mirror of
https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy.git
synced 2026-10-02 20:22:15 +02:00
Two attacker-controlled strings were being joined to library_dir with no
resolve + containment check in the project ZIP import endpoint:
- linked_folders[*].name from the request's project.json
- per-entry zf.namelist() paths from the ZIP itself
An absolute path in either field collapsed the join (Path("/lib") / "/etc"
becomes Path("/etc") because pathlib discards the left side when the right
is absolute) and the next write_bytes landed wherever the attacker chose.
Adjacent finding from the routes audit: GET /archives/{id}/photos/{filename}
had NO validation on filename and FileResponse-served arbitrary paths -
the DELETE counterpart at least gated on the photos membership check.
Adjacent finding from the services audit: ArchiveService.attach_timelapse
wrote archive_dir / filename where filename ultimately came from a printer's
FTP listing (compromised-printer threat model) or the /timelapse/select
query param. A malicious printer that exposes a directory entry with ..
segments could write the timelapse outside the archive directory.
New backend/app/utils/safe_path.py::safe_join_under(parent, *parts) is the
single source of truth: rejects empty / null-byte / absolute parts up-front,
joins under parent, resolves both sides, asserts is_relative_to. Returns the
resolved canonical path on success, raises HTTPException(400) on escape, or
PathTraversalError when http=False (for service-layer callers that need to
match a non-HTTP return contract).
Wired into the import vectors, both archive photo handlers, and the
attach_timelapse service. The full audit sweep inspected every Path/Name
join in backend/app/api/routes/ AND backend/app/services/ - 25 route-layer
sites + 8 service-layer sites confirmed safe and tagged with
# SEC-PATH-OK: <reason> so future audits trust the inline guard at a glance.
Fifth CI backstop test_route_path_arithmetic_is_safe_joined_or_marked
AST-walks both layers and fails the build on any <dir-like>/<bare variable>
join that doesn't either route through safe_join_under or carry the marker.
The services layer is in scope because it receives values verbatim from the
routes AND from external sources Bambuddy has no control over (the printer
FTP-listing case above).
SECURITY.md gets a fifth rule + a fifth row in the CI test mapping table;
the rule now names the printer FTP-listing case explicitly so future
services-layer audits set the right expectation.
--------------
fix(library): suppress warning storm when bulk-uploading ZIPs of empty/stub STL files
Uploading a ZIP of stub or empty STL files (e.g. the 24-byte
"solid test\nendsolid test" shape) produced one WARNING per file in
stl_thumbnail.py::generate_stl_thumbnail. The warnings were technically
correct - trimesh returns a valid Mesh with zero vertices, the safeguard
matches, and the function returns None so the library entry is still
created without a thumbnail - but the volume turned a successful upload
into thousands of WARNING lines in the journal.
Two changes:
1. The per-file "Failed to load STL or empty mesh" message in
stl_thumbnail.py is now logger.debug instead of logger.warning. It's
a per-file content observation, not an actionable error; the caller
already handles None correctly. The branch now catches the rare
"large enough but trimesh still can't parse it" case, visible in
debug logs without spamming production.
2. New module constant MIN_USABLE_STL_BYTES = 200 (smallest binary STL
with one triangle is 134B, smallest ASCII ~150B; 200 is a safe floor
below any real STL). The three thumbnail call sites in library.py
(extract_zip_file, single-file upload, _backfill_external_stl_thumbnails)
pre-skip files below this size before calling generate_stl_thumbnail.
Stubs never enter the trimesh pipeline at all.
Behavior is unchanged for real STLs: any file >=200 bytes runs through
the existing pipeline, MAX_VERTICES still triggers simplification at
100k vertices for the 256x256 thumbnail render, large files still get
thumbnails.
