mirror of
https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy.git
synced 2026-10-01 11:47:46 +02:00
The Tailscale toggle was supposed to obtain a publicly-trusted Let's Encrypt
cert via `tailscale cert` so users wouldn't need to import Bambuddy's CA into
the slicer. End-to-end testing showed this was always going to fail:
- Bambu Studio and OrcaSlicer refuse hostname input in the Add Printer
dialog (IP-only).
- Their printer-MQTT trust path validates only against the bundled BBL CA
store (`printer.cer`), NOT the system trust store. Confirmed against
ClusterM/open-bambu-networking's clean-room reimplementation:
`mosquitto_tls_set(BBL_CA)` + `verify_peer=1` + `tls_insecure=true` —
chain validation against BBL CA only, hostname check intentionally
skipped (because Bambu's printer cert CN is the device serial).
- LE certs don't chain to BBL CA, so the slicer rejects with the
well-known "-1" before any hostname/IP logic runs.
The cert-import step is unavoidable; LE provisioning was dead code for slicer
connections. Pivot:
- Toggle stays as an informational marker — when ON, the VP card surfaces
the host's Tailscale IP + MagicDNS hostname so users know what to paste
into the slicer.
- Cert is always self-signed (signed by `bbl_ca`).
- Tailscale exposure is via the existing bind_ip dropdown, which already
includes `tailscale0` IPs.
- Tailscale's role is strictly network reach — same trust burden as LAN.
Backend cuts:
- `tailscale.py`: `provision_cert`, `ensure_cert`, `cert_needs_renewal`,
`_FQDN_RE`, `_HTTPS_DISABLED_RE`, `TS_CERT_EXPIRY_THRESHOLD_DAYS`,
`cryptography` import. Keep `get_status` and `TailscaleStatus`.
- `certificate.py`: `ts_cert_path`, `ts_key_path`, `use_tailscale_cert`.
- `manager.py`: `tailscale_fqdn` field, `_cert_renewal_task`,
`_cert_restart_task`, `_cert_renewal_loop`, `_restart_for_cert_renewal`,
`_cancel_renewal_task`, `_cancel_restart_task`. Simplify
`_resolve_cert_and_advertise` to a sync method that just generates the
self-signed cert. Drop `tailscale_disabled` from the change-detection
diff (toggle is informational — no service restart needed).
- `routes/virtual_printers.py` + `routes/settings.py`: drop the
`tailscale_not_available` 409 guard on toggle-enable.
Frontend cuts:
- `VirtualPrinterCard.tsx`: FQDN/IP display sourced from
`multiVirtualPrinterApi.getTailscaleStatus()` (host-level) when toggle
is ON, instead of `printer.status.tailscale_fqdn` (cert side-effect,
no longer populated). Drop the `tailscale_not_available` toast handler.
- `api/client.ts`: drop `tailscale_fqdn` from the VP status type.
- i18n: rewrite `tailscaleDisabled.description` in all 8 locales to drop
the "no cert import" promise. Remove `toast.tailscaleNotAvailable` key.
Docs:
- Wiki `features/virtual-printer.md`: rewrite the entire Tailscale section
— remove the LE-cert + HTTPS-Certs-toggle + tailscale-cert-operator
steps, document the toggle as informational, keep the Docker socket
mount + LXC TUN troubleshooting (those still apply for daemon
reachability).
- README: drop "the Tailscale benefit here is the tunnel, not cert-import
elimination" framing in favour of "surfaces the IP for paste into
slicer; CA import unchanged because BBL CA store, not system trust
store, is what gets validated".
Tests:
- `test_tailscale.py`: reduced to surviving `get_status` cases (binary
missing, command fails, success, empty DNSName, malformed JSON).
- `test_virtual_printer.py::test_sync_from_db_restarts_on_tailscale_disabled_change`
→ `test_sync_from_db_does_not_restart_on_tailscale_toggle` (toggle is
informational; `remove_instance` must NOT be called).
