Files
maziggy d56b48c499 feat(auth): connected apps - sign in to external applications with Bambuddy
Minimal OAuth 2.0 authorization-code flow with PKCE (S256): admins register
an app with one exact callback URL (Settings > API Keys > Connected Apps);
/connect/authorize asks for consent once and returns a single-use, 60 s code
bound to app, callback and challenge; POST /api/v1/connect/token swaps it,
with the client secret, for the user's identity and permissions. Codes and
secrets stored hashed, exchanges rate-limited per client and IP, no redirect
before the callback is validated, API keys cannot authorize, refused while
auth is disabled. i18n for all 15 locales.

-----

fix(db): upgrading from 0.2.4.0 or older no longer crashes at startup

The #2974 failure-reason conversion ran before the #1378 migration that adds
print_log_entries.failure_reason, so older databases stopped with "no such
column: failure_reason". It now skips a table without the column, only runs
where a legacy label exists, and on SQLite rebuilds archive_fts first, since
archives created before that index existed trip "database disk image is
malformed" when updated.
2026-09-26 12:51:53 +02:00

605 lines
25 KiB
Python

from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Annotated
import jwt as _jwt
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, status
from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
from sqlalchemy import delete, func, select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
from backend.app.api.routes.settings import get_external_login_url
from backend.app.core.auth import (
ALGORITHM,
SECRET_KEY,
RequireAdminIfAuthEnabled,
RequireAnyPermissionIfAuthEnabled,
RequirePermissionIfAuthEnabled,
get_current_user_optional,
get_password_hash,
revoke_jti,
security,
verify_password,
)
from backend.app.core.database import get_db
from backend.app.core.permissions import Permission
from backend.app.models.api_key import APIKey
from backend.app.models.archive import PrintArchive
from backend.app.models.auth_ephemeral import AuthEphemeralToken, TokenType
from backend.app.models.connected_app import ConnectedApp, ConnectedAppGrant
from backend.app.models.group import Group
from backend.app.models.library import LibraryFile
from backend.app.models.long_lived_token import LongLivedToken
from backend.app.models.oidc_provider import UserOIDCLink
from backend.app.models.print_batch import PrintBatch
from backend.app.models.print_queue import PrintQueueItem
from backend.app.models.settings import Settings
from backend.app.models.user import User
from backend.app.models.user_otp_code import UserOTPCode
from backend.app.models.user_totp import UserTOTP
from backend.app.schemas.auth import (
ChangePasswordRequest,
GroupBrief,
UserCreate,
UserResponse,
UserSlim,
UserUpdate,
)
from backend.app.services.email_service import (
create_welcome_email_from_template,
generate_secure_password,
get_smtp_settings,
send_email,
)
from backend.app.services.finance_defaults import ensure_user_finance_defaults
from backend.app.utils.library_paths import remove_library_photos_dir
router = APIRouter(prefix="/users", tags=["users"])
def _user_to_response(user: User) -> UserResponse:
"""Convert a User model to UserResponse schema."""
return UserResponse(
id=user.id,
username=user.username,
email=user.email,
role=user.role,
is_active=user.is_active,
is_admin=user.is_admin,
auth_source=getattr(user, "auth_source", "local"),
groups=[GroupBrief(id=g.id, name=g.name) for g in user.groups],
permissions=sorted(user.get_permissions()),
created_at=user.created_at.isoformat(),
)
@router.get("", response_model=list[UserResponse])
@router.get("/", response_model=list[UserResponse])
async def list_users(
_: User | None = RequirePermissionIfAuthEnabled(Permission.USERS_READ),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""List all users.
