|
||
# Determine the IP to advertise in PASV response
|
||
if self.pasv_address:
|
||
# Explicit override (e.g., for Docker bridge mode behind NAT)
|
||
ip = self.pasv_address
|
||
else:
|
||
# Use the local IP of the control connection
|
||
sockname = self.writer.get_extra_info("sockname")
|
||
ip = sockname[0] if sockname else "127.0.0.1"
|
||
# 0.0.0.0 is not routable — fall back to control connection IP
|
||
if ip == "0.0.0.0": # nosec B104
|
||
ip = "127.0.0.1"
|
||
|
||
# Format IP and port for PASV response
|
||
ip_parts = ip.split(".")
|
||
port_hi = self.data_port // 256
|
||
port_lo = self.data_port % 256
|
||
|
||
await self.send(
|
||
227,
|
||
f"Entering Passive Mode ({ip_parts[0]},{ip_parts[1]},{ip_parts[2]},{ip_parts[3]},{port_hi},{port_lo})",
|
||
)
|
||
logger.info("FTP PASV listening on %s:%s", ip, self.data_port)
|
||
else:
|
||
logger.error("Failed to bind any passive port for PASV")
|
||
await self.send(425, "Cannot open data connection")
|
||
|
||
async def _handle_data_connection(self, reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle incoming data connection (used by PASV/EPSV).
|
||
|
||
This callback stays alive until the transfer completes to ensure the
|
||
asyncio task holds strong references to the reader/writer throughout
|
||
the data transfer. If the callback returned immediately, the task
|
||
would complete and the StreamReaderProtocol could release its strong
|
||
reader reference, potentially destabilising the connection.
|
||
"""
|
||
# Reject duplicate connections — only one data connection per transfer
|
||
if self._data_reader is not None:
|
||
logger.warning("FTP rejecting duplicate data connection from %s", self.remote_ip)
|
||
try:
|
||
writer.close()
|
||
await writer.wait_closed()
|
||
except OSError:
|
||
pass
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
# Log TLS details for debugging
|
||
ssl_obj = writer.get_extra_info("ssl_object")
|
||
if ssl_obj:
|
||
logger.info(
|
||
f"FTP data TLS from {self.remote_ip}: cipher={ssl_obj.cipher()}, "
|
||
f"version={ssl_obj.version()}, session_reused={ssl_obj.session_reused}"
|
||
)
|
||
else:
|
||
logger.warning("FTP data connection from %s has no SSL!", self.remote_ip)
|
||
|
||
logger.info("FTP data connection established from %s", self.remote_ip)
|
||
self._data_reader = reader
|
||
self._data_writer = writer
|
||
|
||
# Stop accepting further connections on the passive port
|
||
if self.data_server:
|
||
self.data_server.close()
|
||
|
||
self._data_connected.set()
|
||
|
||
# Keep this callback alive until the transfer command (STOR/RETR)
|
||
# finishes. This ensures the asyncio server-handler task holds strong
|
||
# references to reader/writer for the entire transfer lifetime.
|
||
await self._transfer_done.wait()
|
||
|
||
async def _close_data_connection(self) -> None:
|
||
"""Close the data connection and server."""
|
||
had_connection = self._data_writer is not None or self.data_server is not None
|
||
|
||
# Signal the _handle_data_connection callback to return, allowing
|
||
# its asyncio task to complete cleanly.
|
||
self._transfer_done.set()
|
||
|
||
if self._data_writer:
|
||
try:
|
||
self._data_writer.close()
|
||
await self._data_writer.wait_closed()
|
||
except OSError:
|
||
pass # Best-effort data writer cleanup; peer may have closed already
|
||
self._data_writer = None
|
||
self._data_reader = None
|
||
|
||
if self.data_server:
|
||
try:
|
||
self.data_server.close()
|
||
await self.data_server.wait_closed()
|
||
except OSError:
|
||
pass # Best-effort data server shutdown; port may already be released
|
||
self.data_server = None
|
||
|
||
# Only delay if we actually closed something
|
||
if had_connection:
|
||
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_STOR(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle STOR command - receive file upload.
|
||
|
||
Streams each chunk directly to disk inside the receive loop instead
|
||
of buffering the whole file in a ``list[bytes]`` and joining at the
|
||
end. Wire protocol unchanged — same 150/226/426 sequence, same
|
||
single-write target path (no ``.part`` or atomic rename), no new
|
||
verbs, no concurrency guard. The visible behaviour difference is
|
||
that the destination file grows progressively during upload rather
|
||
than appearing all-at-once on completion; slicers don't LIST during
|
||
STOR, so this isn't observable. Peak RSS for a multi-GB upload
|
||
drops from ~2× file size to one chunk (64 KiB).
