A slicer holding the CA of two Bambuddy installs could only connect to
one of them. Each CA worked on its own; together, one stopped, with the
generic "Connect ... failed! [SN:..., code=-1]" that an install whose
CA was never imported gives.
Every install signed as exactly CN=Virtual Printer CA. A slicer's trust
store is a flat list of certificates and OpenSSL resolves an issuer by
Subject DN: it takes the first authority whose name matches and fails
the chain when that one turns out not to have signed the certificate,
rather than trying the next match. Whichever CA landed second in the
file lost -- decided by nothing but the order they were appended in.
Reproduced with openssl verify against a bundle holding two CAs: the
first leaf verifies, the second fails with "certificate signature
failure".
- certificate.py: a newly generated CA takes a suffix from its own key
identifier (CN=Virtual Printer CA D55808BE) and publishes that
identifier, which the printer certificate points back at.
- Existing CAs are untouched, so nothing has to be re-imported. A
printer certificate signed by one keeps exactly the shape it has
today: the authority key identifier is added only when the CA has an
identifier to name.
- tests: unique names per install, the identifier reaching the leaf,
an existing CA being reused unchanged, and both chains verifying
through openssl from a single trust store.
The collision goes away as soon as one of the two CAs is newer than
this change. Two installs that both predate it still collide until one
has its bbl_ca.crt/.key deleted and regenerated, which is a re-import
for that one -- documented in the wiki.
Reported by @Steven-Pierce.
Two recurring virtual-printer support pains, both on the Virtual Printers
settings page.
Setup check: a stethoscope action on each VP card runs a pass/fail/warn/skip
checklist — VP enabled, services running, bind interface still exists, access
code set, target printer (proxy mode), and a live TCP probe of the FTP / MQTT
/ discovery ports on the bind IP. start_server swallows per-service bind
errors, so a service object can exist while nothing is listening; probing the
bind IP from outside is the only reliable signal and it catches the common
"VP not visible in the slicer" bind-IP-conflict and stale-interface cases.
Slicer certificate: virtual printers present a TLS cert signed by a shared CA
the slicer must trust. Until now users had to docker exec in and cat
bbl_ca.crt. A "Slicer certificate" row on the settings card now offers Copy
and Download (bambuddy-virtual-printer-ca.crt) plus the SHA-256 fingerprint.
GET /virtual-printers/ca-certificate returns only the public certificate; the
CA private key never leaves the backend. The CA is generated on demand so the
button works before the first VP is enabled.
Backend:
- services/virtual_printer/diagnostic.py — run_vp_diagnostic + port probes
- schemas/virtual_printer.py — VPDiagnosticResult
- CertificateService.get_ca_certificate_info() + manager helper
- routes: GET /virtual-printers/ca-certificate, /{vp_id}/diagnostic
Frontend:
- VirtualPrinterDiagnosticModal.tsx; stethoscope button on VirtualPrinterCard
- caCert row on VirtualPrinterList; utils/clipboard.ts (shared copy w/
non-secure-context fallback + downloadTextFile), de-duplicating the
existing FQDN-copy logic
- vpDiagnostic.* + virtualPrinter.caCert.* across all 9 locales
9 backend unit tests + 4 route integration tests + 6 frontend tests.
Backend ruff clean, frontend build clean, i18n parity green.
The Tailscale toggle was supposed to obtain a publicly-trusted Let's Encrypt
cert via `tailscale cert` so users wouldn't need to import Bambuddy's CA into
the slicer. End-to-end testing showed this was always going to fail:
- Bambu Studio and OrcaSlicer refuse hostname input in the Add Printer
dialog (IP-only).
- Their printer-MQTT trust path validates only against the bundled BBL CA
store (`printer.cer`), NOT the system trust store. Confirmed against
ClusterM/open-bambu-networking's clean-room reimplementation:
`mosquitto_tls_set(BBL_CA)` + `verify_peer=1` + `tls_insecure=true` —
chain validation against BBL CA only, hostname check intentionally
skipped (because Bambu's printer cert CN is the device serial).
- LE certs don't chain to BBL CA, so the slicer rejects with the
well-known "-1" before any hostname/IP logic runs.
The cert-import step is unavoidable; LE provisioning was dead code for slicer
connections. Pivot:
- Toggle stays as an informational marker — when ON, the VP card surfaces
the host's Tailscale IP + MagicDNS hostname so users know what to paste
into the slicer.
- Cert is always self-signed (signed by `bbl_ca`).
- Tailscale exposure is via the existing bind_ip dropdown, which already
includes `tailscale0` IPs.
- Tailscale's role is strictly network reach — same trust burden as LAN.
