Files
bambuddy/backend/tests/integration/test_settings_ui_flags_3023.py
maziggy 93eeb05264 fix(auth): let the sidebar read install flags without settings:read (issue #3023)
cost_centers:read_own exists so a non-admin can see their own wallet, balance
and cost-centre spend, and the Finance page honoured it -- typing the URL
worked and rendered their balance. The sidebar never offered the entry.

It decides whether to show Finance by reading billing_enabled from
GET /settings, which requires SETTINGS_READ. A non-admin gets 403 there, so
the value arrived undefined, `undefined !== true` held, and the entry was
hidden from precisely the users the permission was written for. The permission
map and the route guard were both already right; only discovery was broken.

Three more fields came from that same 403, and one of them failed the other way
up. The Notifications gate tests `=== false`, which undefined never satisfies,
so an administrator who switched user notifications off still left the entry
showing to the non-admins it governs. Nobody reported that one, and no
administrator could have reproduced either: administrators can read /settings.
The remaining two were quieter -- the sponsor prompt fell back to EUR whatever
the install uses, and the update check ran where it had been turned off.

SETTINGS_READ cannot be the price of knowing whether billing is on. It also
grants sight of the SMTP, LDAP and MQTT credentials, which is the reason
/settings/ui-preferences exists at all.

So: a second endpoint, GET /settings/ui-flags, carrying those four fields and
asking only that the caller be signed in, via the existing
require_auth_if_enabled. Layout drops its /settings query altogether, which
closes the class rather than the two instances that happened to be visible.

Deliberately not four more fields on /ui-preferences. That endpoint is served
to anyone at all on the recorded grounds that its contents are "public defaults
that ship with the app" (test_route_auth_coverage.py), and its field set is
pinned by a test written to make anyone adding to it stop and think. These
fields are not defaults -- they say how this deployment is configured -- so
they get their own endpoint at their own trust level instead of stretching that
charter to fit them. require_auth_if_enabled also keeps the auth-disabled case
that /ui-preferences was ungated for: "works when there is no auth" and
"readable by anyone" are different statements, and conflating them is what put
a settings read in front of a permission that never needed one.

Twelve tests. Backend pins that the operator can read the flags, that the same
operator still gets 403 from /settings, that an anonymous caller is refused
when auth is on, that it answers when auth is off, the exact field set, that no
credential ever appears, and that the public endpoint did not quietly gain
these fields. Frontend pins Finance visible for cost_centers:read_own with
/settings returning 403, and Notifications hidden when the flag is off -- each
waiting on a positive signal before asserting an absence, so the negative cases
cannot pass before the query resolves.

Reported by @lonix, who traced it to the queryKey and the route gate.
2026-09-07 12:48:31 +02:00

