Two recurring virtual-printer support pains, both on the Virtual Printers
settings page.
Setup check: a stethoscope action on each VP card runs a pass/fail/warn/skip
checklist — VP enabled, services running, bind interface still exists, access
code set, target printer (proxy mode), and a live TCP probe of the FTP / MQTT
/ discovery ports on the bind IP. start_server swallows per-service bind
errors, so a service object can exist while nothing is listening; probing the
bind IP from outside is the only reliable signal and it catches the common
"VP not visible in the slicer" bind-IP-conflict and stale-interface cases.
Slicer certificate: virtual printers present a TLS cert signed by a shared CA
the slicer must trust. Until now users had to docker exec in and cat
bbl_ca.crt. A "Slicer certificate" row on the settings card now offers Copy
and Download (bambuddy-virtual-printer-ca.crt) plus the SHA-256 fingerprint.
GET /virtual-printers/ca-certificate returns only the public certificate; the
CA private key never leaves the backend. The CA is generated on demand so the
button works before the first VP is enabled.
Backend:
- services/virtual_printer/diagnostic.py — run_vp_diagnostic + port probes
- schemas/virtual_printer.py — VPDiagnosticResult
- CertificateService.get_ca_certificate_info() + manager helper
- routes: GET /virtual-printers/ca-certificate, /{vp_id}/diagnostic
Frontend:
- VirtualPrinterDiagnosticModal.tsx; stethoscope button on VirtualPrinterCard
- caCert row on VirtualPrinterList; utils/clipboard.ts (shared copy w/
non-secure-context fallback + downloadTextFile), de-duplicating the
existing FQDN-copy logic
- vpDiagnostic.* + virtualPrinter.caCert.* across all 9 locales
9 backend unit tests + 4 route integration tests + 6 frontend tests.
Backend ruff clean, frontend build clean, i18n parity green.
The Tailscale toggle was supposed to obtain a publicly-trusted Let's Encrypt
cert via `tailscale cert` so users wouldn't need to import Bambuddy's CA into
the slicer. End-to-end testing showed this was always going to fail:
- Bambu Studio and OrcaSlicer refuse hostname input in the Add Printer
dialog (IP-only).
- Their printer-MQTT trust path validates only against the bundled BBL CA
store (`printer.cer`), NOT the system trust store. Confirmed against
ClusterM/open-bambu-networking's clean-room reimplementation:
`mosquitto_tls_set(BBL_CA)` + `verify_peer=1` + `tls_insecure=true` —
chain validation against BBL CA only, hostname check intentionally
skipped (because Bambu's printer cert CN is the device serial).
- LE certs don't chain to BBL CA, so the slicer rejects with the
well-known "-1" before any hostname/IP logic runs.
The cert-import step is unavoidable; LE provisioning was dead code for slicer
connections. Pivot:
- Toggle stays as an informational marker — when ON, the VP card surfaces
the host's Tailscale IP + MagicDNS hostname so users know what to paste
into the slicer.
- Cert is always self-signed (signed by `bbl_ca`).
- Tailscale exposure is via the existing bind_ip dropdown, which already
includes `tailscale0` IPs.
- Tailscale's role is strictly network reach — same trust burden as LAN.
Backend cuts:
- `tailscale.py`: `provision_cert`, `ensure_cert`, `cert_needs_renewal`,
`_FQDN_RE`, `_HTTPS_DISABLED_RE`, `TS_CERT_EXPIRY_THRESHOLD_DAYS`,
`cryptography` import. Keep `get_status` and `TailscaleStatus`.
- `certificate.py`: `ts_cert_path`, `ts_key_path`, `use_tailscale_cert`.
- `manager.py`: `tailscale_fqdn` field, `_cert_renewal_task`,
`_cert_restart_task`, `_cert_renewal_loop`, `_restart_for_cert_renewal`,
`_cancel_renewal_task`, `_cancel_restart_task`. Simplify
`_resolve_cert_and_advertise` to a sync method that just generates the
self-signed cert. Drop `tailscale_disabled` from the change-detection
diff (toggle is informational — no service restart needed).