------------
fix(stl-thumbnail): silence matplotlib first-import noise (writable cache + font_manager log level)
On first STL upload, three matplotlib-internal log lines surfaced:
WARNING [matplotlib] /opt/claude/.config/matplotlib is not a writable directory
INFO [matplotlib.font_manager] Failed to extract font properties from NotoColorEmoji.ttf
INFO [matplotlib.font_manager] generated new fontManager
The writable-dir warning fired because Bambuddy's $HOME isn't writable for
matplotlib's default config path; matplotlib fell back to /tmp/matplotlib-XXX
which lost the font cache on every host reboot, so font_manager rebuilt it
each cold start - producing another batch of INFO lines.
Fix is two small additions in stl_thumbnail.py before the matplotlib import:
1. New _configure_matplotlib_cache() sets MPLCONFIGDIR to
settings.base_dir/.cache/matplotlib (mkdir if missing) so the cache
persists across container restarts and the writable-dir warning never
fires. Respects an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR so operators who chose
their own path aren't overridden. Best-effort with a debug fallback if
settings can't be imported or the mkdir fails.
2. logging.getLogger("matplotlib.font_manager").setLevel(WARNING) at module
import demotes the per-font INFO scan that fires when font_manager
builds its cache cold. Real font warnings (>= WARNING) still surface.
3 new tests: font_manager logger at WARNING after module import;
_configure_matplotlib_cache creates the directory under base_dir and sets
MPLCONFIGDIR; an externally-set MPLCONFIGDIR is preserved verbatim.
5516 backend tests green, frontend gates clean.
714 lines
25 KiB
Python
714 lines
25 KiB
Python
"""Camera capture service for Bambu Lab printers.
|
|
|
|
Supports two camera protocols:
|
|
- RTSP: Used by X1, X1C, X1E, X2D, H2C, H2D, H2DPRO, H2S, P2S (port 322)
|
|
- Chamber Image: Used by A1, A1MINI, P1P, P1S (port 6000, custom binary protocol)
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
import logging
|
|
import os
|
|
import shutil
|
|
import ssl
|
|
import struct
|
|
import subprocess
|
|
import uuid
|
|
from datetime import datetime
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
|
|
# JPEG markers
|
|
JPEG_START = b"\xff\xd8"
|
|
JPEG_END = b"\xff\xd9"
|
|
|
|
# Cache the ffmpeg path after first lookup
|
|
_ffmpeg_path: str | None = None
|
|
|
|
# Cached result of rtsp_socket_timeout_flag(); see that function for context.
|
|
_rtsp_socket_timeout_flag: str | None = None
|
|
|
|
# Track PIDs of ffmpeg processes spawned for one-shot frame capture (snapshot).
|
|
# The cleanup task in routes/camera.py checks this set to avoid killing active captures.
|
|
_active_capture_pids: set[int] = set()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_ffmpeg_path() -> str | None:
|
|
"""Find the ffmpeg executable path.
|
|
|
|
Uses shutil.which first, then checks common installation locations
|
|
for systems where PATH may be limited (e.g., systemd services).
|
|
"""
|
|
global _ffmpeg_path
|
|
|
|
if _ffmpeg_path is not None:
|
|
return _ffmpeg_path
|
|
|
|
# Try PATH first
|
|
ffmpeg_path = shutil.which("ffmpeg")
|
|
|
|
# If not found via PATH, check common installation locations
|
|
if ffmpeg_path is None:
|
|
common_paths = [
|
|
"/usr/bin/ffmpeg",
|
|
"/usr/local/bin/ffmpeg",
|
|
"/opt/homebrew/bin/ffmpeg", # macOS Homebrew
|
|
"/snap/bin/ffmpeg", # Ubuntu Snap
|
|
"C:\\ffmpeg\\bin\\ffmpeg.exe", # Windows common
|
|
]
|
|
for path in common_paths:
|
|
if Path(path).exists():
|
|
ffmpeg_path = path
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
_ffmpeg_path = ffmpeg_path
|
|
if ffmpeg_path:
|
|
logger.info("Found ffmpeg at: %s", ffmpeg_path)
|
|
else:
|
|
logger.warning("ffmpeg not found in PATH or common locations")
|
|
|
|
return ffmpeg_path
|
|
|
|
|
|
def rtsp_socket_timeout_flag() -> str:
|
|
"""Return the ffmpeg argv flag (without the leading dash) that sets the
|
|
RTSP demuxer's client-side TCP socket I/O timeout, in microseconds.