Read-only — gated on ``USERS_READ`` only. Operator-visible UIs
(Stats filter-by-user, Archives Print Log username column, File
Manager username autocomplete) consume this endpoint via custom-
group ``users:read`` grants without admin role. The admin-only
boundary lives on the write endpoints below."""
result = await db.execute(select(User).options(selectinload(User.groups)).order_by(User.created_at))
users = result.scalars().all()
return [_user_to_response(user) for user in users]
@router.post("", response_model=UserResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
@router.post("/", response_model=UserResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def create_user(
user_data: UserCreate,
_admin: User | None = RequireAdminIfAuthEnabled(),
_: User | None = RequirePermissionIfAuthEnabled(Permission.USERS_CREATE),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Create a new user.
When advanced authentication is enabled:
- Email is required
- Password is auto-generated and emailed to user
- Admin cannot set or see the password
"""
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Check if advanced auth is enabled
result = await db.execute(select(Settings).where(Settings.key == "advanced_auth_enabled"))
advanced_auth_setting = result.scalar_one_or_none()
advanced_auth_enabled = advanced_auth_setting and advanced_auth_setting.value.lower() == "true"
# Check if username already exists (case-insensitive)
existing_user = await db.execute(select(User).where(func.lower(User.username) == func.lower(user_data.username)))
if existing_user.scalar_one_or_none():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Username already exists",
)
# Validate role
if user_data.role not in ["admin", "user"]:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Role must be 'admin' or 'user'",
)
# Advanced auth validation
if advanced_auth_enabled:
if not user_data.email:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Email is required when advanced authentication is enabled",
)
# Check if email already exists (case-insensitive)
existing_email = await db.execute(select(User).where(func.lower(User.email) == func.lower(user_data.email)))
if existing_email.scalar_one_or_none():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Email already exists",
)
# Generate password if advanced auth enabled, otherwise require password
if advanced_auth_enabled:
password = generate_secure_password()
else:
if not user_data.password:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Password is required when advanced authentication is disabled",
)
password = user_data.password
new_user = User(
username=user_data.username,
email=user_data.email,
password_hash=get_password_hash(password),
role=user_data.role,
is_active=True,
)
# Handle group assignments
if user_data.group_ids:
groups_result = await db.execute(select(Group).where(Group.id.in_(user_data.group_ids)))
groups = groups_result.scalars().all()
if len(groups) != len(user_data.group_ids):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="One or more group IDs are invalid",
)
new_user.groups = list(groups)
db.add(new_user)
await db.flush()
await ensure_user_finance_defaults(db, new_user)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(new_user)
# Send welcome email if advanced auth enabled
if advanced_auth_enabled and new_user.email:
try:
smtp_settings = await get_smtp_settings(db)
if smtp_settings:
login_url = await get_external_login_url(db)
subject, text_body, html_body = await create_welcome_email_from_template(
db, new_user.username, password, login_url
)
send_email(smtp_settings, new_user.email, subject, text_body, html_body)
logger.info(f"Welcome email sent to {new_user.email}")
else:
logger.warning(f"SMTP not configured, could not send welcome email to {new_user.email}")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to send welcome email: {e}")
# Don't fail user creation if email fails
return _user_to_response(new_user)
@router.get("/slim", response_model=list[UserSlim])
async def list_users_slim(
_: User | None = RequireAnyPermissionIfAuthEnabled(Permission.USERS_READ_SLIM, Permission.USERS_READ),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""List users as ``{id, username}`` only (#1894).
Exists so an API key -- or a group that should not see emails, roles and
permission sets -- can turn the ``created_by_id`` values it already gets
back from archives, stats and the queue into names.
``USERS_READ`` is accepted alongside ``USERS_READ_SLIM`` because it is
strictly broader; groups that already hold it keep working without a
permission backfill. For API keys only the slim permission resolves (the
full one is unmapped = administrative), so a key reaches this and not the
listing above.
Declared before ``/{user_id}`` on purpose: FastAPI matches in declaration
order, and the reverse order would parse "slim" as the int path parameter
and answer 422.
"""
result = await db.execute(select(User.id, User.username).order_by(User.username))
return [UserSlim(id=row.id, username=row.username) for row in result.all()]
@router.get("/{user_id}", response_model=UserResponse)
async def get_user(
user_id: int,
_: User | None = RequirePermissionIfAuthEnabled(Permission.USERS_READ),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Get a user by ID. Read-only — gated on ``USERS_READ`` only."""