- `routes/virtual_printers.py` + `routes/settings.py`: drop the
`tailscale_not_available` 409 guard on toggle-enable.
Frontend cuts:
- `VirtualPrinterCard.tsx`: FQDN/IP display sourced from
`multiVirtualPrinterApi.getTailscaleStatus()` (host-level) when toggle
is ON, instead of `printer.status.tailscale_fqdn` (cert side-effect,
no longer populated). Drop the `tailscale_not_available` toast handler.
- `api/client.ts`: drop `tailscale_fqdn` from the VP status type.
- i18n: rewrite `tailscaleDisabled.description` in all 8 locales to drop
the "no cert import" promise. Remove `toast.tailscaleNotAvailable` key.
Docs:
- Wiki `features/virtual-printer.md`: rewrite the entire Tailscale section
— remove the LE-cert + HTTPS-Certs-toggle + tailscale-cert-operator
steps, document the toggle as informational, keep the Docker socket
mount + LXC TUN troubleshooting (those still apply for daemon
reachability).
- README: drop "the Tailscale benefit here is the tunnel, not cert-import
elimination" framing in favour of "surfaces the IP for paste into
slicer; CA import unchanged because BBL CA store, not system trust
store, is what gets validated".
Tests:
- `test_tailscale.py`: reduced to surviving `get_status` cases (binary
missing, command fails, success, empty DNSName, malformed JSON).
- `test_virtual_printer.py::test_sync_from_db_restarts_on_tailscale_disabled_change`
→ `test_sync_from_db_does_not_restart_on_tailscale_toggle` (toggle is
informational; `remove_instance` must NOT be called).
- `test_virtual_printer_api.py::TestVirtualPrinterTailscaleGuardAPI` →
`TestVirtualPrinterTailscaleToggleAPI` (single test asserts both
directions succeed and daemon is never consulted).
- `VirtualPrinterCard.test.tsx`: mock now stubs `getTailscaleStatus`;
FQDN-copy block drives data through that query.
DB column `tailscale_disabled` is kept (persists toggle state) — Postgres-
safe column drop is harder; future cleanup can remove if the toggle goes
away entirely. LE cert files on disk (`virtual_printer_ts.{crt,key}`) are
left in place per VP — harmless residue, manual cleanup if desired.
Verified: ruff clean, 2484 backend unit tests pass, 17 frontend VP-card
tests pass, frontend build succeeds, live service restart confirms VPs
serve `issuer=CN=Virtual Printer CA` on the Tailscale interface — slicer
trusts the user-imported bambuddy CA and skips hostname checks, so MQTT
connection succeeds end-to-end.
Enable Bambu Studio on a remote network to print through BamBuddy
acting as a TLS-terminating proxy for both MQTT and FTP connections.
- Add TLSProxy base class and FTPTLSProxy with PASV response rewriting,
EPSV→PASV translation, PROT P/C tracking, and one-shot data proxies
- Add SlicerProxyManager to coordinate per-slicer MQTT + FTP proxy pairs
- Support additional SAN IPs in certificate generation for proxy mode
- Broadcast SSDP on LAN B so slicers discover the proxy as a printer
- Narrow FTP passive port range to 50000-50100 with retry logic
- Expose proxy ports (8883, 9990, 50000-50100) in Dockerfile
- Document passive port range in docker-compose.yml
- Correct SSDP model codes: C11=P1P, C12=P1S, N7=P2S, C13=X1E
- Fix serial prefixes based on actual Bambu serial format
- Add confirmation modal for pending upload discard
- Sort model dropdown alphabetically, remove internal codes
- Add "Setup Required" warning with link to wiki documentation
- Update wiki with certificate installation and platform setup guides
- Virtual printer appears in Bambu Studio/Orca Slicer via SSDP discovery
- Secure TLS/MQTT communication with auto-generated certificates
- Queue mode (pending uploads) or auto-start mode
- Configurable access code for authentication
- Docker support with network_mode: host and certificate persistence
- Fix backup/restore for virtual printer settings (auto-save no longer overwrites)
maziggy