Files
bambuddy/backend/tests/unit/test_external_camera_ssrf.py
T

291 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""The RTSP camera paths must not become a request generator for arbitrary hosts.
`_sanitize_camera_url` is the SSRF boundary for user-configured camera URLs. It
was applied to the MJPEG and snapshot paths but not to the two RTSP ones, which
handed the URL to `ffmpeg -i` unchecked — and ffmpeg's `-i` speaks http, tcp,
file and everything else it was built with, so `camera_type=rtsp` was a way to
name any destination and any protocol.
Wiring the guard in is only half of it. The guard rebuilt URLs from
`parsed.hostname`, which drops credentials and unbrackets IPv6 literals, and it
recognised loopback by comparing against four spellings of it. So these tests
pin three things at once: the RTSP paths refuse what they should, the guard
recognises a destination however it is written, and a real camera — which
usually means an authenticated one — still works.
"""
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from backend.app.services.external_camera import (
_blocked_host_reason,
_capture_rtsp_frame,
_safe_usb_device_path,
_sanitize_camera_url,
_stream_rtsp,
)
RTSP_SCHEMES = ("rtsp", "rtsps")
HTTP_SCHEMES = ("http", "https")
class TestTheHostsWeRefuse:
"""Loopback, the unspecified address and link-local, however they are spelled."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
[
"127.0.0.1",
"127.0.0.2", # the whole 127/8 range, not just .1
"127.1", # short form
"2130706433", # decimal
"0177.0.0.1", # octal
"0x7f.0.0.1", # hex
"[::1]",
"[::ffff:127.0.0.1]", # loopback wearing an IPv6 spelling
"localhost",
"sub.localhost",
],
)
def test_loopback_is_refused(self, host):
assert _sanitize_camera_url(f"rtsp://{host}:554/live", RTSP_SCHEMES) is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize("host", ["0.0.0.0", "[::]"]) # nosec B104
def test_the_unspecified_address_is_refused(self, host):
assert _sanitize_camera_url(f"rtsp://{host}:554/live", RTSP_SCHEMES) is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"host",
[
"169.254.169.254", # AWS/GCP/Azure metadata
"169.254.1.1", # the rest of the range, not just the metadata IP
"[fe80::1]",
"metadata.google.internal",
"metadata.google",
],
)
def test_link_local_and_metadata_are_refused(self, host):
assert _sanitize_camera_url(f"rtsp://{host}/live", RTSP_SCHEMES) is None
def test_the_reason_is_reported_for_logging(self):
assert _blocked_host_reason("2130706433") == "loopback"
assert _blocked_host_reason("169.254.169.254") is not None
assert _blocked_host_reason("192.168.1.50") is None
class TestTheCamerasWeAllow:
"""LAN is allowed on purpose — that is where cameras are."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url",
[
"rtsp://192.168.1.50:554/live",
"rtsp://10.0.0.5/stream1",
"rtsp://172.16.4.9:8554/cam",
"rtsp://[fd00::1]:554/live", # unique-local IPv6
"rtsp://cam.lan/live",
"rtsps://camera.example.com:322/stream",
],
)
def test_a_camera_url_survives(self, url):
assert _sanitize_camera_url(url, RTSP_SCHEMES) is not None
def test_a_hostname_is_not_resolved(self):
"""A name that would resolve to loopback still passes.
Not an oversight: aiohttp and ffmpeg resolve independently afterwards,
so a lookup here decides nothing (DNS rebinding) while costing a DNS
round trip on every capture. Pinned so the omission stays deliberate.
"""
assert _sanitize_camera_url("rtsp://localtest.me/live", RTSP_SCHEMES) is not None
class TestWhatTheGuardMustNotDestroy:
"""Most RTSP cameras carry their login in the URL. Stripping it would turn
every one of them into an authentication failure — a worse outage than the
hole being closed."""
def test_credentials_survive(self):
url = "rtsp://admin:hunter2@192.168.1.50:554/live"
assert _sanitize_camera_url(url, RTSP_SCHEMES) == url
def test_percent_encoded_credentials_survive_byte_for_byte(self):
"""urlparse's .username/.password are already decoded, so rebuilding
from them would corrupt any password containing an @ or a :."""
url = "rtsp://ad%40min:p%3Ass%40word@192.168.1.50:554/live"
assert _sanitize_camera_url(url, RTSP_SCHEMES) == url
def test_an_ipv6_literal_keeps_its_brackets(self):
"""Without them the result is not a URL any client can parse."""