|
||
``MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES`` cap kept — purely server-internal DoS guard.
|
||
"""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
if not self.data_server and not self._data_connected.is_set():
|
||
await self.send(425, "Use PASV first")
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
filename = Path(arg).name # Sanitize filename
|
||
file_path = (
|
||
self.upload_dir / filename
|
||
) # SEC-PATH-OK: filename = Path(arg).name strips every path component above
|
||
|
||
logger.info("FTP receiving file: %s from %s", filename, self.remote_ip)
|
||
|
||
await self.send(150, f"Opening data connection for {filename}")
|
||
|
||
# Wait for data connection to be established (client connects after 150)
|
||
try:
|
||
await asyncio.wait_for(self._data_connected.wait(), timeout=30)
|
||
except TimeoutError:
|
||
logger.error("FTP data connection timeout - client didn't connect")
|
||
await self.send(425, "Data connection timeout")
|
||
await self._close_data_connection()
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
if not self._data_reader:
|
||
await self.send(425, "Data connection failed")
|
||
await self._close_data_connection()
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
# Receive + stream to disk
|
||
total_received = 0
|
||
write_failed: Exception | None = None
|
||
try:
|
||
with file_path.open("wb") as f:
|
||
while True:
|
||
chunk = await asyncio.wait_for(self._data_reader.read(65536), timeout=60)
|
||
if not chunk:
|
||
break
|
||
total_received += len(chunk)
|
||
if total_received > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
|
||
raise OSError(f"upload exceeded size cap ({total_received} > {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES} bytes)")
|
||
f.write(chunk)
|
||
logger.debug("FTP received chunk: %s bytes (total: %s)", len(chunk), total_received)
|
||
except TimeoutError:
|
||
logger.error("FTP data transfer timeout after %s bytes for %s", total_received, filename)
|
||
write_failed = TimeoutError("Transfer timeout")
|
||
except Exception as e:
|
||
logger.error(
|
||
"FTP data transfer error after %s bytes for %s: %s(%s)",
|
||
total_received,
|
||
filename,
|
||
type(e).__name__,
|
||
e,
|
||
)
|
||
write_failed = e
|
||
|
||
# Close data connection
|
||
await self._close_data_connection()
|
||
|
||
if write_failed is not None:
|
||
# Drop the partial file so it doesn't masquerade as a complete
|
||
# upload — buffer-then-write never had a partial-file footprint.
|
||
try:
|
||
file_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
|
||
except OSError:
|
||
pass
|
||
await self.send(426, f"Transfer failed: {write_failed}")
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
# Confirm + notify
|
||
logger.info("FTP saved file: %s (%s bytes)", file_path, total_received)
|
||
await self.send(226, "Transfer complete")
|
||
|
||
if self.on_file_received:
|
||
try:
|
||
result = self.on_file_received(file_path, self.remote_ip)
|
||
if asyncio.iscoroutine(result):
|
||
await result
|
||
except Exception as e:
|
||
logger.error("File received callback error: %s", e)
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_SIZE(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle SIZE command."""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
# We don't store files for SIZE queries
|
||
await self.send(550, "File not found")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_QUIT(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle QUIT command."""
|
||
await self.send(221, "Goodbye")
|
||
raise asyncio.CancelledError()
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_NOOP(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle NOOP command."""
|
||
await self.send(200, "OK")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_OPTS(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle OPTS command."""
|
||
if arg.upper().startswith("UTF8"):
|
||
await self.send(200, "UTF8 mode enabled")
|
||
else:
|
||
await self.send(501, "Option not supported")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_PBSZ(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle PBSZ (Protection Buffer Size) command.
|
||
|
||
Required for FTP security extensions. With TLS, buffer size is 0.
|
||
"""
|
||
await self.send(200, "PBSZ=0")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_PROT(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle PROT (Data Channel Protection Level) command.
|
||
|
||
P = Private (encrypted), which we always use with implicit FTPS.