|
|
|
|
ffmpeg has shipped three different option arrangements for this over
|
|
time, and Bambuddy supports the full range:
|
|
|
|
- **Modern ffmpeg (5.x / 6.x / 7.x)** — Debian 13, Ubuntu 24.04, current
|
|
Homebrew, etc. ``-timeout`` is the socket I/O timeout (microseconds);
|
|
``-stimeout`` was REMOVED.
|
|
- **Transitional ffmpeg (~late-4.x, some 5.x builds)** — Ubuntu 22.04's
|
|
shipped version is one of these. ``-timeout`` was deprecated and
|
|
*repurposed* to mean the RTSP listen-mode incoming-connection
|
|
timeout — and any non-zero value implies ``-listen``, which makes
|
|
ffmpeg bind the localhost proxy port and fail with EADDRINUSE
|
|
(#1504). ``-stimeout`` was the replacement socket I/O timeout in
|
|
that window.
|
|
- **Old ffmpeg (early 4.x and earlier)** — ``-timeout`` is socket I/O
|
|
timeout (the original meaning, before the deprecation churn).
|
|
|
|
We probe ``-h demuxer=rtsp`` once and cache: if ``-stimeout`` is
|
|
advertised, prefer it (covers the transitional window and stays
|
|
correct on the older builds that still accept it as an alias); else
|
|
fall back to ``-timeout`` (correct on modern and pre-deprecation
|
|
ffmpeg). The result is cached for the process lifetime — ffmpeg
|
|
isn't going to swap mid-run.
|
|
|
|
Returns the option name without the leading dash, e.g. ``"timeout"``
|
|
or ``"stimeout"``. Callers must prepend ``-`` themselves so a string
|
|
formatting bug can't pass an empty flag.
|
|
"""
|
|
global _rtsp_socket_timeout_flag
|
|
|
|
if _rtsp_socket_timeout_flag is not None:
|
|
return _rtsp_socket_timeout_flag
|
|
|
|
ffmpeg = get_ffmpeg_path()
|
|
chosen = "timeout" # safe default for modern ffmpeg
|
|
if ffmpeg:
|
|
try:
|
|
result = subprocess.run(
|
|
[ffmpeg, "-hide_banner", "-h", "demuxer=rtsp"],
|
|
capture_output=True,
|
|
text=True,
|
|
timeout=5,
|
|
check=False,
|
|
)
|
|
help_text = (result.stdout or "") + (result.stderr or "")
|
|
# Help lines list each option as `-<name> ` (trailing space) — match
|
|
# that exact form so we don't accidentally hit a substring elsewhere.
|
|
if "-stimeout " in help_text:
|
|
chosen = "stimeout"
|
|
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
|
|
# If probing fails, keep the modern-ffmpeg default. Worst case
|
|
# is the EADDRINUSE regression returns for transitional-ffmpeg
|
|
# users — same as before this function existed.
|
|
logger.warning("Could not probe ffmpeg RTSP timeout flag, defaulting to -timeout: %s", exc)
|
|
|
|
_rtsp_socket_timeout_flag = chosen
|
|
logger.info("RTSP socket I/O timeout flag: -%s", chosen)
|
|
return chosen
|
|
|
|
|
|
def supports_rtsp(model: str | None) -> bool:
|
|
"""Check if printer model supports RTSP camera streaming.
|
|
|
|
RTSP supported: X1, X1C, X1E, X2D, H2C, H2D, H2DPRO, H2S, P2S
|
|
Chamber image only: A1, A1MINI, P1P, P1S
|
|
|
|
Note: Model can be either display name (e.g., "P2S") or internal code (e.g., "N7").
