Every pipeline endpoint answered 403 for API keys whatever scopes the key
carried. PR A parked all three permissions on the admin denylist until the
run dispatch existed to decide about; it landed in PR C and the parking was
never revisited.
PIPELINES_READ now rides can_read_status. PIPELINES_RUN requires
can_queue AND can_manage_library together, so the allowlist gained tuple
values: a run slices into the library and then queues prints, and mapping
it to either flag alone would hand that flag the other one's authority.
The 403 names every flag the key is short of. PIPELINES_WRITE stays
admin-only -- a key can run the recipe, not rewrite it or clear the log.
Opening the run route also needed the cloud-owner fallback the direct
slice route makes: a pipeline can carry Bambu/Orca Cloud presets, and
resolving those reads a token off a user record that an API-keyed request
does not have. retry_failed forwards the new dependency explicitly,
since a direct call receives the Depends marker rather than None.
PROJECTS_CREATE/UPDATE/DELETE were in _APIKEY_DENIED_PERMISSIONS with no
entry in _APIKEY_SCOPE_BY_PERMISSION, so every project mutation returned a
generic 403 for any API key regardless of granted permissions -- the same
regression class as archives (#1888) and library (#1832).
Add a per-key can_manage_projects scope. Project routes gate on plain
PROJECTS_* (no OWN/ALL split), so all three CRUD permissions map to the one
scope; membership edits (add-archives) gate on PROJECTS_UPDATE and are
covered. PROJECTS_READ is unchanged (already under can_read_status).
Column defaults TRUE for new keys; existing rows backfill to FALSE so the
upgrade never silently widens scope. Migration is BOOLEAN (SQLite + Postgres
safe), verified on fresh SQLite and Postgres 17. Bundled SpoolBuddy kiosk key
set to False. Settings API-key UI gets a Manage Projects toggle + Projects
badge; 11-locale i18n. RBAC scope matrix + drift guards extended.
DELETE /api/v1/archives/{id} rejected every API key with 403
"API keys cannot be used for administrative operations", regardless of
the print's owner or the key's scopes. ARCHIVES_DELETE_ALL/_OWN (and the
create/update variants) were on the denylist and absent from the scope
allowlist, so require_ownership_permission fell through to the generic
admin-denied 403 — the whole archive-management surface was unreachable
for API keys. Same regression class as the #1832 library/maintenance
carve-outs.
Add a can_manage_archives per-key scope: ARCHIVES_CREATE, ARCHIVES_
UPDATE_OWN/_ALL and ARCHIVES_DELETE_OWN/_ALL move from the denylist to
the allowlist under it (OWN and ALL fold into the same scope, matching
can_manage_library). ARCHIVES_PURGE stays admin-only — it drops the
print's Quick Stats contribution, mirroring LIBRARY_PURGE. Column
defaults TRUE for UI-created keys; existing rows backfill to FALSE so the
upgrade never silently widens scope. Bundled SpoolBuddy kiosk key stays
minimally scoped (False). Migration is dialect-agnostic and verified on
fresh SQLite and Postgres 17.
Adds the Settings API-key toggle + badge (11-locale i18n) and extends the
RBAC scope matrix to cover all five archive-management permissions.
Carve MAINTENANCE_CREATE/UPDATE/DELETE out of the admin denylist so
HA automations can log "cleaned nozzle" / reset a counter via API key
without granting broader printer control. Follows the same shape as
can_manage_library and can_manage_inventory: new column, allowlist
entry, UI checkbox, wiki row, RBAC test coverage.
Distinct backfill: these perms were EXPLICITLY denied for every API
key before this change (no existing integration relies on them), so
existing rows migrate to FALSE — no silent scope widening on upgrade.
New keys default to TRUE, matching the safe-on-by-default pattern.