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id).options(selectinload(User.groups)))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
detail="User not found",
)
return _user_to_response(user)
@router.patch("/{user_id}", response_model=UserResponse)
async def update_user(
user_id: int,
user_data: UserUpdate,
_admin: User | None = RequireAdminIfAuthEnabled(),
_: User | None = RequirePermissionIfAuthEnabled(Permission.USERS_UPDATE),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Update a user."""
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id).options(selectinload(User.groups)))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
detail="User not found",
)
# Prevent deactivating the last admin
if user_data.is_active is False and user.is_admin:
# Count admins by role or Administrators group membership
admin_count_result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active.is_(True)))
role_admins = admin_count_result.scalars().all()
# Also check for users in Administrators group
admin_group_result = await db.execute(
select(Group).where(Group.name == "Administrators").options(selectinload(Group.users))
)
admin_group = admin_group_result.scalar_one_or_none()
group_admins = [u for u in (admin_group.users if admin_group else []) if u.is_active]
# Combine unique admins
all_admins = {u.id for u in role_admins} | {u.id for u in group_admins}
if len(all_admins) <= 1 and user.id in all_admins:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Cannot deactivate the last admin user",
)
# Prevent changing role of last admin
if user_data.role and user_data.role != "admin" and user.role == "admin":
admin_count_result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active.is_(True)))
admin_count = len(admin_count_result.scalars().all())
if admin_count <= 1:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Cannot change role of the last admin user",
)
if user_data.username is not None:
# Check if new username already exists (case-insensitive)
existing_user = await db.execute(
select(User).where(func.lower(User.username) == func.lower(user_data.username), User.id != user_id)
)
if existing_user.scalar_one_or_none():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Username already exists",
)
user.username = user_data.username
if user_data.email is not None:
# Check if new email already exists (case-insensitive)
existing_email = await db.execute(
select(User).where(func.lower(User.email) == func.lower(user_data.email), User.id != user_id)
)
if existing_email.scalar_one_or_none():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Email already exists",
)
user.email = user_data.email
if user_data.password is not None:
if getattr(user, "auth_source", "local") == "ldap":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Cannot set password for LDAP users",
)
user.password_hash = get_password_hash(user_data.password)
if user_data.role is not None:
if user_data.role not in ["admin", "user"]:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Role must be 'admin' or 'user'",
)
user.role = user_data.role
if user_data.is_active is not None:
user.is_active = user_data.is_active
# Handle group assignments
if user_data.group_ids is not None:
groups_result = await db.execute(select(Group).where(Group.id.in_(user_data.group_ids)))
groups = groups_result.scalars().all()
if len(groups) != len(user_data.group_ids):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="One or more group IDs are invalid",
)
user.groups = list(groups)
await ensure_user_finance_defaults(db, user)
await db.commit()
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id).options(selectinload(User.groups)))
user = result.scalar_one()
return _user_to_response(user)
@router.get("/{user_id}/items-count")
async def get_user_items_count(
user_id: int,
_: User | None = RequirePermissionIfAuthEnabled(Permission.USERS_READ),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Get count of items created by this user. Read-only — gated on
``USERS_READ`` only."""
# Verify user exists
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
if not result.scalar_one_or_none():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
detail="User not found",
)
# Count archives
archives_result = await db.execute(select(func.count(PrintArchive.id)).where(PrintArchive.created_by_id == user_id))
archives_count = archives_result.scalar() or 0
# Count queue items
queue_result = await db.execute(
select(func.count(PrintQueueItem.id)).where(PrintQueueItem.created_by_id == user_id)
)
queue_items_count = queue_result.scalar() or 0
# Count library files
library_result = await db.execute(
select(func.count(LibraryFile.id)).where(
LibraryFile.created_by_id == user_id,
LibraryFile.deleted_at.is_(None),
)
)
library_files_count = library_result.scalar() or 0
return {
"archives": archives_count,
"queue_items": queue_items_count,
"library_files": library_files_count,
}
@router.delete("/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def delete_user(
user_id: int,
delete_items: bool = Query(False, description="Delete all items created by this user"),
_admin: User | None = RequireAdminIfAuthEnabled(),
current_user: User | None = RequirePermissionIfAuthEnabled(Permission.USERS_DELETE),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Delete a user.
