settings was gated on settings:update because a restore rewrites rows
PUT /api/v1/settings/ owns. The same argument applies to the other three
categories, and gating one but not the rest is the only state that is
not defensible: a role holding Backup alone could still write spools,
archives and K-profiles through a restore that it cannot write through
the endpoints that own them.
Each category now also requires that endpoint's write permission -
inventory:update, archives:update_all and kprofiles:update. archives
takes update_all rather than create because a restore writes rows owned
by other users, which is exactly what update_all means.
All missing permissions are reported in one refusal: a restore is a
multi-select, so naming them one at a time turns picking four categories
into four round trips.
The restore endpoint was gated on `github:restore` alone, and the settings
category rewrites arbitrary non-auth `Settings` rows. Backup and Settings are
separate permission groups, so a role holding only Backup could change
settings it cannot change through `PUT /api/v1/settings/`, the endpoint that
owns them.
The inconsistency is ours rather than an inference: this module already makes
exactly this argument — it is why the four protected auth keys are refused
outright — and `library.py` sets the precedent of elevating a route to
`settings:update` for the same reason.
Gated per-category rather than by demoting `github:restore` wholesale, so it
stays narrow and doesn't presume the answer for `spools:*`, `archives:*` and
`kprofiles`. That broader permission-model question goes to the maintainer in
the PR reply.
`current_user is None` only means auth is disabled — `github:restore` is in
`_APIKEY_DENIED_PERMISSIONS`, so an API key never reaches the route body.
No frontend change: `request()` puts the 403's `detail` on the Error, and the
modal already renders `restoreMutation.error.message` in its red block, so
the user sees the missing permission named.
Tests: 1 regression (a Backup-only role gets 403 and `run_restore` is never
awaited) + 3 controls (the same role still restores the other three
categories; a role holding both permissions still restores settings; auth
disabled is unaffected). The regression confirmed failing against the pre-fix
route. `_create_config` gained an optional token so it works under auth.
A settings restore refuses to write anything credential-shaped, but wrote the
switches that depend on those credentials like any other key. Restoring the two
halves apart is not a partial restore, it is a downgrade.
The sharp case is Prometheus. /api/v1/metrics is on PUBLIC_API_ROUTES and its
only gate is `if token:`, so an empty or absent token means no authentication at
all. prometheus_token matches the `token` hint and is refused; prometheus_enabled
is an ordinary key and was written. On an instance that never enabled Prometheus
there is no local token row, so overwrite-*off* alone was enough to publish the
whole metrics body to anyone who could reach the port. The new integration test
shows exactly that: 200 with a full unauthenticated body before, 404 after.
Four more pairs are the same shape and break an integration rather than open one:
ldap_enabled/ldap_bind_password, mqtt_enabled/mqtt_password, ha_enabled/ha_token
(with an HA_TOKEN env arm, since get_homeassistant_settings prefers the
environment over the row), and virtual_printer_enabled/virtual_printer_access_code
— the last largely vestigial post-migration, included for consistency.
A toggle is refused only when all five hold: the payload value is truthy, the
backup carried a non-empty companion credential, that credential is denylisted,
this instance has no usable value for it, and the toggle is not already on
locally. The second condition is what keeps the rule honest — an anonymous MQTT
broker and an anonymous LDAP bind are legitimate configs that pass empty
credentials straight through, and without it both would be false positives. With
it, the rule fires only when the restore would produce a config weaker than both
the backup and the local instance. A present-but-blank prometheus_token row
counts as unusable, since that is precisely the `if token:` hole.
The rule needs the payload *and* local database state, which the old static
_count_items could not see, so preview and restore now share one classifier:
_plan_settings() runs a single SELECT over both halves of every candidate pair
before anything enters the session, and returns the three refusal buckets.
preview() takes the session the route already has. _is_skipped_setting_key is
gone rather than having its docstring corrected as asked: a name is no longer
enough to decide, so the union predicate had no caller left.
Also implements the review's third ruling — the tally counts what the preview
counted, and refusals live in the notes. Two `skipped += 1` increments are
dropped (blocked, protected) and the companion refusal adds none; the value-is-
None and overwrite-off skips stay, because they depend on the run's flags, which
the preview cannot see. restored + skipped + failed now equals the item count the
user was shown — off by three before.
Behaviour change called out for review: test_credential_keys_are_never_restored
and test_auth_settings_are_never_restored asserted skipped == 2 and 4; both are
now 0, which is the point of the ruling.
16 new unit tests plus 2 integration tests. Nine of them are controls, because
over-refusal is the real risk of this change — the anonymous-broker and
anonymous-bind guards are load-bearing, not decoration.