- `test_virtual_printer_api.py::TestVirtualPrinterTailscaleGuardAPI` →
`TestVirtualPrinterTailscaleToggleAPI` (single test asserts both
directions succeed and daemon is never consulted).
- `VirtualPrinterCard.test.tsx`: mock now stubs `getTailscaleStatus`;
FQDN-copy block drives data through that query.
DB column `tailscale_disabled` is kept (persists toggle state) — Postgres-
safe column drop is harder; future cleanup can remove if the toggle goes
away entirely. LE cert files on disk (`virtual_printer_ts.{crt,key}`) are
left in place per VP — harmless residue, manual cleanup if desired.
Verified: ruff clean, 2484 backend unit tests pass, 17 frontend VP-card
tests pass, frontend build succeeds, live service restart confirms VPs
serve `issuer=CN=Virtual Printer CA` on the Tailscale interface — slicer
trusts the user-imported bambuddy CA and skips hostname checks, so MQTT
connection succeeds end-to-end.
360 lines
13 KiB
Python
360 lines
13 KiB
Python
"""TLS certificate generation for virtual printer services.
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Generates certificates that mimic real Bambu printer certificate format:
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- CA certificate mimics "BBL CA" from "BBL Technologies Co., Ltd"
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- Printer certificate has CN = serial number, signed by the CA
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The CA certificate is persistent and only regenerated if missing or expired.
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This allows users to add the CA to their slicer's trust store once.
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"""
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import logging
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import socket
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from ipaddress import IPv4Address
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from pathlib import Path
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from cryptography import x509
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
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from cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Default serial number for virtual printer (matches SSDP/MQTT config)
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DEFAULT_SERIAL = "00M09A391800001"
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# Minimum days remaining before CA is considered expired and needs regeneration
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CA_EXPIRY_THRESHOLD_DAYS = 30
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def _get_local_ip() -> str:
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"""Get the local IP address."""
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try:
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s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
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s.connect(("8.8.8.8", 80))
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ip = s.getsockname()[0]
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s.close()
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return ip
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except OSError:
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return "127.0.0.1"
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class CertificateService:
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"""Generate and manage TLS certificates for virtual printer.
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Creates a certificate chain mimicking real Bambu printers:
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- Root CA with CN="BBL CA", O="BBL Technologies Co., Ltd", C="CN"
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- Printer cert with CN=serial_number, signed by the CA
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"""
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def __init__(self, cert_dir: Path, serial: str = DEFAULT_SERIAL, shared_ca_dir: Path | None = None):
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"""Initialize the certificate service.
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Args:
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cert_dir: Directory to store per-instance certificates
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serial: Serial number to use as CN in printer certificate
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shared_ca_dir: If set, CA cert/key are read from this directory
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instead of cert_dir (for multi-instance shared CA)
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"""
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self.cert_dir = cert_dir
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self.serial = serial
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ca_dir = shared_ca_dir or cert_dir
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self.ca_cert_path = ca_dir / "bbl_ca.crt"
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self.ca_key_path = ca_dir / "bbl_ca.key"
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self.cert_path = cert_dir / "virtual_printer.crt"
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self.key_path = cert_dir / "virtual_printer.key"
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def ensure_certificates(self) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
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"""Ensure certificates exist, generate if needed.
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Returns:
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Tuple of (cert_path, key_path)
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"""
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if self.cert_path.exists() and self.key_path.exists():
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logger.debug("Using existing virtual printer certificates")
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return self.cert_path, self.key_path
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return self.generate_certificates()
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def _load_existing_ca(self) -> tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, x509.Certificate] | None:
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"""Try to load existing CA certificate and key.