If delete_items=True, all archives, queue items, and library files created by
this user will also be deleted. Otherwise, these items will become "ownerless"
(created_by_id set to NULL by the foreign key constraint).
"""
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id).options(selectinload(User.groups)))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
detail="User not found",
)
# Prevent deleting the last admin
if user.is_admin:
# Count admins by role or Administrators group membership
admin_count_result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.id != user_id))
other_role_admins = admin_count_result.scalars().all()
# Also check for users in Administrators group
admin_group_result = await db.execute(
select(Group).where(Group.name == "Administrators").options(selectinload(Group.users))
)
admin_group = admin_group_result.scalar_one_or_none()
other_group_admins = [u for u in (admin_group.users if admin_group else []) if u.id != user_id and u.is_active]
# Combine unique admins
all_other_admins = {u.id for u in other_role_admins} | {u.id for u in other_group_admins}
if len(all_other_admins) == 0:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Cannot delete the last admin user",
)
# Prevent deleting yourself (only if auth is enabled and we have a current user)
if current_user and user.id == current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Cannot delete your own account",
)
# Photo directories of the library rows about to go, resolved while the
# rows still exist to say which ids they belong to. Removed after the
# commit, so a failed delete leaves the pictures alone (#3077).
doomed_library_file_ids: list[int] = []
if delete_items:
doomed_library_file_ids = list(
(await db.execute(select(LibraryFile.id).where(LibraryFile.created_by_id == user_id))).scalars().all()
)
# Delete all items created by this user
await db.execute(delete(PrintArchive).where(PrintArchive.created_by_id == user_id))
await db.execute(delete(PrintQueueItem).where(PrintQueueItem.created_by_id == user_id))
await db.execute(delete(LibraryFile).where(LibraryFile.created_by_id == user_id))
await db.execute(delete(PrintBatch).where(PrintBatch.created_by_id == user_id))
else:
# Explicitly set created_by_id to NULL for all items (ensures consistent behavior
# across different database backends, including SQLite without foreign key support).
# PrintBatch carries the same created_by_id FK with ondelete=SET NULL — admin-deleted
# users would otherwise leave dangling created_by_id on SQLite (#1295 review nit).
from sqlalchemy import update
await db.execute(update(PrintArchive).where(PrintArchive.created_by_id == user_id).values(created_by_id=None))
await db.execute(
update(PrintQueueItem).where(PrintQueueItem.created_by_id == user_id).values(created_by_id=None)
)
await db.execute(update(LibraryFile).where(LibraryFile.created_by_id == user_id).values(created_by_id=None))
await db.execute(update(PrintBatch).where(PrintBatch.created_by_id == user_id).values(created_by_id=None))
# Drop API keys owned by this user. The model declares ON DELETE CASCADE
# so Postgres handles this automatically, but SQLite ships with FK
# enforcement off (the project's existing pattern — same reason the
# blocks above set created_by_id = NULL by hand). Without an explicit
# DELETE here, deleting a user on SQLite would leave their API keys
# with a dangling user_id and ``_user_from_api_key`` would return None,
# silently degrading the keys to anonymous (and locking them out of
# /cloud/* — but the rest of the API would still accept them, which is
# exactly the orphan-key state the CASCADE was meant to prevent).
await db.execute(delete(APIKey).where(APIKey.user_id == user_id))