|
||
"""
|
||
if arg.upper() == "P":
|
||
await self.send(200, "Protection level set to Private")
|
||
elif arg.upper() == "C":
|
||
# Clear (unprotected) - we don't support this
|
||
await self.send(536, "Protection level C not supported")
|
||
else:
|
||
await self.send(504, f"Protection level {arg} not supported")
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_MKD(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle MKD (Make Directory) command."""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
# We don't really create directories, just pretend it works
|
||
await self.send(257, f'"{arg}" directory created')
|
||
|
||
async def cmd_LIST(self, arg: str) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle LIST command - list directory contents.
|
||
|
||
Intentionally answers 150 + 226 without opening the passive data
|
||
channel. Bambuddy is an upload-only VP — no slicer in capture logs
|
||
actually issues LIST during the project_file flow, so the
|
||
no-data-conn ack is what every observed slicer accepts. A previous
|
||
audit recommended opening + closing the data conn for protocol
|
||
purity; reverted because (a) the bug was theoretical, (b) slicer
|
||
compatibility matters more than RFC purity here, and (c) adding
|
||
NLST/MLSD alongside changes the "supported verbs" surface in a way
|
||
we cannot regression-test without every supported slicer build.
|
||
"""
|
||
if not self.authenticated:
|
||
await self.send(530, "Not logged in")
|
||
return
|
||
# We don't support listing, return empty
|
||
await self.send(150, "Opening data connection")
|
||
await self.send(226, "Transfer complete")
|
||
|
||
|
||
class VirtualPrinterFTPServer:
|
||
"""Implicit FTPS server that accepts uploads from slicers."""
|
||
|
||
# Passive-mode data port range. Widened from 50000-50100 (101 ports) to
|
||
# 50000-51000 (1001 ports) so concurrent transfers across multiple VPs
|
||
# — particularly when a VP falls back to bind 0.0.0.0 (manager.py picks
|
||
# this when bind_ip is unset) — don't collide. With 101 ports and 10
|
||
# random pick attempts per session, birthday-style collisions hit
|
||
# under load; 1001 ports gives multi-VP setups headroom.
|
||
PASSIVE_PORT_MIN = 50000
|
||
PASSIVE_PORT_MAX = 51000
|
||
|
||
def __init__(
|
||
self,
|
||
upload_dir: Path,
|
||
access_code: str,
|
||
cert_path: Path,
|
||
key_path: Path,
|
||
port: int = FTP_PORT,
|
||
on_file_received: Callable[[Path, str], None] | None = None,
|
||
bind_address: str = "0.0.0.0", # nosec B104
|
||
vp_name: str = "",
|
||
):
|
||
"""Initialize the FTPS server.
|
||
|
||
Args:
|
||
upload_dir: Directory to store uploaded files
|
||
access_code: Password for authentication (bblp user)
|
||
cert_path: Path to TLS certificate file
|
||
key_path: Path to TLS private key file
|
||
port: Port to listen on (default 990)
|
||
on_file_received: Callback when file upload completes (path, source_ip)
|
||
bind_address: IP address to bind to (default 0.0.0.0)
|
||
vp_name: Virtual printer name for log identification
|
||
"""
|
||
self.upload_dir = upload_dir
|
||
self.access_code = access_code
|
||
self.cert_path = cert_path
|
||
self.key_path = key_path
|
||
self.port = port
|
||
self.on_file_received = on_file_received
|
||
self.bind_address = bind_address
|
||
self.vp_name = vp_name
|
||
self._server: asyncio.Server | None = None
|
||
self._running = False
|
||
# Set after the socket is bound and the server is accepting connections,
|
||
# so VirtualPrinterInstance.start_server can wait for readiness before
|
||
# reporting is_running=True. Without this, a caller racing the start
|
||
# could probe the port and see "connection refused" while is_running
|
||
# already says yes.
|
||
self.ready = asyncio.Event()
|
||
self._ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None = None
|
||
self._active_sessions: list[asyncio.Task] = []
|
||
# Override PASV response IP for Docker bridge mode / NAT environments
|
||
self._pasv_address = os.environ.get("VIRTUAL_PRINTER_PASV_ADDRESS", "")
|
||
|
||
async def start(self) -> None:
|
||
"""Start the implicit FTPS server."""