170 lines
7.0 KiB
Python

"""The app shell can read install configuration without settings:read (#3023).
Reporter @lonix: a user holding `cost_centers:read_own` never saw the Finance
entry in the sidebar. The permission map was right and the route guard was
right -- navigating to /finance directly worked and showed their balance. What
hid it was an extra condition, `billing_enabled !== true`, read from
GET /settings, which requires SETTINGS_READ. A non-admin gets 403 there, so the
value arrived undefined and the entry was hidden from exactly the users the
permission exists to serve.
SETTINGS_READ cannot be the price of knowing whether billing is on: it also
grants sight of the SMTP, LDAP and MQTT credentials. Hence /settings/ui-flags,
which asks only that the caller be signed in.
It is deliberately not more fields on /settings/ui-preferences. That endpoint is
served to anyone at all, on the recorded grounds that its contents are "public
defaults that ship with the app" (test_route_auth_coverage.py), and its field
set is pinned by a test written to stop exactly this kind of addition. These
fields are not defaults -- they say how this deployment is configured -- so the
last test here pins that they did not leak into it.
"""
import secrets
import pytest
from httpx import AsyncClient
from backend.app.models.settings import Settings
FLAGS_URL = "/api/v1/settings/ui-flags"
_FIXTURE_PW = "Aa1!" + secrets.token_urlsafe(12) # pragma: allowlist secret
async def _setup_admin(async_client: AsyncClient, username: str) -> str:
await async_client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/setup",
json={"auth_enabled": True, "admin_username": username, "admin_password": _FIXTURE_PW},
)
login = await async_client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login",
json={"username": username, "password": _FIXTURE_PW},
)
assert login.status_code == 200, login.text
return login.json()["access_token"]
async def _create_operator(
async_client: AsyncClient,
admin_token: str,
*,
username: str,
permissions: list[str],
) -> str:
"""A non-admin holding exactly `permissions` -- never settings:read."""
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
grp = await async_client.post(
"/api/v1/groups/",
headers=headers,
json={"name": f"ui_flags_test_{username}", "permissions": permissions},
)
assert grp.status_code == 201, grp.text
user = await async_client.post(
"/api/v1/users/",
headers=headers,
json={
"username": username,
"password": _FIXTURE_PW,
"role": "user",
"group_ids": [grp.json()["id"]],
},
)
assert user.status_code == 201, user.text
assert user.json()["is_admin"] is False
login = await async_client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login",
json={"username": username, "password": _FIXTURE_PW},
)
assert login.status_code == 200, login.text
return login.json()["access_token"]
@pytest.mark.integration
class TestTheUserTheEndpointExistsFor:
"""A non-admin with cost_centers:read_own and nothing else."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_they_can_read_the_flags(self, async_client: AsyncClient):
admin = await _setup_admin(async_client, "flagadmin1")
op = await _create_operator(async_client, admin, username="flagop1", permissions=["cost_centers:read_own"])
resp = await async_client.get(FLAGS_URL, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {op}"})
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert "billing_enabled" in resp.json()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_they_still_cannot_read_settings(self, async_client: AsyncClient):
"""The fix must not have widened SETTINGS_READ to get there."""
admin = await _setup_admin(async_client, "flagadmin2")
op = await _create_operator(async_client, admin, username="flagop2", permissions=["cost_centers:read_own"])
resp = await async_client.get("/api/v1/settings/", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {op}"})
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_billing_enabled_carries_the_configured_value(self, async_client: AsyncClient, db_session):
"""The whole point: the sidebar tests this for `true`, so it has to be
the real value and a real bool, not a truthy string."""
admin = await _setup_admin(async_client, "flagadmin3")
op = await _create_operator(async_client, admin, username="flagop3", permissions=["cost_centers:read_own"])
db_session.add(Settings(key="billing_enabled", value="true"))
await db_session.commit()
resp = await async_client.get(FLAGS_URL, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {op}"})
assert resp.json()["billing_enabled"] is True
@pytest.mark.integration
class TestTheBoundaryItDraws:
"""Signed in is required; settings:read is not."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_an_anonymous_caller_is_refused_when_auth_is_on(self, async_client: AsyncClient):
"""This is the reason it is a separate endpoint rather than four more
fields on the public one."""
await _setup_admin(async_client, "flagadmin4")
resp = await async_client.get(FLAGS_URL)
assert resp.status_code in (401, 403), resp.text
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_it_answers_when_auth_is_switched_off(self, async_client: AsyncClient):
"""An install with no auth has no user to authenticate, and the shell
still has to render. require_auth_if_enabled returns None there."""
resp = await async_client.get(FLAGS_URL)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
@pytest.mark.integration
class TestWhatItExposes:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_the_field_set_is_exactly_these_four(self, async_client: AsyncClient):
"""Pinned like the /ui-preferences set: anything added here is readable
by every signed-in user, so adding one should require editing this."""
resp = await async_client.get(FLAGS_URL)
assert set(resp.json().keys()) == {
"billing_enabled",
"user_notifications_enabled",
"currency",
"check_updates",
}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_no_credential_ever_appears(self, async_client: AsyncClient, db_session):
for i, key in enumerate(
("smtp_password", "ldap_bind_password", "mqtt_password", "ha_token", "prometheus_token")
):
db_session.add(Settings(key=key, value=f"SECRET_VALUE_{i}_DO_NOT_LEAK"))
await db_session.commit()
body = (await async_client.get(FLAGS_URL)).text
assert "DO_NOT_LEAK" not in body
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_the_public_endpoint_did_not_gain_them(self, async_client: AsyncClient):
"""These describe the deployment, not app defaults, so they must not
have been added to the endpoint that serves anyone at all."""
public = (await async_client.get("/api/v1/settings/ui-preferences")).json()
assert "billing_enabled" not in public
assert "user_notifications_enabled" not in public