7 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jmoore-skild	9284240279	fix(backup): gate every restore category on the permission owning its rows (#2656) ... settings was gated on settings:update because a restore rewrites rows PUT /api/v1/settings/ owns. The same argument applies to the other three categories, and gating one but not the rest is the only state that is not defensible: a role holding Backup alone could still write spools, archives and K-profiles through a restore that it cannot write through the endpoints that own them. Each category now also requires that endpoint's write permission - inventory:update, archives:update_all and kprofiles:update. archives takes update_all rather than create because a restore writes rows owned by other users, which is exactly what update_all means. All missing permissions are reported in one refusal: a restore is a multi-select, so naming them one at a time turns picking four categories into four round trips.	2026-08-05 16:10:04 -04:00
jmoore-skild	bbd991510f	fix(backup): refuse prometheus_enabled when the backup has no token either (#2656) ... The companion-credential rule has five conditions, and the second one -- "the backup itself carried a usable credential" -- was applied to all five pairs. It should not be. It is what stops the rule over-refusing an anonymous MQTT broker or an anonymous LDAP bind, both of which are working configs: there, an empty credential in the backup means the restore is not producing anything weaker than what was backed up. For prometheus_enabled it does not transfer. An empty prometheus_token removes /api/v1/metrics' only gate, so the exposure is a property of the toggle, not of a downgrade relative to the backup -- and prometheus_token is optional, so a backup taken on an instance that enabled Prometheus without ever setting one carries the toggle and no usable token. That payload skipped the refusal entirely: not a candidate, so the local-state pass never ran, and the blocklist quietly dropped the token key. On a token-less target the result was prometheus_enabled=true, no token row anywhere, and a full unauthenticated metrics dump -- the same hole the rule was written to close, reached from the likelier of the two directions. So condition 2 is now per-pair: an exposure class (prometheus) that skips it and is judged on local state alone, and an availability class (mqtt, ldap, ha, virtual_printer) that keeps it. Nothing else changes -- the local-state pass already stands down when the instance has its own credential, when HA_TOKEN is in the environment, and when the toggle is already on locally, so "the exposure pre-dates this restore" still holds and refusals still get no tally increment. One wording consequence: an exposure toggle can now be refused on a payload with no credential-like key in it at all, where the shared caveat would have read "0 credential-like key(s) will be skipped". That case gets its own preview detail code, settingsCompanionOnlyWillSkip, in all 13 locales. Tests: 6 that fail pre-fix -- the token key absent and blank at the unit level, the new preview wording, and the integration test through the real endpoint for both payloads (200 with a full metrics body before this, 404 after). Plus 3 controls, because over-refusal is still the real risk: the exposure route must still stand down for a local token and for an already-on toggle, and the availability class must still let a credential-less mqtt/ldap/virtual_printer toggle through. The anonymous-broker and anonymous-bind controls are unchanged and still pass.	2026-08-04 08:57:34 -04:00
jmoore-skild	8efa9c2945	fix(backup): require settings:update to restore the settings category (#2656) ... The restore endpoint was gated on `github:restore` alone, and the settings category rewrites arbitrary non-auth `Settings` rows. Backup and Settings are separate permission groups, so a role holding only Backup could change settings it cannot change through `PUT /api/v1/settings/`, the endpoint that owns them. The inconsistency is ours rather than an inference: this module already makes exactly this argument — it is why the four protected auth keys are refused outright — and `library.py` sets the precedent of elevating a route to `settings:update` for the same reason. Gated per-category rather than by demoting `github:restore` wholesale, so it stays narrow and doesn't presume the answer for `spools:*`, `archives:*` and `kprofiles`. That broader permission-model question goes to the maintainer in the PR reply. `current_user is None` only means auth is disabled — `github:restore` is in `_APIKEY_DENIED_PERMISSIONS`, so an API key never reaches the route body. No frontend change: `request()` puts the 403's `detail` on the Error, and the modal already renders `restoreMutation.error.message` in its red block, so the user sees the missing permission named. Tests: 1 regression (a Backup-only role gets 403 and `run_restore` is never awaited) + 3 controls (the same role still restores the other three categories; a role holding both permissions still restores settings; auth disabled is unaffected). The regression confirmed failing against the pre-fix route. `_create_config` gained an optional token so it works under auth.	2026-08-04 08:57:34 -04:00
