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597762685c
#1558: cached-as-base push_status only forced gcode_state=IDLE while letting the real printer's live-progress fields (mc_percent, stg_cur, layer_num, ...) leak through. Bambu Studio's Send pre-flight read them as busy and refused. The cached branch now overrides the activity-field set the same way it already overrode storage indicators (#1228) and protocol fields. Same bundle ships a multi-round VP audit that found adjacent bugs in the same family: - #1558: cached branch zeroes mc_print_stage / mc_percent / mc_remaining_time / stg / stg_cur / layer_num / total_layer_num / print_error - MQTT auth: per-IP rate-limit (5/60s lockout), hmac.compare_digest, access_code redacted in DEBUG log - FTP cmd_STOR streams chunks to disk + 4 GiB cap (was buffering whole upload) - Sticky-keys allowlist extended with upgrade_state / xcam / hw_switch_state / nozzle_diameter / nozzle_type / online / ams_status - _pending_files cleanup in finally for archive / queue / dispatch handlers - _add_to_print_queue position uses MAX+1 (was hardcoded 1) - DELETE VP removes orphan PendingUpload rows + upload_dir from disk - Per-VP cert regenerates on shared-CA rotation (real signature verification, not DN match) - DHCP target-IP refresh + queue_force_color_match toggle now restart proxy VPs - Per-slicer bridge-response routing (multi-slicer cross-leak fix via sequence_id map) - Child-service readiness barrier (FTP / MQTT / Bind / SSDP) — no false is_running before sockets bind - H2D Pro O1E / O2D model codes added (experimental, needs field confirmation) - FTP passive port range widened 50000-51000; docker-compose + wiki updated - VP refresh_loop crash now unbinds raw_message_handler; tailscale catches asyncio.TimeoutError; SlicerProxyManager lifecycle hardening
77 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
77 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
"""Tests for CertificateService.ensure_certificates' CA-rotation guard.
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When the shared CA is regenerated (e.g. its expiry crossed
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``CA_EXPIRY_THRESHOLD_DAYS``), any per-VP printer certificate that was
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signed by the OLD CA becomes orphaned: it still exists on disk and the
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old fallback ``cert_path.exists()`` check would happily reuse it. A
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slicer that imported the NEW CA then fails the TLS handshake because
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the printer cert's issuer doesn't match anything in its trust store.
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``_cert_matches_current_ca`` is the guard. It compares the on-disk
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printer cert's issuer against the on-disk CA cert's subject; on
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mismatch ``ensure_certificates`` regenerates the per-VP cert under the
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current CA.
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"""
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from backend.app.services.virtual_printer.certificate import CertificateService
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def test_ensure_certificates_reuses_cert_when_issuer_matches_ca(tmp_path):
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"""Happy path: a freshly-generated CA + per-VP cert pair shares
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issuer/subject. ``ensure_certificates`` reads them back without
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regenerating."""
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svc = CertificateService(cert_dir=tmp_path, serial="01P00A391800001")
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# First call: generates the CA + per-VP cert from scratch.
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first_cert, first_key = svc.ensure_certificates()
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first_cert_bytes = first_cert.read_bytes()
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# Second call: cert + CA exist and the issuer matches. Should reuse.
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second_cert, _ = svc.ensure_certificates()
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assert second_cert.read_bytes() == first_cert_bytes
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def test_ensure_certificates_regenerates_when_ca_rotated(tmp_path):
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"""CA rotation scenario: the CA file is replaced with a different one
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(e.g. previous expired and was regenerated). The per-VP cert on disk
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was signed by the old CA, so its issuer no longer matches the new CA's
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subject. ``ensure_certificates`` must regenerate the per-VP cert."""
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# Build the first pair.
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svc1 = CertificateService(cert_dir=tmp_path, serial="01P00A391800001")
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orig_cert_bytes = svc1.ensure_certificates()[0].read_bytes()
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orig_ca_bytes = svc1.ca_cert_path.read_bytes()
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# Simulate CA rotation: build a SECOND CA in a different dir, then
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# swap that CA's files into the original CA path. The per-VP cert
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# still on disk was signed by the original CA — issuer mismatch now.
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rotated_dir = tmp_path / "rotated"
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rotated_dir.mkdir()
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svc_rotated = CertificateService(cert_dir=rotated_dir, serial="01P00A391800002")
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svc_rotated.ensure_certificates()
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# Overwrite the original CA on disk with the rotated one.
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svc1.ca_cert_path.write_bytes(svc_rotated.ca_cert_path.read_bytes())
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svc1.ca_key_path.write_bytes(svc_rotated.ca_key_path.read_bytes())
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assert svc1.ca_cert_path.read_bytes() != orig_ca_bytes # confirm rotation
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# Build a fresh service against the rotated CA, then ensure_certificates
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# should detect the mismatch and regenerate the per-VP cert.
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svc2 = CertificateService(cert_dir=tmp_path, serial="01P00A391800001")
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new_cert, _ = svc2.ensure_certificates()
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new_cert_bytes = new_cert.read_bytes()
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# New per-VP cert must differ from the old (signed by a different CA now).
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assert new_cert_bytes != orig_cert_bytes
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def test_cert_matches_current_ca_returns_false_when_no_ca(tmp_path):
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"""If the CA file is missing entirely, the match check must return
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False so ``ensure_certificates`` falls through to ``generate_certificates``
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instead of returning a per-VP cert that nothing can validate."""
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svc = CertificateService(cert_dir=tmp_path, serial="01P00A391800001")
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# Write a per-VP cert without a CA.
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svc.cert_path.write_bytes(b"fake cert content")
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svc.key_path.write_bytes(b"fake key content")
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# No bbl_ca.crt on disk → match fails safely.
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assert svc._cert_matches_current_ca() is False
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