Files
bambuddy/backend
maziggy 9d549050f7 fix(cloud): complete the CSRF handshake on Bambu Cloud TOTP sign-in (#2696)
Signing in to Bambu Cloud with an authenticator-app account failed every
time with "Invalid code", whatever the code was. Bambu Lab added double-
submit CSRF protection to the bambulab.com web origin - which is where,
and only where, this service posts the two-factor code. The endpoint
refused the request with 403 "CSRF error: missing_cookie" before it ever
evaluated the code, and Bambuddy reported that refusal as a bad code.

Verified against the live endpoint with a deliberately invalid key: a
bare POST returns missing_cookie; GET /api/csrf mints a bbl_csrf_token
cookie; a POST carrying only the cookie returns missing_header; a POST
carrying the cookie plus an x-bbl-csrf-token header reaches application
logic. Landing on the sign-in page first - the intuitive fix - does not
help, as that page sets only Cloudflare's __cf_bm. Of five header
spellings tried, only x-bbl-csrf-token is accepted, so the tests pin it.

verify_totp now performs that handshake against the same origin it will
post to (bambulab.cn for the China region - a token minted by the global
site is a cookie the .cn endpoint never issued), and declines to submit
the code at all when no token can be obtained rather than burning the
user's 30-second TOTP window on a request that is certain to be refused.
A CSRF refusal now also says the code was never checked instead of
masquerading as a wrong code, which is what sent the reporter chasing
clock drift and leading-zero parsing.

Only TOTP sign-ins were affected. Every other cloud call, the email-code
two-factor path included, goes to api.bambulab.com, which is not gated,
and existing stored tokens were unaffected throughout.

The region-routing test's MockTransport needed teaching about the
handshake: it returns one canned response for every request and set no
cookie, so the fix correctly refused to POST and the test lost the URL it
asserts on. It now mints a token for /api/csrf and additionally checks
the handshake stays on the .cn origin.
2026-07-28 15:05:28 +02:00
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