|
|
Internal codes from MQTT/SSDP:
|
|
- BL-P001: X1/X1C
|
|
- C13: X1E
|
|
- N6: X2D
|
|
- O1D: H2D
|
|
- O1C, O1C2: H2C
|
|
- O1S: H2S
|
|
- O1E, O2D: H2D Pro
|
|
- N7: P2S
|
|
"""
|
|
if model:
|
|
model_upper = model.upper()
|
|
# Display names: X1, X1C, X1E, X2D, H2C, H2D, H2DPRO, H2S, P2S
|
|
if model_upper.startswith(("X1", "X2", "H2", "P2")):
|
|
return True
|
|
# Internal codes for RTSP models
|
|
if model_upper in ("BL-P001", "C13", "N6", "O1D", "O1C", "O1C2", "O1S", "O1E", "O2D", "N7"):
|
|
return True
|
|
# A1/P1 and unknown models use chamber image protocol
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_camera_port(model: str | None) -> int:
|
|
"""Get the camera port based on printer model.
|
|
|
|
X1/X2/H2/P2 series use RTSP on port 322.
|
|
A1/P1 series use chamber image protocol on port 6000.
|
|
"""
|
|
if supports_rtsp(model):
|
|
return 322
|
|
return 6000
|
|
|
|
|
|
def rewrite_rtsp_request_url(data: bytes, proxy_url: bytes, real_url: bytes) -> bytes:
|
|
"""Rewrite RTSP request-line URLs, leaving other lines (e.g. Authorization) intact.
|
|
|
|
RTSP request lines have the form ``METHOD <url> RTSP/1.0\\r\\n``.
|
|
Only those lines are modified so that Digest auth headers (which embed
|
|
the original URL and a cryptographic hash) are not broken.
|
|
"""
|
|
rtsp_marker = b" RTSP/1.0"
|
|
if rtsp_marker not in data:
|
|
return data
|
|
lines = data.split(b"\r\n")
|
|
for i, line in enumerate(lines):
|
|
if line.endswith(rtsp_marker):
|
|
lines[i] = line.replace(proxy_url, real_url)
|
|
break
|
|
return b"\r\n".join(lines)
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def create_tls_proxy(target_host: str, target_port: int) -> tuple[int, "asyncio.Server"]:
|
|
"""Create a local TCP→TLS proxy for RTSP streams.
|
|
|
|
Bambu printers use RTSPS (RTSP over TLS) with self-signed certificates.
|
|
The Debian ffmpeg package uses GnuTLS, whose hardened defaults reject
|
|
certain TLS behaviors (renegotiation, legacy ciphers) that some printer
|
|
firmwares (notably P2S) rely on. This causes streams to drop after a
|
|
few seconds.
|
|
|
|
This proxy terminates TLS using Python's ssl module (OpenSSL), which is
|
|
more permissive, and exposes a plain TCP port that ffmpeg connects to
|
|
with ``rtsp://`` instead of ``rtsps://``.
|
|
|
|
RTSP embeds URLs in protocol messages (DESCRIBE, SETUP, PLAY). The proxy
|
|
rewrites ``127.0.0.1:<proxy_port>`` → ``<target_host>:<target_port>`` in
|
|
client→server data so the printer recognises the stream path.
|
|
|
|
Returns ``(local_port, server)``. Caller must close the server when done.
|
|
"""
|
|
ssl_ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT)
|
|
ssl_ctx.check_hostname = False
|
|
ssl_ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
|
|
|
|
# Filled in after the server socket is created (handler only runs after).
|
|
_local_port: list[int] = [0]
|
|
|
|
async def _handle(client_reader: asyncio.StreamReader, client_writer: asyncio.StreamWriter):
|
|
tls_writer = None
|
|
try:
|
|
tls_reader, tls_writer = await asyncio.wait_for(
|
|
asyncio.open_connection(target_host, target_port, ssl=ssl_ctx),
|
|
timeout=10.0,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# URL patterns for RTSP request-line rewriting.
