[bitnami/airflow] Release 3.2.1-debian-12-r10 (#94078)

Signed-off-by: Bitnami Bot <bitnami.bot@broadcom.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bitnami Bot
2026-05-29 22:00:36 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7a6a6bc73f
commit 7d978c83a2
15 changed files with 73 additions and 12 deletions
+6 -6
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ARG DOWNLOADS_URL="downloads.bitnami.com/files/stacksmith"
ARG TARGETARCH
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.base.name="docker.io/bitnami/minideb:bookworm" \
org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-23T06:29:44Z" \
org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-29T19:14:50Z" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="Application packaged by Broadcom, Inc." \
org.opencontainers.image.documentation="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/airflow/README.md" \
org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/airflow" \
@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=downloads_url,env=SECRET_DOWNLOADS_URL \
for COMPONENT in "${COMPONENTS[@]}"; do \
if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" ]; then \
curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -O ; \
curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" -O ; \
fi ; \
sha256sum -c "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
sha256sum -c "/opt/bitnami/checksums/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
tar -zxf "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -C /opt/bitnami --strip-components=2 --no-same-owner ; \
rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz{,.sha256} ; \
done
rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz ; \
done ; \
rm -rf /opt/bitnami/checksums ;
RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && \
apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists /var/cache/apt/archives
RUN chmod g+rwX /opt/bitnami
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ RUN /opt/bitnami/scripts/airflow/postunpack.sh
ENV AIRFLOW_HOME="/opt/bitnami/airflow" \
APP_VERSION="3.2.1" \
BITNAMI_APP_NAME="airflow" \
IMAGE_REVISION="9" \
IMAGE_REVISION="10" \
LANG="en_US.UTF-8" \
LANGUAGE="en_US:en" \
LD_LIBRARY_PATH="/opt/bitnami/airflow/venv/lib/python3.13/site-packages/numpy.libs:/opt/bitnami/mariadb/lib:/opt/bitnami/python/lib:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH" \
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
553d0f809424921364cc34e7981a9a1657698acba8b05924c4a2fc76ac64857b airflow-3.2.1-2-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
4dc3e25b7124589e03d90cc310f1ce2cf62180d6fa00701039f0f6dea86756e1 airflow-3.2.1-2-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
7576302f2870643e4c48e7a4be12fef12e472e68b0b407e6033f812c8742c1f1 ini-file-1.4.9-10-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
83dd2355db6b63fc46bb02008fdace7510b339c88d91d45abaa256f2a7ae54bd ini-file-1.4.9-10-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
a4c1ec7675e8b5f5d8565ebfe2f0af242950d9e815d62b11bcadcdee9606b130 mariadb-lib-12.2.2-3-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
065a632ae105baeeecd4ce6022ed60a261fe255b65b8e434a43a3b1821b77905 mariadb-lib-12.2.2-3-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
af31040a9ef21924a1d4c6d3f0bd6a6be9ef701c9e726b9b3997b82394779b6e nss-wrapper-1.1.16-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
9315fee0fbce2e445778f4cddd4b5a9ae657d40bcc4c9534430d8eaeecf7307c nss-wrapper-1.1.16-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
e8356fb884820a397a25c9fb315f81ad08058086538d1ccc4eb654831e3d52e8 python-3.13.13-8-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
afa46726fb6696bed74a06d8c3bd2cdf0f04b9582ba279fa2ed6012f5ad8c11f python-3.13.13-8-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
4af7eb9cb9f027f08bd67ead26a6585ac71810c7dc396a453df794235e3476b3 wait-for-port-1.0.10-10-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
72c721c238602c257e3f933797f266358032e3d2267c4f99707a33de5ee2038e wait-for-port-1.0.10-10-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -139,3 +139,40 @@ wait_for_log_entry() {
return 1
fi
}
########################
# Creates a secure temporary file containing the provided secret
# Arguments:
# $1 - secret to write to the temporary file
# Returns:
# String
#########################
credential_to_temp_file() {
local secret="$1"
local tmp_file
# Use mktemp with a specific prefix for easier debugging if something lingers
if ! tmp_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/at.cred.XXXXXXXX"); then
echo "Error: Failed to create temp file" >&2
return 1
fi
# Restrict permissions before writing the secret
chmod 0600 "$tmp_file"
# Write secret and ensure it's flushed to disk
printf "%s" "$secret" > "$tmp_file"
# Output the filename so the caller can capture it
echo "$tmp_file"
}
########################
# Cleans up temporary files created by credential_to_temp_file
# Arguments:
# None
# Returns:
# None
#########################
cleanup_credentials() {
debug "Cleaning up temporary files containing credentials"
rm -rf "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"/at.cred.*
}
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ relativize() {
# -d|--dir-mode - mode for files.
# -u|--user - user
# -g|--group - group
# -n|--no-dereference - do not follow symlinks (use for runtime root chown of daemon-writable dirs)
# Returns:
# None
#########################
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
local file_mode=""
local user=""
local group=""
local follow_symlinks="yes"
# Validate arguments
shift 1
@@ -161,6 +163,9 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
shift
group="${1:?missing group}"
;;
-n | --no-dereference)
follow_symlinks="no"
;;
*)
echo "Invalid command line flag $1" >&2
return 1
@@ -169,22 +174,29 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
shift
done
# -L: follow symlinks and emits the target path
# This is dangerous at runtime, given a co-located lower-privileged process with write access
# to the target path can redirect the chown/chmod to arbitrary paths. Example:
# Lower-privileged process run: ln -s /etc /tmp/etc
# Then, setup.sh runs: configure_permissions_ownership --dir-mode 775 /tmp
local find_L_flag=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "yes" ]] && find_L_flag=("-L")
# -h: changes symlink inode ownership without touching the target.
local chown_flags=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "no" ]] && chown_flags=("-h")
read -r -a filepaths <<<"$paths"
for p in "${filepaths[@]}"; do
if [[ -e "$p" ]]; then
find -L "$p" -printf ""
if [[ -n $dir_mode ]]; then
find -L "$p" -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
fi
if [[ -n $file_mode ]]; then
find -L "$p" -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
fi
if [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}:${group}"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}:${group}"
elif [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -z $group ]]; then
find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}"
elif [[ -z $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${group}"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${chown_flags[@]}" "${group}"
fi
else
stderr_print "$p does not exist"