assert _sanitize_camera_url("rtsp://[fd00::1]:554/live", RTSP_SCHEMES) == "rtsp://[fd00::1]:554/live"
def test_http_cameras_keep_their_basic_auth_too(self):
url = "http://admin:hunter2@192.168.1.50/stream.mjpg"
assert _sanitize_camera_url(url, HTTP_SCHEMES) == url
def test_port_query_and_fragment_survive(self):
url = "rtsp://192.168.1.50:8554/live?channel=2&subtype=1#frag"
assert _sanitize_camera_url(url, RTSP_SCHEMES) == url
class TestSchemeAllowlist:
"""What keeps an ffmpeg input a camera fetch rather than a fetch."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url",
[
"http://192.168.1.50:8080/internal",
"https://192.168.1.50/internal",
"tcp://192.168.1.50:22",
"file:///etc/passwd",
"concat:/etc/passwd",
"udp://192.168.1.50:1234",
"ftp://192.168.1.50/x",
],
)
def test_only_rtsp_reaches_the_rtsp_paths(self, url):
assert _sanitize_camera_url(url, RTSP_SCHEMES) is None
def test_rtsp_does_not_reach_the_http_paths(self):
assert _sanitize_camera_url("rtsp://192.168.1.50/live", HTTP_SCHEMES) is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize("url", ["", "not a url", "rtsp://", "://192.168.1.50/x"])
def test_malformed_input_is_refused(self, url):
assert _sanitize_camera_url(url, RTSP_SCHEMES) is None
def _fake_ffmpeg():
return patch("backend.app.services.external_camera.get_ffmpeg_path", return_value="/usr/bin/ffmpeg")
def _spawn_spy(returncode: int | None = 0, stdout: bytes = b"\xff\xd8" + b"\x00" * 200):
"""Stand in for the ffmpeg subprocess, recording the argv it was handed.
The streaming path reads until EOF, so stdout.read returns b"" and the
generator finishes immediately — these tests are about whether ffmpeg was
launched and with what, not about frame extraction.
"""
process = MagicMock()
process.returncode = returncode
process.communicate = AsyncMock(return_value=(stdout, b""))
process.stdout.read = AsyncMock(return_value=b"")
process.stderr.read = AsyncMock(return_value=b"")
process.wait = AsyncMock(return_value=returncode)
process.kill = MagicMock()
process.terminate = MagicMock()
return patch(
"backend.app.services.external_camera.asyncio.create_subprocess_exec",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=process),
)
class TestRtspCaptureRefusesUnsafeUrls:
"""`_capture_rtsp_frame` — the one-shot path behind the test-connection
endpoint, which takes url and camera_type straight off the query string."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url",
[
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal-service", # the reported PoC
"http://192.168.1.100:8080/any-image.jpg",
"file:///etc/passwd",
"rtsp://127.0.0.1:554/live",
"rtsp://2130706433:554/live",
"rtsp://169.254.169.254/live",
],
)
async def test_no_process_is_spawned(self, url):
with _fake_ffmpeg(), _spawn_spy() as spawn:
assert await _capture_rtsp_frame(url, timeout=5) is None
spawn.assert_not_awaited()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_a_real_camera_still_captures(self):
with _fake_ffmpeg(), _spawn_spy() as spawn:
frame = await _capture_rtsp_frame("rtsp://admin:hunter2@192.168.1.50:554/live", timeout=5)
assert frame is not None
cmd = spawn.await_args.args
assert "rtsp://admin:hunter2@192.168.1.50:554/live" in cmd, (
"the camera's credentials must reach ffmpeg or every authenticated camera breaks"
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ffmpeg_is_confined_to_rtsp_protocols(self):
"""Belt and braces behind the scheme check: a stream that references
something outside itself must not be able to pull it in."""
with _fake_ffmpeg(), _spawn_spy() as spawn:
await _capture_rtsp_frame("rtsp://192.168.1.50:554/live", timeout=5)
cmd = spawn.await_args.args
whitelist = cmd[cmd.index("-protocol_whitelist") + 1].split(",")
assert "rtsp" in whitelist
assert "file" not in whitelist
assert "http" not in whitelist
class TestRtspStreamRefusesUnsafeUrls:
"""`_stream_rtsp` — the live-view path, and the one the report missed."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url",
[
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal-service",
"rtsp://127.0.0.1:554/live",
"rtsp://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:554/live",
"file:///etc/passwd",
],
)
async def test_no_process_is_spawned(self, url):
with _fake_ffmpeg(), _spawn_spy() as spawn:
frames = [frame async for frame in _stream_rtsp(url, fps=5)]
assert frames == []
spawn.assert_not_awaited()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_a_real_camera_still_reaches_ffmpeg(self):
with _fake_ffmpeg(), _spawn_spy(returncode=None) as spawn:
[frame async for frame in _stream_rtsp("rtsp://admin:hunter2@192.168.1.50:554/live", fps=5)]
spawn.assert_awaited_once()
cmd = spawn.await_args.args
assert "rtsp://admin:hunter2@192.168.1.50:554/live" in cmd
assert "-protocol_whitelist" in cmd
class TestUsbDevicePaths:
"""The USB paths take a device path from the same request field, and the
streaming one used to check only that it started with /dev/video."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"device",
[
"/dev/video/../../etc/passwd",
"/dev/videos/../../etc/shadow",
"/dev/video0; rm -rf /",
"/etc/passwd",
"/dev/video100", # three digits is not a device number
"",
],
)
def test_a_path_that_is_not_a_device_node_is_refused(self, device):
assert _safe_usb_device_path(device) is None
def test_a_missing_device_is_refused(self):
"""Existence is part of the check — ffmpeg must never be pointed at a
path just because it is shaped like one."""
with patch("backend.app.services.external_camera.Path") as path_cls:
path_cls.return_value.exists.return_value = False
assert _safe_usb_device_path("/dev/video0") is None
def test_the_path_is_rebuilt_from_the_device_number(self):
with patch("backend.app.services.external_camera.Path") as path_cls:
path_cls.return_value.exists.return_value = True
path_cls.return_value.__str__.return_value = "/dev/video7"
assert _safe_usb_device_path("/dev/video7") == "/dev/video7"
path_cls.assert_called_once_with("/dev/video7")