jmoore-skild	af8d14d796	i18n(backup): make the restore notes and preview details translatable (#2656) ... A German user got a translated modal with "Not present in this backup commit" in the middle of it. Every tally note and preview caveat was a server-built English sentence rendered verbatim. Follows the backup.pathCheck contract already in use one card down in the same component, deliberately rather than inventing a second convention: the server sends a `code` plus typed `params` and carries the English along as the fallback, and the client renders `t(`...${code}`, { ...params, defaultValue: message })`. The defaultValue arm is what keeps a newer backend's unfamiliar code readable instead of printing the raw key — covered by its own test. Shapes: - notes: list[str] -> list[GitHubRestoreNote] {code, params, message}. Breaking, but the field is unreleased in this same PR. - GitHubRestorePreviewCategory gains detail_code / detail_params; `detail` stays as the English fallback. - _CategoryTally.note(code, message, **params), deduped on (code, params) rather than on the rendered text, so two offline printers both keep their names. The 20-note cap is unchanged. 28 new leaves across 13 locales: 20 notes.* and 8 details.*. `noData` collapses the four per-category "No X data in this backup" strings into one, since the category heading already renders beside it. Counts use single-form {{count}} in the existing "N record(s)" style rather than i18next plural suffixes — nothing in this block uses _one/_other and the parity script has extra rules for them. Parity holds at 5737 leaves in all 13 locales. Deliberately out of scope, and worth saying so rather than leaving it to look like an oversight: result.message, the commit-picker subject lines and the HTTP error strings stay English. Those also originate in the provider backends, so code-ifying them widens the diff well past the restore service. spoolTagKept is added here with the rest of the locale churn but is not emitted until the next commit, so the 13-locale change lands once.	2026-08-04 08:57:33 -04:00
jmoore-skild	cfa82bfcfb	fix(backup): carry the owner across, or restored archives are invisible (#2656) ... Neither _collect_archives nor _restore_archives touched created_by_id, so every restored archive row landed NULL. That column is not attribution, it is what the access check runs on: _ensure_archive_visible (api/routes/archives.py) fails closed on NULL — a 404 for any caller without archives:read_all — and the list paths filter created_by_id == user.id. On a multi-user instance the tally therefore reported archives restored while the person who owns them could neither list nor open them. Same shape as the deleted_at fix, and the same remedy: the collector records the key next to deleted_at, the restore mirrors the printer_id/project_id pattern exactly — one hoisted select(User.id), a membership test per row, an unknown id coerced to None rather than failing the row, and one de-duplicated note. It is in the overwrite setattr loop too, so overwrite keeps meaning "make local match the backup". Additive on the backup side, so older backups still restore; they just cannot know the owner. Clearing the id is not silent-safe, so the note says what it costs: those archives are visible only to users with archives:read_all until an admin reassigns them. Caveat recorded in a comment and raised in the PR, not decided here: this is the one place the module reuses a raw backup id, against its own rule. Validating it means a *stale* id clears rather than pointing somewhere wrong, but a live id belonging to a different person on a different instance would still collide. Collecting username and resolving on that would close it. 6 unit tests and 1 integration test that all fail against the parent commit, plus 2 controls that pass either way — a backup with no created_by_id key still restores, and a second operator still gets a 404.	2026-08-04 08:57:33 -04:00
jmoore-skild	ca93d4cf44	fix(backup): never restore a toggle whose credential can't come with it (#2656) ... A settings restore refuses to write anything credential-shaped, but wrote the switches that depend on those credentials like any other key. Restoring the two halves apart is not a partial restore, it is a downgrade. The sharp case is Prometheus. /api/v1/metrics is on PUBLIC_API_ROUTES and its only gate is `if token:`, so an empty or absent token means no authentication at all. prometheus_token matches the `token` hint and is refused; prometheus_enabled is an ordinary key and was written. On an instance that never enabled Prometheus there is no local token row, so overwrite-*off* alone was enough to publish the whole metrics body to anyone who could reach the port. The new integration test shows exactly that: 200 with a full unauthenticated body before, 404 after. Four more pairs are the same shape and break an integration rather than open one: ldap_enabled/ldap_bind_password, mqtt_enabled/mqtt_password, ha_enabled/ha_token (with an HA_TOKEN env arm, since get_homeassistant_settings prefers the environment over the row), and virtual_printer_enabled/virtual_printer_access_code — the last