The Git backup feature was push-only: there was no equivalent of the local
backup's Restore button, so recovering meant hand-downloading JSON files from
the repository. This adds the read side.
Providers gain list_commits / list_tree / fetch_files on the GitProviderBackend
ABC. GitHub implements them against the Git Data API and Gitea/Forgejo inherit
that unchanged; GitLab overrides for its own REST shape, including tree
pagination and subgroup path encoding. fetch_files is batched so the path ->
blob SHA lookup happens once per restore rather than once per file, and uses the
blobs API rather than contents because contents silently inlines only the first
1 MB.
The new GitHubRestoreService resolves HEAD to a concrete SHA up front, so a
preview and the restore that follows act on the same commit even if a scheduled
backup lands in between. Categories are applied archives -> spools -> settings
-> kprofiles: archives first because spool usage history references archive_id,
K-profiles last because they leave the database and publish over MQTT.
Restores never reuse the backup's primary keys. spool.id and print_archives.id
are bare autoincrement columns, so ids from an old backup very likely belong to
unrelated rows today; rows are matched on natural keys (tag_uid, then
tray_uuid, then a descriptive composite for spools; content_hash or filename
plus started_at for archives), inserted without an explicit id, and an
old_id -> new_id map rewrites the foreign keys in spool usage history.
created_at is carried across on insert so restoring the same backup twice
matches instead of duplicating. Dangling printer/project links are cleared and
reported rather than failing the row.
Settings restore re-applies the collector's credential denylist on the read
side, plus a pattern guard, because a backup taken before that denylist existed
can still contain secrets. Restored archives are metadata-only: the 3MF and
thumbnail bytes are not in a Git backup and print_archives.file_path is NOT
NULL, so inserted rows get an empty path and the UI says so.
Backup and restore take a mutex against each other; both write the same tables
and talk to the same printers. Restores are logged as GitHubBackupLog rows with
trigger="restore", which needs no migration and surfaces them in the existing
History card.
Cloud profiles are deliberately not a restore category. The collector never
actually writes cloud_profiles/*.json - it reads a "setting" list key the Bambu
Cloud API does not return - and the preset list it would write carries no
setting payload. Filed separately.
Permission github:restore already existed and is granted to Administrators, so
no permission changes were needed.
Tests: 125 new backend tests (provider reads across all four providers, the
per-category appliers, the API endpoints) and 13 frontend tests. Full suites
pass with no regressions; the 35 backend failures on Windows are byte-identical
with and without this branch.
Enabling Cloud Profiles for a Git backup produced nothing, and said it had
worked. Two independent faults, either one sufficient.
The collector looked for a "setting" list. The Bambu Cloud listing endpoint
is keyed by preset type instead, each key holding private and public arrays,
so the loop body never executed once — and the entries carry no type of
their own either, which routes/cloud.py already knew: it takes the type from
the outer key and maps Bambu's "print" to process. Two bugs on one line.
It also asked build_authenticated_cloud for the credential store used when
authentication is disabled. With auth on, tokens live on User rows, so the
collector returned at "Cloud not authenticated" before ever reaching the bad
key. Every multi-user install was collecting from zero accounts.
Neither failure surfaced. backup_metadata.json recorded the configured flag
rather than the outcome, so it claimed cloud_profiles: true on runs that
wrote nothing, and the log read "Collected cloud profiles: 0 filament, 0
printer, 0 process" at INFO — which is exactly what a successful backup of
an empty account looks like.
Cloud profiles now come from every connected account across both clouds. The
toggle predates Orca Cloud entirely, and Orca has the same three preset
types, so both are collected and grouped the same way:
cloud_profiles/bambu/user-3/{filament,printer,process}.json
cloud_profiles/orca/user-3/{filament,printer,process}.json
Accounts are keyed by Bambuddy user id, "global" when auth is off. Never by
email: a backup repository can be public, and the Bambu listing's user_id is
dropped for the same reason. Both credential stores are read on every run,
because a Settings row survives someone enabling auth later and dropping it
would silently stop backing that account up.
Bambu costs one get_setting_detail per private preset. The listing is
metadata only, and without base_id and setting the backup is a list of names
that create_setting cannot rebuild from. Public presets are skipped — Bambu's
bundled catalogue is the same hundreds of entries for everyone, always
re-downloadable, not recreatable under your account, and would rewrite the
repository on every run. Orca needs no second call; its sync-pull carries
each profile's content inline. Where the Orca route drops a profile whose
content.type it cannot map, the backup writes it to other.json instead:
silently omitting a profile because Orca added a type is the same class of
bug as this one.