Backend cuts:
- `tailscale.py`: `provision_cert`, `ensure_cert`, `cert_needs_renewal`,
`_FQDN_RE`, `_HTTPS_DISABLED_RE`, `TS_CERT_EXPIRY_THRESHOLD_DAYS`,
`cryptography` import. Keep `get_status` and `TailscaleStatus`.
- `certificate.py`: `ts_cert_path`, `ts_key_path`, `use_tailscale_cert`.
- `manager.py`: `tailscale_fqdn` field, `_cert_renewal_task`,
`_cert_restart_task`, `_cert_renewal_loop`, `_restart_for_cert_renewal`,
`_cancel_renewal_task`, `_cancel_restart_task`. Simplify
`_resolve_cert_and_advertise` to a sync method that just generates the
self-signed cert. Drop `tailscale_disabled` from the change-detection
diff (toggle is informational — no service restart needed).
- `routes/virtual_printers.py` + `routes/settings.py`: drop the
`tailscale_not_available` 409 guard on toggle-enable.
Frontend cuts:
- `VirtualPrinterCard.tsx`: FQDN/IP display sourced from
`multiVirtualPrinterApi.getTailscaleStatus()` (host-level) when toggle
is ON, instead of `printer.status.tailscale_fqdn` (cert side-effect,
no longer populated). Drop the `tailscale_not_available` toast handler.
- `api/client.ts`: drop `tailscale_fqdn` from the VP status type.
- i18n: rewrite `tailscaleDisabled.description` in all 8 locales to drop
the "no cert import" promise. Remove `toast.tailscaleNotAvailable` key.
Docs:
- Wiki `features/virtual-printer.md`: rewrite the entire Tailscale section
— remove the LE-cert + HTTPS-Certs-toggle + tailscale-cert-operator
steps, document the toggle as informational, keep the Docker socket
mount + LXC TUN troubleshooting (those still apply for daemon
reachability).
- README: drop "the Tailscale benefit here is the tunnel, not cert-import
elimination" framing in favour of "surfaces the IP for paste into
slicer; CA import unchanged because BBL CA store, not system trust
store, is what gets validated".
Tests:
- `test_tailscale.py`: reduced to surviving `get_status` cases (binary
missing, command fails, success, empty DNSName, malformed JSON).
- `test_virtual_printer.py::test_sync_from_db_restarts_on_tailscale_disabled_change`
→ `test_sync_from_db_does_not_restart_on_tailscale_toggle` (toggle is
informational; `remove_instance` must NOT be called).
- `test_virtual_printer_api.py::TestVirtualPrinterTailscaleGuardAPI` →
`TestVirtualPrinterTailscaleToggleAPI` (single test asserts both
directions succeed and daemon is never consulted).
- `VirtualPrinterCard.test.tsx`: mock now stubs `getTailscaleStatus`;
FQDN-copy block drives data through that query.
DB column `tailscale_disabled` is kept (persists toggle state) — Postgres-
safe column drop is harder; future cleanup can remove if the toggle goes
away entirely. LE cert files on disk (`virtual_printer_ts.{crt,key}`) are
left in place per VP — harmless residue, manual cleanup if desired.
Verified: ruff clean, 2484 backend unit tests pass, 17 frontend VP-card
tests pass, frontend build succeeds, live service restart confirms VPs
serve `issuer=CN=Virtual Printer CA` on the Tailscale interface — slicer
trusts the user-imported bambuddy CA and skips hostname checks, so MQTT
connection succeeds end-to-end.
Enable Bambu Studio on a remote network to print through BamBuddy
acting as a TLS-terminating proxy for both MQTT and FTP connections.
- Add TLSProxy base class and FTPTLSProxy with PASV response rewriting,
EPSV→PASV translation, PROT P/C tracking, and one-shot data proxies
- Add SlicerProxyManager to coordinate per-slicer MQTT + FTP proxy pairs
- Support additional SAN IPs in certificate generation for proxy mode
- Broadcast SSDP on LAN B so slicers discover the proxy as a printer
- Narrow FTP passive port range to 50000-50100 with retry logic
- Expose proxy ports (8883, 9990, 50000-50100) in Dockerfile
- Document passive port range in docker-compose.yml
- Correct SSDP model codes: C11=P1P, C12=P1S, N7=P2S, C13=X1E
- Fix serial prefixes based on actual Bambu serial format
- Add confirmation modal for pending upload discard
- Sort model dropdown alphabetically, remove internal codes
- Add "Setup Required" warning with link to wiki documentation
- Update wiki with certificate installation and platform setup guides
- Virtual printer appears in Bambu Studio/Orca Slicer via SSDP discovery
- Secure TLS/MQTT communication with auto-generated certificates
- Queue mode (pending uploads) or auto-start mode
- Configurable access code for authentication
- Docker support with network_mode: host and certificate persistence
- Fix backup/restore for virtual printer settings (auto-save no longer overwrites)
maziggy