|
|
proxy_url = f"rtsp://127.0.0.1:{_local_port[0]}".encode()
|
|
real_url = f"rtsps://{target_host}:{target_port}".encode()
|
|
|
|
# Note on the broad except below: dst.write() raises RuntimeError
|
|
# under uvloop when the underlying handle has already been torn
|
|
# down (uvloop.loop.UVHandle._ensure_alive). asyncio's default
|
|
# selector loop reports the same situation as ConnectionResetError
|
|
# / OSError, so a tuple that doesn't include RuntimeError leaks the
|
|
# uvloop variant up to asyncio's unhandled-exception logger
|
|
# ("Unhandled exception in client_connected_cb"). The forwarders
|
|
# are intentionally fire-and-forget on tear-down — once either
|
|
# peer drops, both halves of the proxy should exit quietly.
|
|
|
|
async def _fwd_to_server(src: asyncio.StreamReader, dst: asyncio.StreamWriter):
|
|
"""Forward client→server, rewriting RTSP request-line URLs only."""
|
|
try:
|
|
while True:
|
|
data = await src.read(65536)
|
|
if not data:
|
|
break
|
|
data = rewrite_rtsp_request_url(data, proxy_url, real_url)
|
|
dst.write(data)
|
|
await dst.drain()
|
|
except (ConnectionError, OSError, asyncio.CancelledError, RuntimeError):
|
|
pass
|
|
finally:
|
|
if not dst.is_closing():
|
|
try:
|
|
dst.close()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
async def _fwd_to_client(src: asyncio.StreamReader, dst: asyncio.StreamWriter):
|
|
"""Forward server→client unchanged."""
|
|
try:
|
|
while True:
|
|
data = await src.read(65536)
|
|
if not data:
|
|
break
|
|
dst.write(data)
|
|
await dst.drain()
|
|
except (ConnectionError, OSError, asyncio.CancelledError, RuntimeError):
|
|
pass
|
|
finally:
|
|
if not dst.is_closing():
|
|
try:
|
|
dst.close()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
await asyncio.gather(
|
|
_fwd_to_server(client_reader, tls_writer),
|
|
_fwd_to_client(tls_reader, client_writer),
|
|
)
|
|
except (ConnectionError, OSError, TimeoutError) as e:
|
|
logger.debug("TLS proxy connection to %s:%s failed: %s", target_host, target_port, e)
|
|
finally:
|
|
for w in (client_writer, tls_writer):
|
|
if w and not w.is_closing():
|
|
try:
|
|
w.close()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
server = await asyncio.start_server(_handle, "127.0.0.1", 0)
|
|
_local_port[0] = server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
|
|
logger.debug("TLS proxy for %s:%s listening on 127.0.0.1:%s", target_host, target_port, _local_port[0])
|
|
return _local_port[0], server
|
|
|
|
|
|
def is_chamber_image_model(model: str | None) -> bool:
|
|
"""Check if printer uses chamber image protocol instead of RTSP.
|
|
|
|
A1, A1MINI, P1P, P1S use the chamber image protocol on port 6000.
|
|
"""
|
|
return not supports_rtsp(model)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def build_camera_url(ip_address: str, access_code: str, model: str | None) -> str:
|
|
"""Build the RTSPS URL for the printer camera (RTSP models only)."""
|
|
port = get_camera_port(model)
|
|
return f"rtsps://bblp:{access_code}@{ip_address}:{port}/streaming/live/1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _create_chamber_auth_payload(access_code: str) -> bytes:
|
|
"""Create the 80-byte authentication payload for chamber image protocol.
|
|
|
|
Format:
|
|
- Bytes 0-3: 0x40 0x00 0x00 0x00 (magic)
|
|
- Bytes 4-7: 0x00 0x30 0x00 0x00 (command)
|
|
- Bytes 8-15: zeros (padding)
|
|
- Bytes 16-47: username "bblp" (32 bytes, null-padded)
|
|
- Bytes 48-79: access code (32 bytes, null-padded)
|
|
"""
|
|
username = b"bblp"
|
|
access_code_bytes = access_code.encode("utf-8")
|
|
|
|
# Build the 80-byte payload
|
|
payload = struct.pack(
|
|
"<II8s32s32s",
|
|
0x40, # Magic header
|
|
0x3000, # Command
|
|
b"\x00" * 8, # Padding
|
|
username.ljust(32, b"\x00"), # Username padded to 32 bytes
|
|
access_code_bytes.ljust(32, b"\x00"), # Access code padded to 32 bytes
|
|
)
|
|
return payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _create_ssl_context() -> ssl.SSLContext:
|
|
"""Create an SSL context for chamber image connection.