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Returns:
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Tuple of (ca_private_key, ca_certificate) if valid CA exists, None otherwise
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"""
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if not self.ca_cert_path.exists() or not self.ca_key_path.exists():
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logger.debug("CA certificate or key not found")
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return None
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try:
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# Load CA certificate
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ca_cert_pem = self.ca_cert_path.read_bytes()
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ca_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(ca_cert_pem)
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# Check if CA is expired or about to expire
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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days_remaining = (ca_cert.not_valid_after_utc - now).days
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if days_remaining < CA_EXPIRY_THRESHOLD_DAYS:
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logger.warning("CA certificate expires in %s days, will regenerate", days_remaining)
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return None
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# Load CA private key
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ca_key_pem = self.ca_key_path.read_bytes()
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ca_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(ca_key_pem, password=None)
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logger.info("Using existing CA certificate (expires in %s days)", days_remaining)
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return ca_key, ca_cert
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except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
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logger.warning("Failed to load existing CA: %s", e)
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return None
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def _get_or_create_ca(self) -> tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, x509.Certificate]:
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"""Get existing CA or create a new one.
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Returns:
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Tuple of (ca_private_key, ca_certificate)
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"""
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# Try to load existing CA first
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existing = self._load_existing_ca()
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if existing:
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return existing
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# Generate new CA
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ca_key, ca_cert = self._generate_ca_certificate()
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# Save CA certificate and key
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self.cert_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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self.ca_key_path.write_bytes(
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ca_key.private_bytes(
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encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
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format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
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encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
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)
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)
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try:
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self.ca_key_path.chmod(0o600)
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except OSError as e:
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logger.warning("Could not set CA key permissions on %s: %s", self.ca_key_path, e)
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self.ca_cert_path.write_bytes(ca_cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM))
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logger.info("Saved new CA certificate")
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return ca_key, ca_cert
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def _generate_ca_certificate(self) -> tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, x509.Certificate]:
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"""Generate a new CA certificate for the virtual printer.
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We use a generic name instead of mimicking BBL CA, since the slicer
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may specifically reject certificates claiming to be from BBL but
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with a different public key.
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Returns:
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Tuple of (ca_private_key, ca_certificate)
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"""
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logger.info("Generating new Virtual Printer CA certificate...")
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# Generate CA private key
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ca_key = rsa.generate_private_key(
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public_exponent=65537,
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key_size=2048,
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)
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# Use a generic CA name - NOT BBL to avoid being rejected as fake
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ca_name = x509.Name(
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[
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x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Virtual Printer CA"),
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]
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)
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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ca_cert = (
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x509.CertificateBuilder()
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.subject_name(ca_name)
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.issuer_name(ca_name)
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.public_key(ca_key.public_key())
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.serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
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.not_valid_before(now)
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.not_valid_after(now + timedelta(days=7300)) # 20 years
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.add_extension(
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x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=0),
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critical=True,
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)
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.add_extension(
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x509.KeyUsage(
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digital_signature=True,
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content_commitment=False,
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key_encipherment=False,
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data_encipherment=False,
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key_agreement=False,
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key_cert_sign=True,
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crl_sign=True,
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encipher_only=False,
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decipher_only=False,
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),
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critical=True,
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)
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.sign(ca_key, hashes.SHA256())
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)
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return ca_key, ca_cert
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def _build_san_entries(self, local_ip: str, additional_ips: list[str] | None) -> list[x509.GeneralName]:
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"""Build Subject Alternative Name entries for the printer certificate."""
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entries: list[x509.GeneralName] = [
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x509.DNSName("localhost"),
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x509.DNSName("bambuddy"),
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x509.DNSName(self.serial),
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x509.IPAddress(IPv4Address(local_ip)),
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x509.IPAddress(IPv4Address("127.0.0.1")),
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]
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seen_ips = {local_ip, "127.0.0.1"}
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if additional_ips:
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for ip in additional_ips:
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if ip and ip not in seen_ips:
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try:
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entries.append(x509.IPAddress(IPv4Address(ip)))
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seen_ips.add(ip)
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logger.info("Added additional SAN IP: %s", ip)
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except ValueError:
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logger.warning("Skipping invalid additional SAN IP: %s", ip)
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return entries
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def generate_certificates(self, additional_ips: list[str] | None = None) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
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"""Generate printer certificate (reusing existing CA if available).
