mirror of
https://github.com/bitnami/containers.git
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[bitnami/jenkins-agent] Release 0.3355.0-debian-12-r14 (#94362)
Signed-off-by: Bitnami Bot <bitnami.bot@broadcom.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bitnami Bot
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ ARG JAVA_EXTRA_SECURITY_DIR="/bitnami/java/extra-security"
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ARG TARGETARCH
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LABEL org.opencontainers.image.base.name="docker.io/bitnami/minideb:bookworm" \
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org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-23T08:24:55Z" \
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org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-06-05T10:45:45Z" \
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org.opencontainers.image.description="Application packaged by Broadcom, Inc." \
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org.opencontainers.image.documentation="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/jenkins-agent/README.md" \
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org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/jenkins-agent" \
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@@ -36,12 +36,12 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=downloads_url,env=SECRET_DOWNLOADS_URL \
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for COMPONENT in "${COMPONENTS[@]}"; do \
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if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" ]; then \
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curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -O ; \
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curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" -O ; \
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fi ; \
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sha256sum -c "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
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sha256sum -c "/opt/bitnami/checksums/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
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tar -zxf "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -C /opt/bitnami --strip-components=2 --no-same-owner ; \
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rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz{,.sha256} ; \
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done
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rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz ; \
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done ; \
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rm -rf /opt/bitnami/checksums ;
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RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && \
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apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists /var/cache/apt/archives
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RUN chmod g+rwX /opt/bitnami
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@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ RUN /opt/bitnami/scripts/java/postunpack.sh
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RUN /opt/bitnami/scripts/jenkins-agent/postunpack.sh
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ENV APP_VERSION="0.3355.0" \
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BITNAMI_APP_NAME="jenkins-agent" \
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IMAGE_REVISION="13" \
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IMAGE_REVISION="14" \
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JAVA_HOME="/opt/bitnami/java" \
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PATH="/opt/bitnami/common/bin:/opt/bitnami/java/bin:$PATH"
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+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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f3545d8cecc8e8931394417465b99cd081e0d946774d4ef66ef90ddac35bcf8f jenkins-agent-0.3355.0-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
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+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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97d18a77c746ea93718e1d2d7b0d85802f447e5a46f5bcc23d2429e57c991494 jenkins-agent-0.3355.0-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
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+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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190f3814d0362c10bc2373945a5fe00ff46aa2980ac2224528a32c7766a2b72d jre-21.0.11-11-1-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
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+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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08f71653cfeafd8e168835acfa95678ad52649c0b8c3512d285cedead2ea0a62 jre-21.0.11-11-1-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
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+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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af31040a9ef21924a1d4c6d3f0bd6a6be9ef701c9e726b9b3997b82394779b6e nss-wrapper-1.1.16-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
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+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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9315fee0fbce2e445778f4cddd4b5a9ae657d40bcc4c9534430d8eaeecf7307c nss-wrapper-1.1.16-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
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@@ -139,3 +139,40 @@ wait_for_log_entry() {
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return 1
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fi
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}
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########################
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# Creates a secure temporary file containing the provided secret
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# Arguments:
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# $1 - secret to write to the temporary file
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# Returns:
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# String
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#########################
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credential_to_temp_file() {
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local secret="$1"
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local tmp_file
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# Use mktemp with a specific prefix for easier debugging if something lingers
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if ! tmp_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/at.cred.XXXXXXXX"); then
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echo "Error: Failed to create temp file" >&2
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return 1
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fi
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# Restrict permissions before writing the secret
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chmod 0600 "$tmp_file"
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# Write secret and ensure it's flushed to disk
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printf "%s" "$secret" > "$tmp_file"
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# Output the filename so the caller can capture it
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echo "$tmp_file"
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}
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########################
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# Cleans up temporary files created by credential_to_temp_file
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# Arguments:
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# None
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# Returns:
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# None
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#########################
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cleanup_credentials() {
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debug "Cleaning up temporary files containing credentials"
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rm -rf "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"/at.cred.*
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}
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@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ relativize() {
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# -d|--dir-mode - mode for files.
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# -u|--user - user
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# -g|--group - group
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# -n|--no-dereference - do not follow symlinks (use for runtime root chown of daemon-writable dirs)
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# Returns:
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# None
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#########################
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@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
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local file_mode=""
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local user=""
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local group=""
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local follow_symlinks="yes"
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# Validate arguments
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shift 1
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@@ -161,6 +163,9 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
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shift
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group="${1:?missing group}"
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;;
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-n | --no-dereference)
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follow_symlinks="no"
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;;
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*)
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echo "Invalid command line flag $1" >&2
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return 1
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@@ -169,22 +174,29 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
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shift
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done
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# -L: follow symlinks and emits the target path
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# This is dangerous at runtime, given a co-located lower-privileged process with write access
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# to the target path can redirect the chown/chmod to arbitrary paths. Example:
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# Lower-privileged process run: ln -s /etc /tmp/etc
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# Then, setup.sh runs: configure_permissions_ownership --dir-mode 775 /tmp
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local find_L_flag=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "yes" ]] && find_L_flag=("-L")
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# -h: changes symlink inode ownership without touching the target.
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local chown_flags=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "no" ]] && chown_flags=("-h")
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read -r -a filepaths <<<"$paths"
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for p in "${filepaths[@]}"; do
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if [[ -e "$p" ]]; then
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find -L "$p" -printf ""
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if [[ -n $dir_mode ]]; then
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find -L "$p" -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
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find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
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fi
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if [[ -n $file_mode ]]; then
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find -L "$p" -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
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find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
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fi
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if [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
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find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}:${group}"
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find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}:${group}"
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elif [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -z $group ]]; then
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find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}"
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find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}"
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elif [[ -z $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
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find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${group}"
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find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${chown_flags[@]}" "${group}"
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fi
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else
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stderr_print "$p does not exist"
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@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ ensure_user_exists() {
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if [[ -n "$home" ]]; then
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mkdir -p "$home"
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usermod -d "$home" "$user" >/dev/null 2>&1
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configure_permissions_ownership "$home" -d "775" -f "664" -u "$user" -g "$group"
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configure_permissions_ownership "$home" -d "775" -f "664" -u "$user" -g "$group" -n
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fi
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}
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
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#########################
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is_int() {
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local -r int="${1:?missing value}"
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if [[ "$int" =~ ^-?[0-9]+ ]]; then
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if [[ "$int" =~ ^-?[0-9]+$ ]]; then
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true
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else
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false
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