|
|
|
|
Bambu printers use self-signed certificates, so we disable verification.
|
|
"""
|
|
ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT)
|
|
ctx.check_hostname = False
|
|
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
|
|
return ctx
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def read_chamber_image_frame(
|
|
ip_address: str,
|
|
access_code: str,
|
|
timeout: float = 10.0,
|
|
) -> bytes | None:
|
|
"""Read a single JPEG frame from the chamber image protocol.
|
|
|
|
This is used by A1/P1 printers which don't support RTSP.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
ip_address: Printer IP address
|
|
access_code: Printer access code
|
|
timeout: Connection timeout in seconds
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
JPEG image data or None if failed
|
|
"""
|
|
port = 6000
|
|
ssl_context = _create_ssl_context()
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
# Connect with SSL
|
|
reader, writer = await asyncio.wait_for(
|
|
asyncio.open_connection(ip_address, port, ssl=ssl_context),
|
|
timeout=timeout,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
# Send authentication payload
|
|
auth_payload = _create_chamber_auth_payload(access_code)
|
|
writer.write(auth_payload)
|
|
await writer.drain()
|
|
|
|
# Read the 16-byte header
|
|
header = await asyncio.wait_for(reader.readexactly(16), timeout=timeout)
|
|
if len(header) < 16:
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: incomplete header received")
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# Parse payload size from header (little-endian uint32 at offset 0)
|
|
payload_size = struct.unpack("<I", header[0:4])[0]
|
|
|
|
if payload_size == 0 or payload_size > 10_000_000: # Sanity check: max 10MB
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: invalid payload size %s", payload_size)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# Read the JPEG data
|
|
jpeg_data = await asyncio.wait_for(
|
|
reader.readexactly(payload_size),
|
|
timeout=timeout,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Validate JPEG markers
|
|
if not jpeg_data.startswith(JPEG_START):
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: data is not a valid JPEG (missing start marker)")
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
if not jpeg_data.endswith(JPEG_END):
|
|
logger.warning("Chamber image: JPEG missing end marker, may be truncated")
|
|
|
|
logger.debug("Chamber image: received %s bytes", len(jpeg_data))
|
|
return jpeg_data
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
writer.close()
|
|
try:
|
|
await writer.wait_closed()
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
pass # Socket already closed; cleanup is best-effort
|
|
|
|
except TimeoutError:
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: connection timeout to %s:%s", ip_address, port)
|
|
return None
|
|
except ConnectionRefusedError:
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: connection refused by %s:%s", ip_address, port)
|
|
return None
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.exception("Chamber image: error connecting to %s:%s: %s", ip_address, port, e)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def generate_chamber_image_stream(
|
|
ip_address: str,
|
|
access_code: str,
|
|
fps: int = 5,
|
|
) -> asyncio.StreamReader | None:
|
|
"""Create a persistent connection for streaming chamber images.
|
|
|
|
Returns a connected reader or None if connection failed.
|
|
"""
|
|
port = 6000
|
|
ssl_context = _create_ssl_context()
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
reader, writer = await asyncio.wait_for(
|
|
asyncio.open_connection(ip_address, port, ssl=ssl_context),
|
|
timeout=10.0,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Send authentication payload
|
|
auth_payload = _create_chamber_auth_payload(access_code)
|
|
writer.write(auth_payload)
|
|
await writer.drain()
|
|
|
|
logger.info("Chamber image: connected to %s:%s", ip_address, port)
|
|
return reader, writer
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: failed to connect to %s:%s: %s", ip_address, port, e)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def read_next_chamber_frame(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, timeout: float = 10.0) -> bytes | None:
|
|
"""Read the next JPEG frame from an established chamber image connection."""