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Creates a certificate chain mimicking real Bambu printers:
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- CA certificate (reused if exists and valid, otherwise generated)
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- Printer certificate (CN=serial, signed by CA)
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Args:
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additional_ips: Extra IP addresses to include in certificate SAN.
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Used in proxy mode to include the remote interface IP so the
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slicer's TLS handshake succeeds when connecting to the proxy.
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Returns:
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Tuple of (cert_path, key_path)
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"""
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logger.info("Generating certificates for virtual printer (serial: %s)...", self.serial)
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# Ensure directory exists
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self.cert_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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# Get or create CA (reuses existing if valid)
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ca_key, ca_cert = self._get_or_create_ca()
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# Generate printer private key
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printer_key = rsa.generate_private_key(
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public_exponent=65537,
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key_size=2048,
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)
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# Printer certificate subject - CN is the serial number (like real Bambu printers)
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printer_subject = x509.Name(
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[
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x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, self.serial),
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]
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)
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# Issuer is the CA
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issuer = ca_cert.subject
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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local_ip = _get_local_ip()
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logger.info("Generating printer certificate with CN=%s, local IP: %s", self.serial, local_ip)
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# Build printer certificate signed by CA
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printer_cert = (
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x509.CertificateBuilder()
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.subject_name(printer_subject)
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.issuer_name(issuer)
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.public_key(printer_key.public_key())
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.serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
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.not_valid_before(now)
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.not_valid_after(now + timedelta(days=3650)) # 10 years
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.add_extension(
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x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None),
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critical=True,
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)
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.add_extension(
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x509.SubjectAlternativeName(self._build_san_entries(local_ip, additional_ips)),
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critical=False,
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)
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.add_extension(
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x509.ExtendedKeyUsage(
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[
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ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH,
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ExtendedKeyUsageOID.CLIENT_AUTH,
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]
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),
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critical=False,
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)
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.add_extension(
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x509.KeyUsage(
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digital_signature=True,
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content_commitment=False,
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key_encipherment=True,
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data_encipherment=False,
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key_agreement=False,
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key_cert_sign=False,
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crl_sign=False,
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encipher_only=False,
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decipher_only=False,
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),
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critical=True,
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)
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.sign(ca_key, hashes.SHA256()) # Signed by CA, not self-signed
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)
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# Write printer private key
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self.key_path.write_bytes(
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printer_key.private_bytes(
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encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
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format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
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encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
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)
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)
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try:
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self.key_path.chmod(0o600)
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except OSError as e:
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logger.warning("Could not set printer key permissions on %s: %s", self.key_path, e)
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# Write printer certificate (include CA cert in chain for full chain)
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cert_chain = printer_cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM) + ca_cert.public_bytes(
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serialization.Encoding.PEM
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)
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self.cert_path.write_bytes(cert_chain)
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logger.info("Generated certificate chain at %s", self.cert_dir)
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logger.info(" CA: CN=Virtual Printer CA")
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logger.info(" Printer: CN=%s", self.serial)
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return self.cert_path, self.key_path
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def delete_printer_certificate(self) -> None:
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"""Delete only the printer certificate (preserves CA)."""
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for path in [self.cert_path, self.key_path]:
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if path.exists():
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path.unlink()
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logger.info("Deleted printer certificate (CA preserved)")
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def delete_certificates(self, include_ca: bool = False) -> None:
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"""Delete existing certificates.
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Args:
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include_ca: If True, also delete CA certificate and key.
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If False (default), only delete printer certificate.
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"""
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# Always delete printer certificate
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for path in [self.cert_path, self.key_path]:
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if path.exists():
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path.unlink()
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# Only delete CA if explicitly requested
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if include_ca:
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for path in [self.ca_cert_path, self.ca_key_path]:
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if path.exists():
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path.unlink()
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logger.info("Deleted all certificates including CA")
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else:
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logger.info("Deleted printer certificate (CA preserved)")
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