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maziggy
133ec72527
Tim (@turulix) is building a fully automated headless slicing pipeline against Bambuddy's API and hit the wall flagged in #665: /cloud/* routes resolve cloud_token per-user from User.cloud_token, but the auth gate returned None for API-keyed requests, so the route fell back to the global Settings-table token, which only carries a value in auth-disabled deployments. Net effect on auth-enabled deployments: API keys reached the gate just fine, then /cloud/filaments always saw user=None and returned 401 / empty results — no path to read slicer presets or the filament catalogue that a CLI workflow needs. Make API keys carry an owner and route /cloud/* lookups through that owner; gate the new capability behind an explicit opt-in scope so existing automation doesn't gain cloud-read access on upgrade. - APIKey gains user_id (FK to users.id, ON DELETE CASCADE) and can_access_cloud (BOOLEAN DEFAULT 0). User-delete route also runs an explicit DELETE FROM api_keys WHERE user_id = ? since SQLite ships FK enforcement off — same pattern as the existing created_by_id cleanup blocks. - New cloud_caller dep on /cloud/* routes resolves to the JWT user OR the API-key owner stashed by a router-level gate. The auth gate itself continues to return None for API keys so #1182's surface stays bounded to /cloud/* — without that bound, any route that fences API keys via `if current_user is None: raise 403` (e.g. long-lived-token management) would silently start accepting them. - The /cloud/* router-level dep enforces three independent fences for API-keyed callers: user_id IS NOT NULL (legacy keys → 401 with recreate copy), can_access_cloud=True (otherwise 403), and owner has cloud_token (existing fence, unchanged). Two extra one-shot fence errors at create/update time refuse can_access_cloud=True when auth is disabled or the key is ownerless. - Frontend: APIKey list shows "Cloud" badge on cloud-enabled keys and "Legacy" badge on ownerless rows; create form gains an "Allow cloud access" toggle, default off. New i18n keys in all 8 locales (en + de fully translated, others seeded with English fallbacks pending native translation — matches the project's flow for newly-added features). Migration: two idempotent ALTER TABLE statements + an index on user_id for the auth gate's owner→keys lookup. Postgres-safe. Tests: 9 backend integration tests in test_api_key_cloud_access.py covering creation flags, the three /cloud/* fences, JWT no-op, and deletion CASCADE; 2 frontend SettingsPage tests pinning the badge matrix and the create-form contract; 5 daemon unit tests for the related SpoolBuddy ssh-key sync work that landed in the same branch. Full backend suite: 3578 passed; full frontend suite: 1597 passed; no regressions. Permission semantics for existing keys: keys created before this release become "legacy" and are rejected at /cloud/* with the recreate message. Every other endpoint they were used against — queue, status, control — is untouched.
42 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
42 lines
1.8 KiB
Python
from datetime import datetime
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from sqlalchemy import JSON, Boolean, DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String, func
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
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from backend.app.core.database import Base
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class APIKey(Base):
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"""API key for external webhook access."""
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__tablename__ = "api_keys"
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id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(primary_key=True)
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name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(100)) # User-friendly name
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key_hash: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(255)) # bcrypt hash of the key
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key_prefix: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20)) # First 8 chars + "..." for display
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# Owner — required for new keys, NULL only on legacy rows that predate per-user
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# ownership. Cloud routes reject calls from keys without an owner so callers are
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# forced to recreate them. CASCADE so deleting a user removes their keys.
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user_id: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(
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Integer,
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ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
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nullable=True,
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index=True,
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)
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# Permissions
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can_queue: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=True) # Add to queue
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can_control_printer: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=False) # Start/stop/cancel
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can_read_status: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=True) # Query status
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can_access_cloud: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=False) # Read /cloud/* on the owner's behalf
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# Optional scope limits
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printer_ids: Mapped[list | None] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True) # null = all printers
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enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=True)
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last_used: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime, nullable=True)
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created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime, server_default=func.now())
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expires_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime, nullable=True) # Optional expiry
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