|
|
try:
|
|
# Read the 16-byte header
|
|
header = await asyncio.wait_for(reader.readexactly(16), timeout=timeout)
|
|
|
|
# Parse payload size from header (little-endian uint32 at offset 0)
|
|
payload_size = struct.unpack("<I", header[0:4])[0]
|
|
|
|
if payload_size == 0 or payload_size > 10_000_000:
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: invalid payload size %s", payload_size)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# Read the JPEG data
|
|
jpeg_data = await asyncio.wait_for(
|
|
reader.readexactly(payload_size),
|
|
timeout=timeout,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return jpeg_data
|
|
|
|
except asyncio.IncompleteReadError:
|
|
logger.warning("Chamber image: connection closed by printer")
|
|
return None
|
|
except TimeoutError:
|
|
logger.warning("Chamber image: read timeout")
|
|
return None
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.error("Chamber image: error reading frame: %s", e)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def capture_camera_frame(
|
|
ip_address: str,
|
|
access_code: str,
|
|
model: str | None,
|
|
output_path: Path,
|
|
timeout: int = 30,
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Capture a single frame from the printer's camera stream and save to disk.
|
|
|
|
Uses capture_camera_frame_bytes() internally for protocol selection,
|
|
then writes the result to the specified output path.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
ip_address: Printer IP address
|
|
access_code: Printer access code
|
|
model: Printer model (X1, H2D, P1, A1, etc.)
|
|
output_path: Path where to save the captured image
|
|
timeout: Timeout in seconds for the capture operation
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
True if capture was successful, False otherwise
|
|
"""
|
|
output_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
|
|
|
jpeg_data = await capture_camera_frame_bytes(ip_address, access_code, model, timeout)
|
|
if jpeg_data:
|
|
try:
|
|
with open(output_path, "wb") as f:
|
|
f.write(jpeg_data)
|
|
logger.info("Saved camera frame to: %s", output_path)
|
|
return True
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
logger.error("Failed to write camera frame: %s", e)
|
|
return False
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def capture_camera_frame_bytes(
|
|
ip_address: str,
|
|
access_code: str,
|
|
model: str | None,
|
|
timeout: int = 15,
|
|
) -> bytes | None:
|
|
"""Capture a single frame and return as JPEG bytes (no disk write).
|
|
|
|
Uses the same protocol selection as capture_camera_frame but returns
|
|
bytes directly instead of writing to disk.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
ip_address: Printer IP address
|
|
access_code: Printer access code
|
|
model: Printer model (X1, H2D, P1, A1, etc.)
|
|
timeout: Timeout in seconds for the capture operation
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
JPEG bytes if capture was successful, None otherwise
|
|
"""
|
|
# Chamber image models: A1/P1 - returns bytes directly
|
|
if is_chamber_image_model(model):
|
|
logger.info("Capturing camera frame bytes from %s using chamber image protocol (model: %s)", ip_address, model)
|
|
return await read_chamber_image_frame(ip_address, access_code, timeout=float(timeout))
|
|
|
|
# RTSP models: X1/H2/P2 - use ffmpeg piping to stdout
|
|
# TLS proxy avoids GnuTLS compatibility issues with some printer firmwares
|
|
port = get_camera_port(model)
|
|
proxy_port, proxy_server = await create_tls_proxy(ip_address, port)
|
|
camera_url = f"rtsp://bblp:{access_code}@127.0.0.1:{proxy_port}/streaming/live/1"
|
|
|
|
ffmpeg = get_ffmpeg_path()
|
|
if not ffmpeg:
|
|
proxy_server.close()
|
|
await proxy_server.wait_closed()
|
|
logger.error("ffmpeg not found for camera frame capture")
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
cmd = [
|
|
ffmpeg,
|
|
"-y",
|
|
"-rtsp_transport",
|
|
"tcp",
|
|
"-rtsp_flags",
|
|
"prefer_tcp",
|
|
"-i",
|
|
camera_url,
|
|
"-frames:v",
|
|
"1",
|
|
"-f",
|
|
"image2pipe",
|
|
"-vcodec",
|
|
"mjpeg",
|
|
"-q:v",
|
|
"2",
|
|
"-",
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
