fix(backup): refuse the whole LDAP family on restore, not just its password (#2656)

A settings restore could substitute the instance'"'"'s authentication source.
    auth.py reads the LDAP config live from the settings table on every
    login, and none of ldap_server_url, ldap_user_filter, ldap_auto_provision
    or ldap_default_group is credential-shaped, so the secret-key hints never
    saw them and only the four auth-policy keys were protected.

    ldap_enabled was covered by the companion-credential rule instead, and
    that rule asks the wrong question. It judges availability - "will the
    integration still work?" - and an anonymous bind works, so a payload that
    simply OMITS ldap_bind_password skips the refusal and has its toggle
    written. Omitting the credential is exactly what an attacker authoring
    the file would do: they own the directory being pointed at, so they need
    no bind credential from us.

    Left unrefused, a backup repository anyone can write to yields admin:
    point ldap_server_url at your own directory, set ldap_auto_provision and
    ldap_default_group=Administrators, and the next login on a fresh username
    is provisioned into the admin group. Overwrite-off is enough on an
    instance that never configured LDAP - there are no rows to skip.

    Refused by prefix so a key added to the LDAP schema later is refused by
    default, and matched case-insensitively because the key comes from the
    backup JSON rather than from our own writer. ldap_enabled leaves
    _COMPANION_CREDENTIALS rather than sitting there as dead code, since
    _is_protected_setting_key runs first.

    The two tests asserting an anonymous bind was a false positive are
    inverted - they encoded the hole - and the refusal reuses the existing
    settingsAuthSkipped note, which already points at Settings >
    Authentication.

backend/app/services/github_restore.py

@@ -108,9 +108,10 @@ _MQTT_SETTING_KEYS = {
 #   * bypass the lockout refusals ``update_settings`` enforces (a
 #     ``local_login_enabled=false`` with no enabled OIDC provider, or with no
 #     OIDC link on the caller, is a 400 there — #1589).
-#   * cross a permission boundary: /github-backup/restore is gated on
-#     GITHUB_RESTORE alone, so this would be a way to rewrite auth config
-#     without SETTINGS_UPDATE.
+#   * cross a permission boundary: a restore would be a way to rewrite auth
+#     config without SETTINGS_UPDATE. (The endpoint gates each category on the
+#     permission owning its rows now, but that is settings:update — still not
+#     the auth UI's own guards, which is what these keys actually need.)
 #
 # Auth is reconfigured through the auth UI, which has the guards. Restoring it
 # from a snapshot has no safe reading.
@@ -121,6 +122,25 @@ _PROTECTED_SETTING_KEYS = {
     "setup_completed",
 }
 
+# The LDAP family, refused for the same reason and by prefix rather than by
+# name, so a key added to the schema later is refused by default.
+#
+# These are not "how the instance behaves" settings — together they name *which
+# directory server decides who you are*. auth.py reads them live from this table
+# on every login (see the ldap_keys list in _get_ldap_settings), so a restore
+# that writes them substitutes the authentication source wholesale:
+# ldap_server_url points at another directory, ldap_auto_provision creates a
+# local account for whoever it vouches for, and ldap_default_group decides what
+# that account gets — Administrators, if the backup says so.
+#
+# The companion rule does NOT cover this, which is the trap. ldap_enabled is
+# paired with ldap_bind_password there, but an *anonymous* bind is a working
+# config, so a backup that simply omits the password skips the refusal at the
+# _COMPANION_EXPOSURE_TOGGLES check and the toggle is written. Omitting a
+# credential is exactly what an attacker authoring this file would do — they own
+# the directory being pointed at, so they need no bind credential from us.
+_PROTECTED_SETTING_PREFIXES = ("ldap_",)
+
 # Nozzle diameters the backup collector iterates. A path outside this set means
 # the backup was written by a newer version, so accept it rather than dropping
 # data, but keep the list for validation messages.
@@ -175,7 +195,11 @@ def _is_blocked_setting_key(key: str) -> bool:
 
 
 def _is_protected_setting_key(key: str) -> bool:
-    return key in _PROTECTED_SETTING_KEYS
+    # Lowered for the prefix test for the same reason _is_blocked_setting_key
+    # lowers: the key comes from the backup's JSON, not from our own writer, so
+    # its casing is whatever the file says. An exact-match name stays exact —
+    # those four are ours and are only ever written lowercase.
+    return key in _PROTECTED_SETTING_KEYS or key.lower().startswith(_PROTECTED_SETTING_PREFIXES)
 