Failures are contained per account and per preset, and counted rather than
swallowed. A partial backup that looks complete is how this stayed invisible.
The metadata now reports what was collected, per cloud and per account, and a
run that collects nothing while the category is enabled warns with the reason
instead of an INFO line that reads like success.
The checkbox gated on the viewer's own Bambu sign-in, which is not the same
question as whether there is anything to back up — with auth enabled the
accounts belong to individual users, and an administrator who never signed
in personally saw the category disabled with plenty in scope. It now gates
on the total across both clouds and shows the counts. That comes from its
own endpoint rather than a field on /config, since /config answers null
until the first save and would disable the toggle during the very setup it
belongs to. Counts only, never identities.
One deliberate restraint. _build_authenticated_service clears stored
credentials when a refresh is rejected, which is right for a route — the
user is on the page and can pair again — and wrong for a scheduled job.
Orca reports every rejection with one composite reason ("unknown, expired,
revoked, or already used"), so a genuine revocation cannot be told apart
from a lost token-rotation race, and acting destructively on a signal that
cannot be disambiguated is the #2562 mistake in a different cloud. It also
gains nothing: the Profiles route hits the same failure and clears it then,
with the user present. Background callers now pass clear_on_auth_failure=
False and skip the account. A successful refresh is still persisted either
way — by that point the old token is consumed, so dropping the new pair
would break a working pairing for real.
Restore is not part of this. Nothing reads cloud_profiles/* yet; the format
carries base_id/setting for Bambu and content for Orca so that it can.
While auditing real-world Bambuddy backup repos on GitHub I found
several left public. That's a serious leak: the settings backup only
filters bambu_cloud_token and auth_secret_key, so mqtt_username,
mqtt_password, ha_token, prometheus_token, bambu_cloud_email,
external_url, and the printer access codes (via K-profiles) were going
to whatever visibility the user picked.
Hard guard at every save and re-checked on every push:
- POST /github-backup/config and PATCH /github-backup/config (when URL,
token, or provider changes) run a connection test internally and
return 400 unless is_private comes back True.
- run_backup() re-checks before each scheduled or manual push, so a
repository that flipped from private to public gets a clear
"Backup aborted: the target repository is no longer private" failure.
Each provider's test_connection now returns is_private (GitHub /
Gitea / Forgejo read data.private, GitLab reads visibility=="private";
"internal" is treated as non-private). None means "couldn't determine"
and is also rejected -- safer to fail closed.
Frontend renders visibility inline on Test Connection: green check when
private, red warning panel listing every credential at risk when public,
yellow when unknown.
---
ui(github-backup): show save-failure messages inline on the card
The new "repository is not private" rejection message is ~250 characters
listing every credential the backup carries (MQTT password, HA token,
Prometheus token, Bambu Cloud email, printer access codes), which clips
badly in a toast.
Both the initial-setup save and the debounced autosave now stash the
backend's error message into a saveError state and render it as a red
inline banner above the test-result block, with whitespace-pre-wrap so
the full message stays readable. The banner clears on success, on the
next save attempt, and when the user starts editing URL / token / provider
-- the three fields whose changes invalidate the privacy check -- so it
doesn't linger after the user has already addressed the cause.
Short success toasts (Settings saved, Token updated, Backup enabled) are
unchanged.
GitHub backup can now optionally include spool inventory (with usage
history) and print archive metadata as JSON. Both toggles are off by
default. No binary files (gcode/3MF) are included.
New feature to automatically backup K-profiles, cloud profiles, and app
settings to a GitHub repository with scheduled or on-demand execution.
Features:
- Configure GitHub repo URL and Personal Access Token
- Schedule backups hourly, daily, or weekly (background scheduler)
- Manual backup trigger with real-time progress tracking
- Skip unchanged commits (only creates commit when data changes)
- Backup history log with status and commit links
- Requires Bambu Cloud login for full profile access
- New Settings → Backup & Restore tab consolidating all backup options
- GitHub backup config included in local backup/restore (except PAT)
Backend:
- New models: GitHubBackupConfig, GitHubBackupLog
- New service: GitHubBackupService with scheduler and GitHub API client
- New routes: /github-backup/* for config, status, logs, and triggers
- Updated settings.py to include github_backup in backup/restore
Frontend:
- New GitHubBackupSettings.tsx component with auto-save
- Updated SettingsPage with Backup tab and status indicator
- Added API types and methods to client.ts
Tests:
- Backend integration tests for all GitHub backup API endpoints
- Frontend API type and endpoint tests
jmoore-skild