# Drop OIDC links, MFA state, and long-lived camera-stream tokens
# owned by this user. Same SQLite/FK pattern as APIKey above. Without
# these, deleting a user on SQLite leaves:
# - UserOIDCLink: the OIDC callback finds the orphan link, fails to
# resolve the (now missing) user, and falls through to
# "account_inactive" instead of triggering auto_create (#1285).
# - UserTOTP: MFA secrets persist in the DB after the owning user.
# - UserOTPCode: pending email OTP codes linger.
# - LongLivedToken: per-user camera-stream tokens whose secret_hash
# is still valid — verify() would happily match them by lookup
# prefix even though the user is gone.
await db.execute(delete(UserOIDCLink).where(UserOIDCLink.user_id == user_id))
await db.execute(delete(UserTOTP).where(UserTOTP.user_id == user_id))
await db.execute(delete(UserOTPCode).where(UserOTPCode.user_id == user_id))
await db.execute(delete(LongLivedToken).where(LongLivedToken.user_id == user_id))
# Connected apps, same SQLite/FK pattern. A leftover consent row would
# skip the consent screen for whoever is next given this user id, and a
# code issued in the last minute is keyed by username, not id.
from sqlalchemy import update as _update
await db.execute(delete(ConnectedAppGrant).where(ConnectedAppGrant.user_id == user_id))
await db.execute(
delete(AuthEphemeralToken).where(
AuthEphemeralToken.token_type == TokenType.CONNECT_CODE,
func.lower(AuthEphemeralToken.username) == user.username.lower(),
)
)
await db.execute(_update(ConnectedApp).where(ConnectedApp.created_by_id == user_id).values(created_by_id=None))
await db.delete(user)
await db.commit()
for file_id in doomed_library_file_ids:
remove_library_photos_dir(file_id)
@router.post("/me/change-password", response_model=dict)
async def change_own_password(
password_data: ChangePasswordRequest,
credentials: Annotated[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials | None, Depends(security)] = None,
current_user: User | None = Depends(get_current_user_optional),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""Change the current user's password. Requires current password verification."""
if not current_user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Authentication required to change password",
)
# Block password change for LDAP users
if getattr(current_user, "auth_source", "local") == "ldap":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Cannot change password for LDAP users — passwords are managed by the LDAP server",
)
# Verify current password
if not current_user.password_hash:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Account has no local password set",
)
# Rate-limit failed password-change attempts (H-R5-A)
from backend.app.api.routes.mfa import MAX_2FA_ATTEMPTS, check_rate_limit, record_failed_attempt
await check_rate_limit(db, current_user.username, event_type="password_change", max_attempts=MAX_2FA_ATTEMPTS)
if not verify_password(password_data.current_password, current_user.password_hash):
await record_failed_attempt(db, current_user.username, event_type="password_change")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Current password is incorrect",
)
# Fetch user from this session to ensure changes are persisted
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == current_user.id))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
detail="User not found",
)
# Update password
user.password_hash = get_password_hash(password_data.new_password)
user.password_changed_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) # M-R7-B: invalidate all prior JWTs
await db.commit()
# L-R6-A: Password verified successfully — reset the failure counter
from backend.app.api.routes.mfa import clear_failed_attempts
await clear_failed_attempts(db, user.username, event_type="password_change")
# Revoke the current session token so the caller must re-authenticate (M-R5-A)
if credentials is not None:
try:
payload = _jwt.decode(credentials.credentials, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[ALGORITHM])
jti = payload.get("jti")
exp = payload.get("exp")
if jti and exp:
try:
await revoke_jti(jti, datetime.fromtimestamp(exp, tz=timezone.utc), user.username)
except Exception as exc:
# B4: log so operators know revocation is broken; password was
# already changed so the token will fail freshness checks anyway.
import logging
logging.getLogger(__name__).error(
"Failed to revoke JTI after password change for user %s: %s", user.username, exc
)
except Exception:
pass # Decode failure is harmless — token is already invalidated by password_changed_at
return {"message": "Password changed successfully"}