 
 # There used to be an ``_is_skipped_setting_key`` here, the union of the two
@@ -202,9 +226,16 @@ def _is_protected_setting_key(key: str) -> bool:
 # virtual_printer_enabled is largely vestigial post-migration — core/database.py
 # copies the rows into the virtual_printers table — but it is the same shape, and
 # refusing a vestigial toggle is a harmless no-op.
+#
+# ldap_enabled is deliberately NOT here. It was, paired with
+# ldap_bind_password — but this rule judges availability ("will the integration
+# work?"), and that is the wrong question for an authentication source. An
+# anonymous bind is a working config, so the pair let a backup omit the password
+# and have the toggle written; the whole LDAP family is refused by prefix above
+# instead. _is_protected_setting_key runs first in _plan_settings, so leaving the
+# entry here would be dead code that reads like coverage.
 _COMPANION_CREDENTIALS = {
     "prometheus_enabled": "prometheus_token",
-    "ldap_enabled": "ldap_bind_password",
     "mqtt_enabled": "mqtt_password",
     "ha_enabled": "ha_token",
     "virtual_printer_enabled": "virtual_printer_access_code",

backend/tests/unit/test_github_restore.py

@@ -109,10 +109,54 @@ class TestSettingKeyBlocklist:
         assert _is_blocked_setting_key(key) is False
         assert _is_protected_setting_key(key) is True
 
-    @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", ["currency", "ldap_enabled", "auth_secret_key"])
-    def test_protected_set_is_only_the_auth_policy_keys(self, key):
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("key", ["currency", "auth_secret_key", "mqtt_enabled", "prometheus_enabled"])
+    def test_protected_set_does_not_swallow_ordinary_or_credential_keys(self, key):
         assert _is_protected_setting_key(key) is False
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "key",
+        [
+            "ldap_enabled",
+            "ldap_server_url",
+            "ldap_search_base",
+            "ldap_user_filter",
+            "ldap_security",
+            "ldap_group_mapping",
+            "ldap_auto_provision",
+            "ldap_ca_cert_path",
+            "ldap_default_group",
+            "ldap_bind_dn",
+            "LDAP_ENABLED",
+            "ldap_something_added_later",
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_the_whole_ldap_family_is_protected(self, key):
+        """Together these name *which directory decides who you are*.
+
+        ``auth.py`` reads them live from this table on every login, so a restore
+        that writes them substitutes the authentication source: point
+        ``ldap_server_url`` at another directory, set ``ldap_auto_provision``,
+        and ``ldap_default_group`` decides what the account it creates gets.
+
+        The companion rule did not cover this and could not: it pairs
+        ``ldap_enabled`` with ``ldap_bind_password`` and asks whether the
+        integration will *work*, and an anonymous bind works — so a payload that
+        simply omitted the password had its toggle written. Refused by prefix so
+        a key added to the LDAP schema later is refused by default, and matched
+        case-insensitively because the key comes from the backup's JSON rather
+        than from our own writer.
+        """
+        assert _is_protected_setting_key(key) is True
+
+    def test_ldap_enabled_is_not_also_a_companion_toggle(self):
+        """It was, and the pair is what let the family through.
+
+        Kept as a test rather than a comment because re-adding it would read as
+        tightening the rule while actually being dead code —
+        ``_is_protected_setting_key`` runs first in ``_plan_settings``.
+        """
+        assert "ldap_enabled" not in _COMPANION_CREDENTIALS
+
     def test_ha_token_from_env_is_deliberately_not_carved_out(self):
         """Recorded so the review's question about it is not re-litigated.
 
