[bitnami/activemq] Release 6.2.6-debian-12-r0 (#94090)

Signed-off-by: Bitnami Bot <bitnami.bot@broadcom.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bitnami Bot
2026-05-31 11:22:19 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7ec412c8c5
commit 1df0b1123c
10 changed files with 71 additions and 16 deletions
+9 -9
View File
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ ARG JAVA_EXTRA_SECURITY_DIR="/bitnami/java/extra-security"
ARG TARGETARCH
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.base.name="docker.io/bitnami/minideb:bookworm" \
org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-23T06:42:38Z" \
org.opencontainers.image.created="2026-05-31T09:01:01Z" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="Application packaged by Broadcom, Inc." \
org.opencontainers.image.documentation="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/activemq/README.md" \
org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/bitnami/containers/tree/main/bitnami/activemq" \
org.opencontainers.image.title="activemq" \
org.opencontainers.image.vendor="Broadcom, Inc." \
org.opencontainers.image.version="6.2.5"
org.opencontainers.image.version="6.2.6"
ENV HOME="/" \
OS_ARCH="${TARGETARCH:-amd64}" \
@@ -31,17 +31,17 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=downloads_url,env=SECRET_DOWNLOADS_URL \
COMPONENTS=( \
"render-template-1.0.9-165-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \
"java-21.0.11-11-2-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \
"activemq-6.2.5-0-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \
"activemq-6.2.6-0-linux-${OS_ARCH}-debian-12" \
) ; \
for COMPONENT in "${COMPONENTS[@]}"; do \
if [ ! -f "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" ]; then \
curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -O ; \
curl -SsLf "https://${DOWNLOADS_URL}/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" -O ; \
fi ; \
sha256sum -c "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
sha256sum -c "/opt/bitnami/checksums/${COMPONENT}.tar.gz.sha256" ; \
tar -zxf "${COMPONENT}.tar.gz" -C /opt/bitnami --strip-components=2 --no-same-owner ; \
rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz{,.sha256} ; \
done
rm -rf "${COMPONENT}".tar.gz ; \
done ; \
rm -rf /opt/bitnami/checksums ;
RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && \
apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists /var/cache/apt/archives
RUN chmod g+rwX /opt/bitnami
@@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ RUN find / -perm /6000 -type f -exec chmod a-s {} \; || true
COPY rootfs /
RUN /opt/bitnami/scripts/activemq/postunpack.sh
RUN /opt/bitnami/scripts/java/postunpack.sh
ENV APP_VERSION="6.2.5" \
ENV APP_VERSION="6.2.6" \
BITNAMI_APP_NAME="activemq" \
IMAGE_REVISION="5" \
IMAGE_REVISION="0" \
JAVA_HOME="/opt/bitnami/java" \
PATH="/opt/bitnami/common/bin:/opt/bitnami/java/bin:/opt/bitnami/activemq/bin:$PATH"
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
711b7e4ae8d6f291fda279f737c961dbd670a564bb6a76271245b7a902a6f34d activemq-6.2.6-0-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
fec603e5541af978ed96a746ee2c2c7eb23f3675d65f9d795fdad30d5fb69f5c activemq-6.2.6-0-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
fa2c3125d94154a3bc67bb7899c3fe231267ed4133d3931d1ce4864f915a6d0f java-21.0.11-11-2-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
9bc5e94a5934ab91f797a5cb1f1f0bdd8917ae676a21806b4394887a367eb836 java-21.0.11-11-2-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
374910c7361f00d393eca79a749d29f389b4522057902c7655f0a3a5ae3d1b32 render-template-1.0.9-165-linux-amd64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
d492024d2d8261cfb147e7b508d341b91349fd41cf41aecd0706046be8cb108b render-template-1.0.9-165-linux-arm64-debian-12.tar.gz
@@ -139,3 +139,40 @@ wait_for_log_entry() {
return 1
fi
}
########################
# Creates a secure temporary file containing the provided secret
# Arguments:
# $1 - secret to write to the temporary file
# Returns:
# String
#########################
credential_to_temp_file() {
local secret="$1"
local tmp_file
# Use mktemp with a specific prefix for easier debugging if something lingers
if ! tmp_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/at.cred.XXXXXXXX"); then
echo "Error: Failed to create temp file" >&2
return 1
fi
# Restrict permissions before writing the secret
chmod 0600 "$tmp_file"
# Write secret and ensure it's flushed to disk
printf "%s" "$secret" > "$tmp_file"
# Output the filename so the caller can capture it
echo "$tmp_file"
}
########################
# Cleans up temporary files created by credential_to_temp_file
# Arguments:
# None
# Returns:
# None
#########################
cleanup_credentials() {
debug "Cleaning up temporary files containing credentials"
rm -rf "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"/at.cred.*
}
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ relativize() {
# -d|--dir-mode - mode for files.
# -u|--user - user
# -g|--group - group
# -n|--no-dereference - do not follow symlinks (use for runtime root chown of daemon-writable dirs)
# Returns:
# None
#########################
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
local file_mode=""
local user=""
local group=""
local follow_symlinks="yes"
# Validate arguments
shift 1
@@ -161,6 +163,9 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
shift
group="${1:?missing group}"
;;
-n | --no-dereference)
follow_symlinks="no"
;;
*)
echo "Invalid command line flag $1" >&2
return 1
@@ -169,22 +174,29 @@ configure_permissions_ownership() {
shift
done
# -L: follow symlinks and emits the target path
# This is dangerous at runtime, given a co-located lower-privileged process with write access
# to the target path can redirect the chown/chmod to arbitrary paths. Example:
# Lower-privileged process run: ln -s /etc /tmp/etc
# Then, setup.sh runs: configure_permissions_ownership --dir-mode 775 /tmp
local find_L_flag=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "yes" ]] && find_L_flag=("-L")
# -h: changes symlink inode ownership without touching the target.
local chown_flags=(); [[ "$follow_symlinks" == "no" ]] && chown_flags=("-h")
read -r -a filepaths <<<"$paths"
for p in "${filepaths[@]}"; do
if [[ -e "$p" ]]; then
find -L "$p" -printf ""
if [[ -n $dir_mode ]]; then
find -L "$p" -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type d ! -perm "$dir_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$dir_mode"
fi
if [[ -n $file_mode ]]; then
find -L "$p" -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -not -type l -type f ! -perm "$file_mode" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chmod "$file_mode"
fi
if [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}:${group}"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}:${group}"
elif [[ -n $user ]] && [[ -z $group ]]; then
find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${user}"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chown "${chown_flags[@]}" "${user}"
elif [[ -z $user ]] && [[ -n $group ]]; then
find -L "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${group}"
find "${find_L_flag[@]}" "$p" -print0 | xargs -r -0 chgrp "${chown_flags[@]}" "${group}"
fi
else
stderr_print "$p does not exist"
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ activemq_initialize() {
info "Initializing ActiveMQ ..."
# Configuring permissions for data folder
am_i_root && configure_permissions_ownership "$ACTIVEMQ_DATA_DIR" -u "$ACTIVEMQ_DAEMON_USER" -g "$ACTIVEMQ_DAEMON_GROUP" -d "755" -f "644"
am_i_root && configure_permissions_ownership "$ACTIVEMQ_DATA_DIR" -u "$ACTIVEMQ_DAEMON_USER" -g "$ACTIVEMQ_DAEMON_GROUP" -d "755" -f "644" -n
if ! is_mounted_dir_empty "$ACTIVEMQ_MOUNTED_CONF_DIR"; then
cp -Lr "$ACTIVEMQ_MOUNTED_CONF_DIR"/* "$ACTIVEMQ_CONF_DIR"