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jmoore-skild
bbd991510f
The companion-credential rule has five conditions, and the second one -- "the backup itself carried a usable credential" -- was applied to all five pairs. It should not be. It is what stops the rule over-refusing an anonymous MQTT broker or an anonymous LDAP bind, both of which are working configs: there, an empty credential in the backup means the restore is not producing anything weaker than what was backed up. For prometheus_enabled it does not transfer. An empty prometheus_token removes /api/v1/metrics' only gate, so the exposure is a property of the toggle, not of a downgrade relative to the backup -- and prometheus_token is optional, so a backup taken on an instance that enabled Prometheus without ever setting one carries the toggle and no usable token. That payload skipped the refusal entirely: not a candidate, so the local-state pass never ran, and the blocklist quietly dropped the token key. On a token-less target the result was prometheus_enabled=true, no token row anywhere, and a full unauthenticated metrics dump -- the same hole the rule was written to close, reached from the likelier of the two directions. So condition 2 is now per-pair: an exposure class (prometheus) that skips it and is judged on local state alone, and an availability class (mqtt, ldap, ha, virtual_printer) that keeps it. Nothing else changes -- the local-state pass already stands down when the instance has its own credential, when HA_TOKEN is in the environment, and when the toggle is already on locally, so "the exposure pre-dates this restore" still holds and refusals still get no tally increment. One wording consequence: an exposure toggle can now be refused on a payload with no credential-like key in it at all, where the shared caveat would have read "0 credential-like key(s) will be skipped". That case gets its own preview detail code, settingsCompanionOnlyWillSkip, in all 13 locales. Tests: 6 that fail pre-fix -- the token key absent and blank at the unit level, the new preview wording, and the integration test through the real endpoint for both payloads (200 with a full metrics body before this, 404 after). Plus 3 controls, because over-refusal is still the real risk: the exposure route must still stand down for a local token and for an already-on toggle, and the availability class must still let a credential-less mqtt/ldap/virtual_printer toggle through. The anonymous-broker and anonymous-bind controls are unchanged and still pass.