@@ -348,6 +392,39 @@ class TestCompanionCredentials:
         await self._restore(db_session, **{toggle: "true", credential: "s3cret"})
         assert toggle not in await self._rows(db_session)
 
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_an_authored_ldap_payload_cannot_substitute_the_directory(self, db_session):
+        """The attack the companion rule could not see, refused end to end.
+
+        Anyone who can write to the backup repository can author this file, and
+        the shape that beat the old rule is the natural one for an attacker:
+        *omit* ``ldap_bind_password``. They own the directory being pointed at,
+        so they need no bind credential from us — and an anonymous bind is a
+        working config, which is exactly what the availability rule was built to
+        allow through.
+
+        Left unrefused, the next login against a fresh username binds to
+        ``ldap_server_url``, ``ldap_auto_provision`` creates the local account,
+        and ``ldap_default_group`` decides it is an Administrator. Overwrite-off
+        is enough on an instance that never configured LDAP: there are no rows
+        to skip.
+        """
+        tally = await self._restore(
+            db_session,
+            currency="EUR",
+            ldap_enabled="true",
+            ldap_server_url="ldaps://evil.example.com:636",
+            ldap_security="ldaps",
+            ldap_search_base="dc=evil,dc=com",
+            ldap_user_filter="(uid={username})",
+            ldap_auto_provision="true",
+            ldap_default_group="Administrators",
+        )
+
+        rows = await self._rows(db_session)
+        assert rows == {"currency": "EUR"}, "not one LDAP row may land"
+        assert any("authentication" in note.lower() for note in _messages(tally))
+
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
     async def test_ha_toggle_is_refused_when_the_environment_has_no_token(self, db_session, monkeypatch):
         monkeypatch.delenv("HA_TOKEN", raising=False)
@@ -508,14 +585,19 @@ class TestCompanionCredentials:
     async def test_the_availability_class_keeps_the_backup_credential_condition(self, db_session):
         """The other half of the same change: only Prometheus loses condition 2.
 
-        Absent is treated like blank here — an anonymous broker or bind is a
-        working config, so refusing it would be a false positive.
+        Absent is treated like blank here — an anonymous broker is a working
+        config, so refusing it would be a false positive.
+
+        LDAP used to be in this list and is not any more: the same reasoning that
+        makes an anonymous bind legitimate is what let an authored payload point
+        the instance at another directory, so the family is refused outright
+        rather than judged on availability. See
+        ``test_the_whole_ldap_family_is_protected``.
         """
-        await self._restore(db_session, mqtt_enabled="true", ldap_enabled="true", virtual_printer_enabled="true")
+        await self._restore(db_session, mqtt_enabled="true", virtual_printer_enabled="true")
 
         rows = await self._rows(db_session)
         assert rows["mqtt_enabled"] == "true"
-        assert rows["ldap_enabled"] == "true"
         assert rows["virtual_printer_enabled"] == "true"
 
     def test_every_exposure_toggle_is_a_companion_toggle(self):
@@ -564,12 +646,18 @@ class TestCompanionCredentials:
         assert not any("switched off" in note for note in _messages(tally))
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
-    async def test_an_anonymous_ldap_bind_is_not_a_false_positive(self, db_session):
-        """Same for a backup that carries the key with a blank value."""
-        tally = await self._restore(db_session, ldap_enabled="true", ldap_bind_password="   ")
+    async def test_a_blank_ldap_bind_password_no_longer_lets_the_toggle_through(self, db_session):
+        """The inverted control, and the reason the LDAP pair had to go.
 
-        assert (await self._rows(db_session))["ldap_enabled"] == "true"
-        assert not any("switched off" in note for note in _messages(tally))
+        A blank bind password used to read as "anonymous bind, a working config,
+        do not over-refuse". It reads the same way to an attacker authoring the
+        file, who wants no bind credential precisely because the directory is
+        theirs — so the availability question cannot be asked about an
+        authentication source at all.
+        """
+        await self._restore(db_session, ldap_enabled="true", ldap_bind_password="   ")
+
+        assert "ldap_enabled" not in await self._rows(db_session)
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
     async def test_turning_a_toggle_off_is_always_written(self, db_session):