logger.info("Capturing camera frame bytes from %s using RTSP (model: %s)", ip_address, model)
|
|
|
|
process = None
|
|
try:
|
|
process = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
|
|
*cmd,
|
|
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
|
|
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
_active_capture_pids.add(process.pid)
|
|
try:
|
|
stdout, stderr = await asyncio.wait_for(process.communicate(), timeout=timeout)
|
|
except TimeoutError:
|
|
process.kill()
|
|
await process.wait()
|
|
logger.error("Camera frame bytes capture timed out after %ss", timeout)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
if process.returncode == 0 and stdout and len(stdout) >= 100:
|
|
logger.info("Successfully captured camera frame bytes: %s bytes", len(stdout))
|
|
return stdout
|
|
else:
|
|
stderr_text = stderr.decode() if stderr else "Unknown error"
|
|
logger.error("ffmpeg frame bytes capture failed (code %s): %s", process.returncode, stderr_text[:200])
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
logger.error("ffmpeg not found for camera frame capture")
|
|
return None
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
logger.exception("Camera frame bytes capture failed: %s", e)
|
|
return None
|
|
finally:
|
|
if process is not None:
|
|
_active_capture_pids.discard(process.pid)
|
|
proxy_server.close()
|
|
await proxy_server.wait_closed()
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def capture_finish_photo(
|
|
printer_id: int,
|
|
ip_address: str,
|
|
access_code: str,
|
|
model: str | None,
|
|
archive_dir: Path,
|
|
) -> str | None:
|
|
"""Capture a finish photo and save it to the archive's photos folder.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
printer_id: ID of the printer
|
|
ip_address: Printer IP address
|
|
access_code: Printer access code
|
|
model: Printer model
|
|
archive_dir: Directory of the archive (where the 3MF is stored)
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Filename of the captured photo, or None if capture failed
|
|
"""
|
|
# Create photos subdirectory
|
|
photos_dir = archive_dir / "photos"
|
|
photos_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
|
|
|
# Generate filename with timestamp
|
|
timestamp = datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
|
|
filename = f"finish_{timestamp}_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}.jpg"
|
|
output_path = (
|
|
photos_dir / filename
|
|
) # SEC-PATH-OK: filename = f"finish_{timestamp}_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}.jpg" generated above
|
|
|
|
success = await capture_camera_frame(
|
|
ip_address=ip_address,
|
|
access_code=access_code,
|
|
model=model,
|
|
output_path=output_path,
|
|
timeout=30,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if success:
|
|
logger.info("Finish photo saved: %s", filename)
|
|
return filename
|
|
else:
|
|
logger.warning("Failed to capture finish photo for printer %s", printer_id)
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def test_camera_connection(
|
|
ip_address: str,
|
|
access_code: str,
|
|
model: str | None,
|
|
) -> dict:
|
|
"""Test if the camera stream is accessible.
|
|
|
|
Returns dict with success status and any error message.
|
|
"""
|
|
import tempfile
|
|
|
|
fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".jpg")
|
|
os.close(fd)
|
|
test_path = Path(tmp_name)
|
|
test_path.chmod(0o600)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
success = await capture_camera_frame(
|
|
ip_address=ip_address,
|
|
access_code=access_code,
|
|
model=model,
|
|
output_path=test_path,
|
|
timeout=15,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if success:
|
|
return {"success": True, "message": "Camera connection successful"}
|
|
else:
|
|
return {
|
|
"success": False,
|
|
"error": (
|
|
"Failed to capture frame from camera. "
|
|
"Ensure the printer is powered on, camera is enabled, and Developer Mode is active. "
|
|
"If running in Docker, try 'network_mode: host' in docker-compose.yml."
|
|
),
|
|
}
|
|
finally:
|
|
# Clean up test file
|
|
if test_path.exists():
|
|
test_path.unlink()
|