|
||
if self._running:
|
||
return
|
||
|
||
logger.info("[%s] Starting virtual printer implicit FTPS on %s:%s", self.vp_name, self.bind_address, self.port)
|
||
|
||
# Ensure upload directory exists
|
||
self.upload_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||
cache_dir = self.upload_dir / "cache"
|
||
cache_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
|
||
|
||
# Create SSL context for implicit FTPS (TLS from byte 0).
|
||
# Pinned to TLS 1.2 only. Allowing 1.3 broke BambuStudio mid-upload
|
||
# in the field (session_reused=True on data channel via PSK + libcurl
|
||
# CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE / RST after ~80 KiB; "server did not report OK,
|
||
# got 426"). Real Bambu printers also serve their FTPS at 1.2 only,
|
||
# and the slicer expects to match that. A future slicer drop of 1.2
|
||
# is a problem to solve when it actually happens; until then 1.2 is
|
||
# mandatory for compat.
|
||
self._ssl_context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
|
||
self._ssl_context.load_cert_chain(str(self.cert_path), str(self.key_path))
|
||
self._ssl_context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
|
||
self._ssl_context.maximum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_2
|
||
|
||
# Use standard TLS settings for compatibility
|
||
self._ssl_context.set_ciphers("HIGH:!aNULL:!MD5:!RC4")
|
||
|
||
logger.info("FTP SSL context created with standard settings")
|
||
|
||
try:
|
||
# Create server with SSL - TLS handshake happens before any FTP data
|
||
self._server = await asyncio.start_server(
|
||
self._handle_client,
|
||
self.bind_address,
|
||
self.port,
|
||
ssl=self._ssl_context, # This makes it implicit FTPS!
|
||
)
|
||
self._running = True
|
||
self.ready.set()
|
||
|
||
logger.info("Implicit FTPS server started on port %s", self.port)
|
||
logger.info(
|
||
"FTP passive data port range: %s-%s",
|
||
self.PASSIVE_PORT_MIN,
|
||
self.PASSIVE_PORT_MAX,
|
||
)
|
||
if self._pasv_address:
|
||
logger.info("FTP PASV address override: %s", self._pasv_address)
|
||
|
||
async with self._server:
|
||
await self._server.serve_forever()
|
||
|
||
except OSError as e:
|
||
if e.errno == 98: # Address already in use
|
||
logger.error("FTP port %s is already in use", self.port)
|
||
else:
|
||
logger.error("FTP server error: %s", e)
|
||
except asyncio.CancelledError:
|
||
logger.debug("FTP server task cancelled")
|
||
except Exception as e:
|
||
logger.error("FTP server error: %s", e)
|
||
finally:
|
||
await self.stop()
|
||
|
||
async def _handle_client(self, reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter) -> None:
|
||
"""Handle a new FTP client connection."""
|
||
peername = writer.get_extra_info("peername")
|
||
log_prefix = f"[{self.vp_name}] " if self.vp_name else ""
|
||
logger.info("%sFTP connection from %s", log_prefix, peername)
|
||
|
||
session = FTPSession(
|
||
reader=reader,
|
||
writer=writer,
|
||
upload_dir=self.upload_dir,
|
||
access_code=self.access_code,
|
||
ssl_context=self._ssl_context,
|
||
on_file_received=self.on_file_received,
|
||
passive_port_range=(self.PASSIVE_PORT_MIN, self.PASSIVE_PORT_MAX),
|
||
pasv_address=self._pasv_address,
|
||
bind_address=self.bind_address,
|
||
vp_name=self.vp_name,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# Track the session task so we can cancel it on stop
|
||
task = asyncio.current_task()
|
||
if task:
|
||
self._active_sessions.append(task)
|
||
try:
|
||
await session.handle()
|
||
finally:
|
||
if task and task in self._active_sessions:
|
||
self._active_sessions.remove(task)
|
||
|
||
async def stop(self) -> None:
|
||
"""Stop the FTPS server."""
|
||
logger.info("Stopping FTP server")
|
||
self._running = False
|
||
self.ready.clear()
|
||
|
||
# Cancel all active sessions and AWAIT cancellation. Previously
|
||
# this slept 0.1 s and called it good — a session mid-write,
|
||
# mid-TLS handshake, or holding a 60 s data-read could easily
|
||
# outlive that and then ``_server.close()`` would run while the
|
||
# underlying sockets were still in use.
|
||
for task in self._active_sessions[:]:
|
||
task.cancel()
|
||
if self._active_sessions:
|
||
await asyncio.gather(*self._active_sessions, return_exceptions=True)
|
||
|
||
self._active_sessions.clear()
|
||
|
||
if self._server:
|
||
try:
|
||
self._server.close()
|
||
await self._server.wait_closed()
|
||
except OSError as e:
|
||
logger.debug("Error closing FTP server: %s", e)
|
||
self._server = None
|