Fixed timing attack in cookie validation.
- Changed from using string == to hmac.Equal - See more details here: http://verboselogging.com/2012/08/20/a-timing-attack-in-action
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							|  | @ -18,7 +18,7 @@ func validateCookie(cookie *http.Cookie, seed string) (string, bool) { | |||
| 		return "", false | ||||
| 	} | ||||
| 	sig := cookieSignature(seed, cookie.Name, parts[0], parts[1]) | ||||
| 	if parts[2] == sig { | ||||
| 	if checkHmac(parts[2], sig) { | ||||
| 		ts, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[1]) | ||||
| 		if err == nil && int64(ts) > time.Now().Add(time.Duration(24)*7*time.Hour*-1).Unix() { | ||||
| 			// it's a valid cookie. now get the contents
 | ||||
|  | @ -48,3 +48,14 @@ func cookieSignature(args ...string) string { | |||
| 	b = h.Sum(b) | ||||
| 	return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(b) | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| func checkHmac(input, expected string) bool { | ||||
| 	inputMAC, err1 := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(input) | ||||
| 	if err1 == nil { | ||||
| 		expectedMAC, err2 := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(expected) | ||||
| 		if err2 == nil { | ||||
| 			return hmac.Equal(inputMAC, expectedMAC) | ||||
| 		} | ||||
| 	} | ||||
| 	return false | ||||
| } | ||||
|  |  | |||
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