Bundled SpoolBuddy kiosk key gets False explicitly (kiosk doesn't need it).
require_ownership_permission gates API keys on `all_perm` only — the
comment at auth.py:1659 says OWN and ALL "both map to the same scope
flag" for queue / archives / etc., so checking `all_perm` is the
correct gate. Library deliberately broke that: LIBRARY_UPDATE_OWN /
LIBRARY_DELETE_OWN mapped to can_manage_library, but the ALL variants
were in _APIKEY_DENIED_PERMISSIONS. Result — every API-key request to
DELETE /library/files/{id}, PUT /library/files/{id} (rename), or
POST /library/files/move hit "administrative operations" 403, even
for keys with can_manage_library=True. Only slice worked, because it
doesn't go through require_ownership_permission.
The "ALL stays admin-only because it crosses the user boundary"
intent was internally inconsistent. API keys have no per-row
ownership identity (user=None), so the route's
`file.created_by_id != user.id` ownership check would AttributeError
on a key acting under OWN anyway — the only working path is
can_modify_all=True, which `all_perm` denial blocked outright.
Fix folds LIBRARY_UPDATE_ALL and LIBRARY_DELETE_ALL into
_APIKEY_SCOPE_BY_PERMISSION under can_manage_library, matching the
can_queue precedent (QUEUE_UPDATE_OWN and QUEUE_UPDATE_ALL both
map to can_queue for the same per-key-identity reason). Both removed
from _APIKEY_DENIED_PERMISSIONS. LIBRARY_PURGE stays denied — it
bypasses the soft-delete window and is genuinely destructive.
API-key permission gates went from a 17-entry admin denylist with the three
documented scope flags (can_read_status / can_queue / can_control_printer)
enforced only inside /api/v1/webhook/* to an explicit per-Permission
allowlist consulted by every dependency:
- core/auth.py: _APIKEY_SCOPE_BY_PERMISSION maps every non-admin
Permission to one scope flag on APIKey; unmapped = 403.
_check_apikey_permissions now takes the api_key and checks the flag.
- require_any_permission_if_auth_enabled + require_ownership_permission
were returning None for any valid key with zero scope check; both now
invoke _check_apikey_permissions and fail closed.
- Two new scope flags on api_keys: can_manage_library (LIBRARY_UPLOAD /
UPDATE_OWN / DELETE_OWN / MAKERWORLD_IMPORT) and can_manage_inventory
(INVENTORY_CREATE / UPDATE / DELETE / FORECAST_WRITE — required by
SpoolBuddy kiosks). Default TRUE, backfilled from can_queue so existing
"queue-only" keys keep working and hardened "read-only" keys do not
silently gain writes.
- CLOUD_AUTH now routed through can_access_cloud for defence-in-depth
alongside the existing _cloud_api_key_gate.
- Migration column-existence check (_api_keys_column_exists) gates the
backfill so user-edited values are never overwritten on restart.
Structural drift backstop: test_every_permission_has_a_classification fails
CI on any new Permission added without an explicit scope mapping —
prevents the denylist-shape regression that grew the prior surface.
Backend 5469 tests green; ruff clean. Frontend build green; i18n parity
green across 9 locales (5005 leaves each, +6 new keys). Wiki permissions
table + allowlist callout + upgrade notes updated.
feat(spoolman-inventory): squashed feature work for rebase onto dev
Squashed all commits from feature/spoolman-inventory-ui onto a single commit
to enable a clean rebase onto dev. Original per-commit history preserved at
backup tag backup/spoolman-inventory-ui-prerebase-20260507-105721.
feat(spoolman-inventory): squashed feature work for rebase onto dev
Squashed all commits from feature/spoolman-inventory-ui onto a single commit
to enable a clean rebase onto dev. Original per-commit history preserved at
backup tag backup/spoolman-inventory-ui-prerebase-20260507-105721.
feat(inventory): replace Spoolman iframe with internal inventory UI
When Spoolman is enabled, the Inventory page now uses the same internal
UI (spool list, create/edit modal, archive, delete, weight sync) backed
by a new proxy layer instead of opening an iframe.
maziggy