largely vestigial post-migration, included for consistency. A toggle is refused only when all five hold: the payload value is truthy, the backup carried a non-empty companion credential, that credential is denylisted, this instance has no usable value for it, and the toggle is not already on locally. The second condition is what keeps the rule honest — an anonymous MQTT broker and an anonymous LDAP bind are legitimate configs that pass empty credentials straight through, and without it both would be false positives. With it, the rule fires only when the restore would produce a config weaker than both the backup and the local instance. A present-but-blank prometheus_token row counts as unusable, since that is precisely the `if token:` hole. The rule needs the payload *and* local database state, which the old static _count_items could not see, so preview and restore now share one classifier: _plan_settings() runs a single SELECT over both halves of every candidate pair before anything enters the session, and returns the three refusal buckets. preview() takes the session the route already has. _is_skipped_setting_key is gone rather than having its docstring corrected as asked: a name is no longer enough to decide, so the union predicate had no caller left. Also implements the review's third ruling — the tally counts what the preview counted, and refusals live in the notes. Two `skipped += 1` increments are dropped (blocked, protected) and the companion refusal adds none; the value-is- None and overwrite-off skips stay, because they depend on the run's flags, which the preview cannot see. restored + skipped + failed now equals the item count the user was shown — off by three before. Behaviour change called out for review: test_credential_keys_are_never_restored and test_auth_settings_are_never_restored asserted skipped == 2 and 4; both are now 0, which is the point of the ruling. 16 new unit tests plus 2 integration tests. Nine of them are controls, because over-refusal is the real risk of this change — the anonymous-broker and anonymous-bind guards are load-bearing, not decoration.	2026-08-04 08:57:24 -04:00
jmoore-skild	6a239314dc	feat(backup): restore selected categories from a Git backup commit (#2656) ... The Git backup feature was push-only: there was no equivalent of the local backup's Restore button, so recovering meant hand-downloading JSON files from the repository. This adds the read side. Providers gain list_commits / list_tree / fetch_files on the GitProviderBackend ABC. GitHub implements them against the Git Data API and Gitea/Forgejo inherit that unchanged; GitLab overrides for its own REST shape, including tree pagination and subgroup path encoding. fetch_files is batched so the path -> blob SHA lookup happens once per restore rather than once per file, and uses the blobs API rather than contents because contents silently inlines only the first 1 MB. The new GitHubRestoreService resolves HEAD to a concrete SHA up front, so a preview and the restore that follows act on the same commit even if a scheduled backup lands in between. Categories are applied archives -> spools -> settings -> kprofiles: archives first because spool usage history references archive_id, K-profiles last because they leave the database and publish over MQTT. Restores never reuse the backup's primary keys. spool.id and print_archives.id are bare autoincrement columns, so ids from an old backup very likely belong to unrelated rows today; rows are matched on natural keys (tag_uid, then tray_uuid, then a descriptive composite for spools; content_hash or filename plus started_at for archives), inserted without an explicit id, and an old_id -> new_id map rewrites the foreign keys in spool usage history. created_at is carried across on insert so restoring the same backup twice matches instead of duplicating. Dangling printer/project links are cleared and reported rather than failing the row. Settings restore re-applies the collector's credential denylist on the read side, plus a pattern guard, because a backup taken before that denylist existed can still contain secrets. Restored archives are metadata-only: the 3MF and thumbnail bytes are not in a Git backup and print_archives.file_path is NOT NULL, so inserted rows get an empty path and the UI says so. Backup and restore take a mutex against each other; both write the same tables and talk to the same printers. Restores are logged as GitHubBackupLog rows with trigger="restore", which needs no migration and surfaces them in the existing History card. Cloud profiles are deliberately not a restore category. The collector never actually writes cloud_profiles/*.json - it reads a "setting" list key the Bambu Cloud API does not return - and the preset list it would write carries no setting payload. Filed separately. Permission github:restore already existed and is granted to Administrators, so no permission changes were needed. Tests: 125 new backend tests (provider reads across all four providers, the per-category appliers, the API endpoints) and 13 frontend tests. Full suites pass with no regressions; the 35 backend failures on Windows are byte-identical with and without this branch.	2026-08-04 08:22:57 -04:00